[Sailor Steve]

Tuesday, June 24, 1919

PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

President Wilson’s House, Place des Etats-Unis, Paris, 11:15

Meeting of the Council of Five


1. Mr Lloyd George says he has received a long report from the British Admiralty regarding the sinking of the German ships at Scapa Flow. The case for the British Admiralty is that, at the time of the Armistice, the French the Orkneys and British naval representatives had pressed for the surrender of the German Fleet. Admiral Benson, however, had urged very strongly that surrender should not be demanded and that the Armistice should not be risked for this purpose. Marshal Foch had supported Admiral Benson very strongly. He had said that he did not wish to risk the lives of good soldiers for bad ships which had never fought a decisive battle. The Supreme War Council, consisting of the Prime Ministers and of Colonel House, had over-ruled the French and British Admiralties and unanimously agreed to ask only for the internment of the German ships and only for the surrender of certain submarines. It had been decided originally that the German ships to be interned should be interned in a neutral port. On further examination, it had been realized that this was impossible and the Allied Naval Council had chosen Scapa Flow as a suitable spot for the concentration of the German ships under surveillance. Then came the question of determining what kind of surveillance could be exercised. The British Admiralty had come to the conclusion that none but German crews could be put on board, as the removal of the German personnel would have been a breach of the Armistice. All that could be done was to exercise general surveillance over the fleet. He had seen the instructions issued by the British Admiralty. He quoted certain passages of those instructions. The latest report was that the Baden and Hindenburg had been saved or could be salvaged. There were, therefore, two capital ships available. He wished to add that Baron Makino had just informed him that the Japanese Admiralty did not consider the British Admiralty in any way to blame.

M Clemenceau then hands in the opinion of the French Admiralty.

Mr Lloyd George says that, as Admiral Hope had pointed out, if the original intention of interning the ships in a neutral port had been adhered to, it would not have been possible to place Allied crews on board.

President Wilson says that Admiral Benson, who had been present at the discussions at the Armistice time, had unfortunately gone home. His substitute at present is Admiral Knapp. At Mr Lloyd George’s request, he had obtained his opinion on the point.

Admiral Hope explains that the British Admiralty could not have demanded the complete removal of the German crews. This would have been equivalent to a surrender of the German ships. With any German personnel on board, it was impossible to safeguard the ships completely. Very large parties would have been required to take charge of every compartment in each ship and this could not have been done consistently with the retention of any German crews on board.

President Wilson says that he trusted Admiral Hope would not think he had expressed any opinion on the subject. All he had done was to furnish Admiral Knapp’s personal views in compliance with Mr Lloyd George’s request. The chief interest of the Council was to see what ought to be done. He thinks it is clear that the German Admiral could be held responsible and punished. It also seems clear that the German Government could be held responsible, but what profit could be derived from the responsibility of the German Government is not so clear. The object of the Allies cannot be to renew the war but to obtain some reparation, placing them in the same situation as if the fleet had not been sunk. He assumes that enough German ships remain to make the contemplated distribution, with the exception of the share due to the British Navy. This share being, of course, a very large one could not be furnished, but he thinks that there is perhaps enough to compensate the weaker navies.

Mr Lloyd George observes that there are two first class ships, one a battleship and one a battlecruiser.

M Clemenceau says that he wishes to make a few observations. First, as to the question of right. According to the legal advisers, Germany had violated the Armistice. On the previous day, the application of Article XXXI of the Armistice had been discussed. It seems clear to him that it does apply, and, in addressing the Germans, he thinks that advantage should be taken of that article. There is, further, an anticipated violation of the Peace Conditions and this must be taken into consideration. If this were all, the stories told by the German Admiral that he believed, on the strength of a newspaper, that the Armistice was over, might be alleged in defense of the act. This however, is merely an instance of German mendacity. There is further evidence of the deliberate intention of the Germans to violate not only the Armistice but the Conditions of Peace in anticipation. French flags which, under the Peace Terms, were to be restored had been burned in Berlin. This incident had been deeply felt in France both by Parliament and people. There was, moreover, a telegram seized by the Polish authorities to the effect that an insurrection was to be organised in Upper Silesia. The movement would be disavowed officially but aided unofficially in every possible manner. Von Haniel had warned the Conference that there would be an insurrection against the Polish clauses. There is a clause in the Treaty requiring the withdrawal of the German troops from Upper Silesia within 14 days after the ratification of the Treaty. It had been hard enough to get the Treaty signed, but this evidence shows that there will be even greater difficulty in obtaining its execution. He proposes, if there are no objections on the part of his colleagues, to have this intercepted telegram published in the Press to show the Germans we are awake to their intentions.

As to reparation, he is told that there might be enough ships to indemnify the French Navy. He can make no judgment on this. In regard to responsibility, he leaves the matter entirely in Mr Lloyd George’s hand, but he wishes to say that material reparation is not enough. He now formally makes a demand that reparation be exacted for the burning of the French flags, an act certainly done by order like the sinking of the ships. The question arises as to what form this reparation should take. He will not ask for money. Money can only be obtained at the expense of France and her Allies. He will take ships, if he can get them, but even that is not enough. He wishes, by a striking act, to show that the Allies do not mean to tolerate the conduct evidenced by the burning of the flags, the sinking of the ships and the plot against Poland. It must be remembered that it is difficult to bring aid to the Poles and the forts of Danzig will be able to repel a naval attack. It is quite evident that the Germans mean to violate the Treaty which they are to sign in two days. No one who was not deaf and blind to evidence can doubt it. He regrets that President Wilson is shortly to leave, but he recognizes the urgency of his business in America. The American flag, however, will remain side by side with those of the Allies. He desires that a military act be accomplished, showing the will of the Allies quite clearly not to submit to any fraudulent breach of the Treaty by Germany. He does not wish this act to precede the signing of the Treaty, and, for the present, all he will ask is that a note be sent referring to the incident at Scapa Flow and to the burning of the flags and stating that reparation for these acts will be required. The note should further state that the Allies are aware of what Germany is plotting in Silesia and that precautions will be taken to prevent the execution of the plot. He will not mention what reparation or what precautions would be taken. That is all he will say for the present, with the object of establishing the position of the Allies and their right to act. But he will state what he has in mind very clearly.

He thinks the Allies should take possession of Essen. M Loucheur, whom he has asked to come, informs him that Essen is still at the present time making armaments. It is the most powerful center of munition production in Germany. He has no intention of keeping Essen, but only of preventing supplies being made there to munition the attack on Poland. There can, in the nature of the case, be no military opposition to the operation. It will show the Germans quite clearly that their game js up. The Germans will yield and public opinion, which had supported the Allies throughout the war, will be satisfied. Failing this, there is a fear that the Germans will, one by one, get back every concession they had made. This will result in the necessity of remobilizing to engage in definite acts of war. He recognizes that it is necessary to act prudently for the time being, in order not to jeopardize the signature of the Peace, but it must be made clear to the enemy that Allied will would prevail.

President Wilson asks whether M Clemenceau would allow the discussion of this proposal to be deferred until the afternoon.

Mr Lloyd George joins in this request.

Mr Balfour asks if he understands M Clemenceau aright in thinking that his proposal is to write a letter at once or on the following day, regarding the sinking of the ships, the burning of the flags and the plot against Poland.

President Wilson asks whether M Clemenceau has corroborated the last.

M Clemenceau says that he will produce full evidence.

Mr Balfour, continuing, asks whether the letter would state that those acts violated the Armistice and therefore gave rise to a claim for reparation.

M Clemenceau observes that the case of the flags and of the ships go together and give rise to a claim for reparation. As regards Poland, a case will be made out. Reparation is not in question in regard to that.

Mr Balfour says that the proposal will be then to continue the arrangements for the signature of the Peace, whether the German answer to this letter comes before the signature or after. If he understands M Clemenceau’s intention, he would prefer it to come after. Then, if the answer is unsatisfactory, which in all probability would be the case, the Allies will have to take action, and the action proposed by M Clemenceau is to occupy Essen.

M Clemenceau says that Mr. Balfour had quite understood his policy. Of course, it will be necessary to hear Marshal Foch regarding the execution of the plan. He wishes to add that he has no intention of keeping Essen for any length of time and would, of course, give it up as soon as the Polish difficulty had been cleared up.