Quote:
Originally Posted by Fifi
Thanks, ok i see...
Other little question about US sub:
Playing with DUD on, i don’t see much of bad ones, and in 42 none of them.
I know they had some troubles like the German ones at start of war, but it was so quickly solved?
I’m not US side specialist  |
Quickly as in late 1942-1943.
Known issues during the war.
Running depth. (a.) Warheads were heavier than test heads. The wartime torpedo ran with a head down trim. The shore establishment eventually acknowledged a four foot error in running depths. Fleet tests in Australia found an 11 foot depth error. It was not until Aug'42 that a compromise of 10' was agreed and a trim repair kit was issued to the fleet later in that year.
Running depth. (b.) The depth sensor was designed for a slower running torpedo. The pressure gradient over the torpedo surface at higher speeds gave the wrong feedback. The sensor was later relocated to a neutral position.
The magnetic exploder was designed in the northern latitudes and did not work as well at the equator. The British and Germans had already disabled their magnetic exploders before the USN ordered theirs disabled 24June43. ComSubSWPac had participated in the development of the magnetic exploder, knew the principle was sound, and resisted disablement until Dec'43.
The conventional contact exploder was designed for the earlier, slower, 33 knot, Mk 13 torpedo. The newer, faster, 46 knot, Mk 14 torpedo had higher inertial impacts that would cause the cross-wise mounted firing pin to miss the exploder cap.
Circular runs
There were numerous reports of the Mark 14 running erratically and circling back on the firing boat. A circular run sank the submarine Tullibee, but it may not have been a Mark 14. Likewise, Sargo was almost sunk by a circular run, but the circular run happened because the gyro had not been installed. The subsequent Mark 18 torpedo was no better, sinking Tang. The surface launched Mark 15 torpedo had collars to prevent circular runs, but the Mark 14 was never given this feature.