Thread: [REL] FOTRS Ultimate Project
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Old 01-12-19, 12:10 PM   #7122
CapnScurvy
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History lesson #2

For those thinking "What's wrong with the AI"? "Why is the Japanese AI not doing things as I expect, 'cause in past games (SHIII; Stock SH4), they acted differently"?

It's due to my attempt in follow a more realistic, historical behavior of the Japanese. My source of information, the two U.S. Military studies of Japanese equipment and behavior......."Reports of the U.S. Naval Technical Mission To Japan (1945 – 1946)" and "US Strategic Bombing Survey – Pacific War". If these linked sites don't give you the documentation you're looking for, just do a search on the web using the titles above to find one that will.

Here are excerpts of the Strategic Bombing Survey's, War against Japanese Transportation volume:

Quote:
JAPANESE COUNTERMEASURES
The Japanese apparently went into the war without providing adequately for the vulnerability of their merchant marine to attack. In the early months of the war, merchant vessels were not armed, and no effective convoy system was in use. Until about March 1944 there were only about 25 vessels regularly assigned to convoy escort duty. An additional 40 subchasers too small for open water sailing were distributed among the various naval bases for local defense. Convoying was not regularly begun until 1943 and then only on the Singapore run. But escort was provided to some degree, at least in the southern area, early in the war. What few convoying ships there were were stepchildren of the Navy, wornout vessels that were no longer of use to the fleet. The great bulk of the ships went unescorted. Each naval base was responsible for the safety of ships passing through its area of operation and ship captains were required to check with the local Navy control office for information concerning the presence of Allied submarines. The only protection afforded, however, were such patrols as the local commander might feel inclined to make. Apparently for the purpose of mutual rescue, the plan of traveling in groups, even when unescorted, was adopted. The real, important and dire necessity of effective convoy of merchant ships did not become apparent to the Japanese until the first months of 1944. Then in rapid succession regular convoy routes were established to Saipan, Manila, Saigon, North Borneo, and Formosa. At the same time a large expansion in the convoy escort 2 fleet was begun and by the end of 1944 the number of vessels regularly assigned to such duty had increased to more than 150.
You guys got this?!? Their talking early 1944 before the Japanese even got to thinking about their maritime shipping. 25 escort vessels to cover the entire Pacific until March 1944, and you wonder where's the DD's???

Quote:
The effectiveness of this belated effort was low. The most glaring shortcoming was in technical equipment. Sound and electronic devices for detecting submarines were almost entirely absent in the beginning. Merchant vessels traveling alone during the first 2 years of the war were sitting ducks for any sort of attack; no deck guns or antiaircraft guns were provided. Ships' officers and crews were not trained or given any indoctrination in antisubmarine tactics, and all vessels were allowed to navigate between all ports independently according to the captain's discretion. No centralized system of disseminating information about submarines and other hazards existed.
"Why aren't the escorts coming after me"?

Unlike what the Stock game has done (or other mods for that matter)......The escorts didn't have the same capabilities as the Allied military had.

Quote:
When the arming of merchant vessels began early in 1943, the most ridiculous strategems were employed. Ships in the service of the Navy got top priority on naval guns, while the Army was frequently reported to be equipping its ships with field guns on wheels. Ships operated by the shipping control association received the least attention of all and were reported to have been driven to the installation of wooden guns to achieve at least the appearance of armament. Air cover for merchant convoys, when provided, was inadequate and poorly organized. No carrier escorts were ever provided, and poor liaison existed between land based air headquarters and convoys.
Ok, I've probably already made this post too long for some to bother to read. The bottom line, the Stock game and most of the mods for it do not reflect the true Pacific Theater Japanese behavior during the war. Ultimate has tried to do that.

The fact that more than half, 54.7 percent of the destruction to the Japanese merchant fleet, was attributable to submarines. That's over 5.3 million tons of the total 9.7 million tons of shipping lost by the Japanese. Do you think these kinds of numbers are attributed to the idea that the Japanese had an above average advantage in Anti Submarine Tactics?? They did not and the post war studies tell you why.
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The HMS Shannon vs. USS Chesapeake outside Boston Harbor June 1, 1813

USS Chesapeake Captain James Lawrence lay mortally wounded...
Quote:
.."tell the men to fire faster, fight 'till she sinks,..boys don't give up the ship!"

Last edited by CapnScurvy; 01-13-19 at 01:02 AM.
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