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ikalugin · 12-24-16, 06:27 AM

As many of you know by now Russian Armed Forces are going through a reform and rearmament process. This process began back in 2007 and was greatly accelerated by the war in South Osetia. The problems faced by the forces there were numerous - from the low readiness and poor comms to lack of proper ECM gear for combat aircraft. Hence why the Russian State decided to improve the Armed Forces.

While my review is not exhaustive - it is an overview after all, please do ask any specific questions.

The reform of the Russian Armed Forces historically can be split into several stages. That split is done by the changes made during those stages rather than by some sort of grand plan, created in advances.
Those stages are:

The initial stage. During it the Armed Forces structure was cut down, optimised in terms of officer core (we had too many colonels), the manpower was shifted to create full strength peace time units, capable of responding the challenges at all times via the shift from a divisional to BDE structure for example.
The second stage. The second stage occured after the change in the MoD leadership, where some of the new OOB structures were expanded back into divisions as the manpower and arms to do so became availiable. At the same time the optimisation of manpower usage continued, via the completing of munitions disposal programs and reduction in quantity of bases and thus release of personel from their security.
The third stage. This third stage occured after the Ukrainian crisis and was focused on building the capability for decisive military intervention in Ukraine or elsewhere, if need be. This lead to a massive explosion in terms of new formations. The manpower optimisation process was more or less completed in 2016 and released tens of thousands of servicemen to do more usefull duties.

Then there are rearmament programs, 2 of them - the 2007-2015 program (ГПВ2015 or GPV2015) and the 2011-2020 program (ГПВ2020 or GPV2015), with the 2011-2020 program being the larger one. Those programs were tasked with catching up in terms of rearmament after the slump of procurement in 1991-2007 time period. At the same time we began to hire more contract troops, with the ammount of contract soldiers and NCOs exceeding the ammout of conscripted soldiers and NCOs last year.

12-24-16, 06:27 AM	#2
ikalugin Ocean Warrior Join Date: Aug 2014 Location: Moscow, Russia Posts: 3,212 Downloads: 8 Uploads: 0	The overview of the Russian Armed Forces. As many of you know by now Russian Armed Forces are going through a reform and rearmament process. This process began back in 2007 and was greatly accelerated by the war in South Osetia. The problems faced by the forces there were numerous - from the low readiness and poor comms to lack of proper ECM gear for combat aircraft. Hence why the Russian State decided to improve the Armed Forces. While my review is not exhaustive - it is an overview after all, please do ask any specific questions. The reform of the Russian Armed Forces historically can be split into several stages. That split is done by the changes made during those stages rather than by some sort of grand plan, created in advances. Those stages are: The initial stage. During it the Armed Forces structure was cut down, optimised in terms of officer core (we had too many colonels), the manpower was shifted to create full strength peace time units, capable of responding the challenges at all times via the shift from a divisional to BDE structure for example. The second stage. The second stage occured after the change in the MoD leadership, where some of the new OOB structures were expanded back into divisions as the manpower and arms to do so became availiable. At the same time the optimisation of manpower usage continued, via the completing of munitions disposal programs and reduction in quantity of bases and thus release of personel from their security. The third stage. This third stage occured after the Ukrainian crisis and was focused on building the capability for decisive military intervention in Ukraine or elsewhere, if need be. This lead to a massive explosion in terms of new formations. The manpower optimisation process was more or less completed in 2016 and released tens of thousands of servicemen to do more usefull duties. Then there are rearmament programs, 2 of them - the 2007-2015 program (ГПВ2015 or GPV2015) and the 2011-2020 program (ГПВ2020 or GPV2015), with the 2011-2020 program being the larger one. Those programs were tasked with catching up in terms of rearmament after the slump of procurement in 1991-2007 time period. At the same time we began to hire more contract troops, with the ammount of contract soldiers and NCOs exceeding the ammout of conscripted soldiers and NCOs last year. __________________ Grumpy as always. Last edited by ikalugin; 12-24-16 at 06:56 AM.