Quote:
Originally Posted by Bubblehead1980
The Japanese had the advantage and had we not been so lucky, likely the US would not have scored the big victory, or could have even lost.I often wonder what would have happened had japanese had all four or even 3 carriers to attack once they realized carriers were in the area and armed their planes.Sink the Yorktown then go after Enterprise and Hornet, likely one of them would have been lost, maybe two.We were so close to defeat at that point in the war.
Point I am making while the Admirals showed plenty of sound planning, the aircrews were as brave as any could be, a lot of it was just sheer luck, good luck for US, bad for the japanese.
|
I tend to be of the opinion that luck was heavily minimized by the US prior to Midway. Outstanding US intelligence was no accident. Putting the whole of US carrier strength on location was no accident. Having the
Yorktown repaired and operational in 24 hours was no accident. Having extra search assets at Midway was no accident.
That Japan multi-tasked their carriers to simultaneously attempt to accomplish three missions at once was not due to luck. It was standard bad operational planning for Japan once all the set piece battles had been won in the first six months of the war. Japan failing to grasp the implications of enhanced US search assets all along the string of islands that link the Hawaiian Islands to Midway was no accident. Japan failing to grasp the odd coincidence that American surface vessels just happened to be in their strategic recon lagoon at French Frigate Shoals the right moment, along with all the other obviously weird going-ons on in the Central Pacific was no accident. The latter two were the result of poor pre-war Japanese commitment to intel and their inability to commit resources to (indicative of their contempt for) strategic intelligence. During the battle, the reckless Japanese decision to stubbornly continue fighting with just the
Hiryu alone was also not luck. Just indicative of a poorly thought out naval philosophy that put too much stock into the offensive for the offensive's sake.
Midway turned out as it did because the Japanese were lax, poorly informed, and poorly prepared, and because the USN was well prepared, well informed, and ready to seize the opportunity that was stupidly handed out by Japan. The only "miracle" at Midway was that the Japanese did not lose more than they actually lost when all the shooting stopped. Luck was a factor, but certainly Nimitz did a great deal to stack odds in his favor.