[Skybird]

Techncial modenrization and chnaging training paradigms have been accompanied by two major changes in Russian doctrine. After 1989, the first such reform focussed on the possibility to fight against upraises and rebellions, or civil wars inside Russia and Russian allied states, and the threat by NATO, while not being ignored, became somewhat a second priority only. But some years ago, 5 years or so, that doctrine again changed and led to a u-turn in cutting the defence budgets, and again focussing on the West as a pssible and most likely opponent for a military confrontation, since then Russia's defence spending aim at rising every year again. The forces have been restructured and shrinked, their general mobility was increased, and as Oberon said, more attention was paid to shrink the technology gap to especially the US forces.

I take it for granted that lessons from the Georgian war and the Chechnya campaigns have also been learned.

The US mean while has given up the offiocial claim that it is capable to wage two mahjor wars on the globe simulatenously, and forces in Western Europe have been redcued tremedously in size, esoecially tabk fleets. Some states have given up their heavy tank units completely, or at least considered to dissolve them and to replace them with lighter, more mobile formations using more modular platforms (Netherlands gave up their Leopards, Canada considered to give up all its MBTs, but did not do then, when the Strykers did not show to be too good replacements). Size of air forces and naval fleets also shrunk.

Since some years, some states boost their defence spendings again, but Germany still cuts its forces. For many reaosns not to be deabtes here, the German army and forces in generla are in a pitiful state, and the moral is constantly hitting new lows. I knew two professional officers whom were friends of mine back then and who have quit service in frustration already years ago, saying the political signals and the general trend indicated to them that it is hopeless to expect that any administration would try to swing around the rudder in the forseeable future. Luckily, both men could afford that step. Since then, there have been more scandals, and the general mood has not really improved. Quite the opposite. Also, needed recruiting goals after the draft had been suspended, cannot be met, and many professionals with experience and specialised training, quit early now.

To what degree Russia is able to go to wear with the Europeans, I do not judge, but I would claim that Europe has not really maintained its ability to stand such a war with Russia either. It has always been my thinking that technological superiority can compensate numerical inferiority only to a certain point, but not beyond.

One thing only is relatively certain: both sides probably have not the long breath to wage a major war of that dimension over a longer period of time.

Also, the Russians would not be the Russians if they would not get underestimated a little bit, and would not have the one or the other little technical surprise in their backhand.

That the Russians could start a campaign against Scandinavia, I currently spend no serious thought on. Extremely unlikely scenario, extremely unlikely.