Quote:
Originally Posted by Leandros
Over London, no - over the Channel, yes.
Supremacy was never asked for - local and timely superiority was. Luckily, Hitler did not understand the important differences of these parameters.
The Luftwaffe orders in case of a Seelöwe was a reversal to the tactics used before Sept. 7th.
Royal Navy losses to Luftwaffe action up till the summer of 1940 was so severe (considered the Royal Navy leadership) that they went to the extreme precaution of banning all daylight operations in the Channel after the Kanalkampf in July and August as the RAF could not give proper protection.
Fred
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Without an invasion there were good reasons to minimize warships losses in the Channel if that could be done. With an invasion everything that floats or flies would be thrown at it, losses be damned. The Kriegsmarine was in shambles so the Luftwaffe would have to carry the burden of dealing with both the RAF and the Home fleet pressing forward no matter how many ships they lost.And the bridgeheads might need support in the meantime too.
The Luftwaffe torpedo bomber force in 1940 was a rather pathetic affair, to the point that italian assistance was eventually required, and if I have understood correctly not much in the way of proper AP bombs were in the inventory until late 1940, which should be an hint of how much anti-shipping was taken seriously (not much). Sinking destroyers hampered by carrying out rescue ops or scoring own goals like Z1 is one thing, wiping out (and given the stakes, nothing less will do) large naval formations determined to push throught quite an other. German amphibious transport capability was already insufficient, losses would have crippling effects.