[paulhager]

U.S.S PICUDA (SS 382)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CONFIDENTIAL November 07, 1944

From: The Commanding Officer
To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet

Subject: U.S.S. PICUDA (SS 382), Report of War Patrol #6.

Enclosures: pictures and charts, covering sixth war patrol.

Bernard H. Schwartz

(A) Prologue

Several promotions and transfers among the crew. No new equipment/weapon systems installed. Gaskets on all outer torpedo doors replaced. Old motor on the SJ radar antenna was replaced. Offered the opportunity to test the Mark 27 “Cutie” torpedo. Seemed too small (too “cute”), both in terms of size and warhead charge, to be of any real utility. Chose not to accept the offer.

Received classified briefing and sealed orders to be locked in the Captain’s safe. We were to leave Saipan, head North of the island and then proceed at 12 knots on course 280. On D+1 we were to open the sealed orders.

Torpedo loadout: 8 Mark 18 – stern; 8 Mark 14, 8 Mark 18 – bow.

(Unless otherwise indicated, all times below are GMT.)

(B) Narrative

01 OCT
Left Saipan at 1400, 1 October.

02 OCT
The sealed orders were opened.

“SS-382 is to proceed at 12 knots to Op Area ‘Maru Morgue’ and patrol within a 50 nm radius of point ABLAZE (refer to chart). Duration of the patrol is to be no less than 120 hours. You are to report any contact with IJN Fleet units and engage at your discretion. If no contact, proceed to Sibuyan Sea at best speed to arrive no later than 22 October 0800 GMT. Under no circumstances are Japanese merchant ships to be attacked as they might betray your position. If no enemy contact has been made by 26 October 0100 GMT, report to ComSubPac for further orders.”

03 OCT – 06 OCT
In transit to PZ. Arrive late on 6 October.

07 OCT – 09 OCT
Patrolling

11 OCT
Weather: clear, brisk winds, some chop.

At 0550 detected large task force moving fast: Speed 16 KTS, Course 30°T – range 37500 yards. There appeared to be 5 columns with a circular array of escorts surrounding them. Position was favorable for an attack on the center column – with the sea state, hiding under a thermal until the screen passed and then rising to periscope depth for a quick attack seemed the best plan.

While racing to get into position the radar detector sounded. We gave it a few minutes and then dived the boat. We found a thermal at 200, continued to 210 and went silent.

We waited for the escorts to pass overhead but instead, passive sonar indicated that the task force was turning away. We’d have to surface and go after it. We went to periscope depth to ascertain the new course. Upon raising scope, the first ship to appear was an Atlanta Class CL at 3000 yards – it was Halsey and the carriers! What were they doing up here?

We surfaced and saw one of the new Iowa BB’s at 5000 yards.


The TF completed its turn and headed off to the SE.

It was frightening to contemplate what might have happened had there been heavy rain and fog. We would almost certainly have tried to attack by a combination of radar and sonar. As the Japanese Empire shrinks and the Pacific becomes an American lake, the likelihood of meeting friendlies increases. It means we can no longer assume that ships encountered in Japanese territory are hostile.

Completed the 120 hours and set course for the Sibuyan Sea by way of the Luzon Strait, speed 12 knots.

12 OCT
At 1905 detected TF, range 33000 yards: Position 22° 28’ N 122° 56’ E; Speed 16 KTS; Course 135°T. TF had three columns in the center of a circular arrangement of escorts. The TF was not spread out so an attack from outside the screen, if conducted with Mark 14’s, was feasible. Seas were moderate, with a light mist. A waning crescent Moon had just risen. Decent conditions for a surface attack.

At 1924, a second TF SW of the 1st appeared. Meanwhile, our target TF seemed to be in the midst of a major reshuffling. One ship didn’t seem to be participating, so we began tracking it.

At 1938 the radar warning sounded – we were being painted. We went to decks awash to reduce our cross section. Fortunately, we were very close to our attack position.

The closest escort would pass within 2000 yards. We planned on firing before then, which would give us time to dive for a thermal – escaping on the surface seemed decidedly problematic. The main target came into visual range – we had a good solution. We prepared to fire 3 Mark 14’s when we finally got a good look at the target silhouette.

It was an Iowa Class BB! Again! We were a half minute away from hitting her with three torpedoes.

We sent a blinker message to the near DD – must have given her captain a fright. After an exchange of recognition signals, we surfaced and returned to our course.

12 OCT – 16 OCT
In transit to Sibuyan Sea.

On the 13th clouds rolled in and the sky darkened but the storm passed us by.

Arrived entrance of Sibuyan Sea on the 16th.


17 OCT – 22 OCT
Patrolling.

23 OCT
Received Flash message that large enemy TF spotted and engaged in Palawan passage by Dace and Darter. Based upon this report, the TF could be headed in our direction. We terminated the patrol and raced at flank speed to an optimal ambush point: the Western entrance to the Tablas Strait.

At 2130, a large force was detected North of Semirara Island and SW of Liwagao Island: Position 12° 09’ N 121° 18’ E; Speed 22 KTS, Course 95°T. The TF was arranged in 2 columns and surrounded by escorts. As the TF passed Semirara, it began to turn for its run through the strait, coming to course 53°T.

We had good position so only a slight adjustment was needed. At the current speed of the TF, we should engage just after sunrise.

The TF zigged: Speed 22 KTS, Course 35°T. We adjusted again, setting up for a bow shot. As we did so the radar warning sounded. We went to decks awash.

Attack #1
As the TF passed through the narrow passage between the two islands, several escorts on the starboard side fell back. This was ideal because we were now set up 1400 yards to the starboard off the track of said column. All that was required was to avoid a couple of escorts and then we should be able to set up the attack unmolested. Accordingly, we dived the boat, hoping for a shallow thermal. We found it at 165 feet.

The hydrophone operator tracked the flank escort – the one that would pass close behind us. When he lost it, we began a slow rise – we crossed the thermal just as the escort reappeared from our baffles. At 80 feet we opened tube doors 1 through 6.

Weather was clear but there was heavy wave action – when we popped the scope only an intermittent view was possible. However, a quick scan of the near column showed several CAs, followed by a Kongo BB. Bringing up the rear was a big boy – a very big boy: a Yamato Class BB. In fact both Yamatos were present in the TF – the sister ship was bringing up the rear in the port column.

The Yamato (or Musashi – they look identical) would be our target. Tubes 4 through 6 were loaded with Mark 18’s. They were set for magnetic, depth 37. The three Mark 14’s in tubes 1 through 3 were set for 30 feet, impact, and high speed. The 3 Mark 18’s would be fired first, then the 14’s. Six torpedoes probably wouldn’t be enough for a big boy like this so we also readied the 4 stern tubes – depth 30 – and opened the outer doors. Thanks to our PK, we could fire the two salvos from the bow while executing a hard turn to port. This would bring our stern tubes to bear just in time – we hoped – to fire them at the target as well.

After our final update to the TDC, we commenced the hard turn. The 3 Mark 18’s were fired a few seconds later with a fairly wide pattern: midships, bow, then stern. The Mark 14’s are nearly 60% faster so we delayed firing them accordingly. All torpedoes away, we continued the turn. Then the Mark 18’s hit – one, two, three – with the 14’s right behind.

http://imageshack.us/a/img408/9849/194410232235z.jpg

http://imageshack.us/a/img109/1456/194410232236z0.jpg

Six hits! But we weren’t done. The OOD was on the observation scope – two DD’s were approaching. Meanwhile, our target was making a port turn and slowing, there were only a few seconds to set up the shot. Guesstimated the speed as 11 knots and the course as 40°T, then fired a very wide spread from the stern tubes. There was no time to watch the attack play out – we crash dived, releasing decoys at 100 feet.

Torpedo 1 missed. Torpedo 2 hit, as did number 3. Number 4 was a miss. We crossed the thermal and went to silent running, allowing momentum to carry us deeper. We leveled off at 420 feet. There were no depth charges. Even the decoy didn’t seem to generate any interest.

We continued the port turn in a leisurely fashion. The hydrophone operator reported on the fast screws of the escorts milling around above us. He proffered another report: a warship some distance off was emitting a strange rattling noise that sounded like a propeller shaft out of balance. Our target?

The escorts seemed to tire of the search and hightailed it off toward the TF. Normally, the enemy leaves one or two escorts to conduct sprint drift searches close to the suspected location of a sub but the hydrophone operator said that he could account for all of the escorts and they had all left. He also said the target emitting the rattling noise was still out there, moving slow.




We gave it a half hour and went to periscope depth – making several quick 360’s. Nothing. Next, radar depth. The nearest targets were bearing 300, long range. At 2312 we surfaced and began torpedo reload. The radar showed a large pip at 13400 and a smaller one at 14000. The large one was traveling at 9 knots, 35°T – the smaller one appeared to be accelerating away, leaving the slower one to itself. Curious.

We continued to track the near target. It had slowed to 6 knots by 2337. By 2345 it was moving at 4 knots, 0°T.

24 OCT
Attack #1 (continued)
At 0003, the “Big Boy” – as the crew called the battleship – was scanning us with his targeting radars. We hoped we were too small a target for the big guns.

We closed to visual range as we passed – the pagoda tower visible through the haze. The guns didn’t fire but BB juked away from us. We continued running due North.

Assuming that BB was trying to keep up with the TF, when we reached a position between it and the last known position of the TF – which had now disappeared from our screen – we submerged and doubled back.

By 0107 we were getting in position for a bow shot.




As BB closed, it suddenly made a starboard course change. It was easier to just target it with the stern tubes – all four. Final range was 600 yards when we fired. The first torpedo struck under number 2 turret.




Three more slammed into BB but it seemed to shake them off. Unbelievable! We began a starboard turn to bring the bow tubes to bear when a large fireball erupted from the number 3 turret, followed almost immediately by an audible boom. It had to be the magazine exploding.




More explosions rocked BB – in less than a minute, it was settling into the deep water of the Tablas Strait.

During the terminal phase of the attack, the SD had picked up an aircraft at long range but then it had disappeared. Since all was clear we surfaced. In a matter of seconds, bombs were bursting around us – we crash dived. The wave action must have interfered with the antenna – that’s the only explanation for how the aircraft was able to get so close. Once inside (CLASSIFIED) range, the SD can no longer detect aircraft above (CLASSIFIED) altitude. If the SD antenna was inoperative for a few sweeps that could explain what happened.

We remained submerged for a half hour and then returned to periscope depth. The SD was functioning properly because it detected the same, or another, aircraft patrolling. We followed it for another 15 minutes until it disappeared to the NW. We surfaced and headed North at 3 engine speed, while radioing ComSubPac with our report. We were given a new PZ in the Formosa Strait.

Attack #2
Just before sunset, we sailed North of Verde Island and into the Western passage. Radar began picking up two ships approaching. Presently, one of them began scanning us with radar so we submerged. As the Sun set, a ***a CL and escort hove into view.




It was a worthy target, to which we allocated 3 of our remaining 10 torpedoes: the Mark 14’s in tubes 1 through 3. All 3 hit.




Unlike the escorts for the TF, which left the BB to its fate, this escort hung around and listened. We had to crawl away on our electrics. Fortunately, the escort did not have radar so we were able to surface in due course and escape under cloak of darkness.

Attack #3
At 2000, a single appeared. After more than 3 weeks with no action the past 24 hours had seen a lot.

Our target proved to be a merchant – we targeted it with the two remaining Mark 14’s.




We resumed course for our PZ – now down to 5 torpedoes.

25 OCT
Traveling to PZ.

26 OCT
Reached patrol zone.

Attack #4
Just before sunrise, a single was detected. As the Sun rose, we attacked it with 2 torpedoes, both of which hit.




We had expended 21 torpedoes and sunk 2 cargo ships and two warships for an estimated 77,375 tons!

27 OCT
Attack #5
The night of the 27th, visibility was marginal when radar spotted a convoy headed South toward our position: Speed 8 KTS, Course 196°T. It was composed of 12 merchants in 3 columns with 3 escorts. With only 3 torpedoes left, we’d go for the biggest target.

We obtained a good radar solution on the lead ship in the center column. As we closed in, the radar detector sounded, so we made the final approach decks awash, getting into position 2400 yards off the center column. As the convoy approached we went to radar depth and continued tracking.

When the lead escort passed, we got a reasonably good visual on that lead center ship – it was a Ryuun Maru. We allocated all our remaining torpedoes. We fired and turned away. All torpedoes missed. Not sure how we could have missed at that range. Possibly the last stadimeter check was on an adjoining ship – it was dark enough for that to have happened.

Even though we were out of torpedoes, we still had three more days to patrol. Only then could we go home.

28 OCT
Patrolling.

29 OCT
Attack #6
Though bereft of torpedoes, when a solitary merchant came within radar range, we chose to engage it with the 5”. We submerged to allow it to come within range and then surfaced. From ordering surface until the first shot was fired took 2 minutes and it was a hit! Range was 5200 yards – it was an incredible shot. Many of the subsequent shots were misses but the gunners got a creditable number of hits when we were within 4000 yards. On the down side it took about half our ammo to get the kill. The up side – the merchant was never able to fire a single round in our direction.



Attack #7
This would prove to be our last attack of the patrol. Unlike the previous attack, this one took place at night so we were able to approach on the surface. We got closer before we opened fire – around 4000 yards. Even though it was night, with lower visibility, the hit percentage was higher, possibly because the early hits started a fire among containers stacked on the foredeck. As we closed in to 3200 yards, the target began returning fire from guns mounted fore and aft. We threw it into reverse – all back full – and continued firing. A shell splashed no more than 20’ in front of the boat! Eventually, the rate of fire from the target fell off. When the ship began launching life boats we ceased fire. A final explosion wracked the vessel. She broke in two and sank.



30 OCT – 5 NOV
We notified ComSubPac when we reached the end of our time on station and were ordered to return to a new base at Guam.

The trip home was uneventful – arrived at Guam 5 November.

(C) Fuel Consumed
77%.

(D) Weather
Normal for the area(s).

(E) Torpedoes Expended
24 (16 Mark 18, 8 Mark 14) – 6 ships (4 cargo, 2 warships), estimated tonnage 87,599.

(F) References
See Patrol 5
See Patrol 7