[TorpX]

U-boats may not have won the war for Germany, but it is hard to see how they would have been better off without them. (Unless, you avoid war with UK entirely.) The problem for Germany, as I see it, is that their ambitions simply exceeded the resources they had available. But, if their objectives had been scaled back, different strategies would have been possible.

A more rational plan for Germany would have been to prosecute an air/sea war against UK. Use U-boats, but do not go into US waters. Do not declare war against US, even if Japan's feelings are hurt. Be friendly to the USSR, even if you want to kill them; one war at a time. FDR wanted to help UK, but that doesn't mean people in the US were eager to send troops to europe; a shadow war on the high seas was a real possibility here. At the very least war with US might have been delayed for months or years. Such a strategy would have, at least, given Germany a chance of success.

General points to think about:

In 1938, when Germany was putting the finishing touches on their plans (at least they should have been), nobody knew that Japan would bomb Pearl Harbor.

The effectiveness/ineffectiveness of the U-boat was a matter of speculation. This was also true of the asw elements. The RN thought their ASDIC was much better than it was shown to be. The KM could not be sure of the U-boats abilities in the forthcomming war, but there was reason to be optimistic. More U-boats could have been built at a fraction of the cost of the big capitol ships, and would likely contribute more in a war with UK. Trying to match battleships with the UK and US was a losing proposition. Donetz had no way of knowing the Allies would have RADAR in ships and even worse, planes in the near future.

It is all good and well to make light of the 1 or 2 % of allied ships sunk in the whole war, but in '40, '41 and '42, it was no laughing matter. Allied loses overall may have been low, but during the crisis period, the losses were alarming.

A few quotes from THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC:

The charts demonstrated that before the war total imports of food and raw materials, excluding oil, were close to 60 million tons. By the end of 1940 they had fallen to 45.4 million tons and in the following year to just 30.5 million tons.

The grim figures pouring into the Statistical Branch's spartan offices suggested that nearly 4 million tons of shipping had been lost to the enemy in 1940. British and Canadian shipyards were quite incapable of keeping pace with this rate of loss.....