[Torplexed]

In retrospect it's hardly surprising that things worked out as they did. Peacetime service requirements emphasizing drill and discipline did not necessarily select leaders best suited for the exacting conditions of real submarine warfare when lone COs could rationalize the need to withdraw, unhindered by the presence of higher brass who had their own periscope view of the situation. Not only did USN submariner training exaggerate caution, it also failed to instil the tenacity required simply to patrol for any length of time under war conditions. One CO returning from his failed attempt to penetrate the Gulf of Lingayen reported that his crew had been aboard under trying conditions since December 8th, "and an opportunity to rest and relax in the sunshine is rapidly becoming imperative for the maintenance of good health, morale and efficiency." His was a boat with air-conditioning, refrigerated food, separate messrooms and washing facilities and two bunk cabins called staterooms for officers and petty officers. Imagine him in command of a U-Boat!

Only actual combat can weed the passive commanders out, and in all navies the aces were a select group. It does appear however that US training and promotion methods, together with lack of previous submarine battle experience, and perhaps the American outlook on life, combined at the start of the war to cause a higher proportion of unsatisfactory submarine COs than were found in other major navies. But torpedo failure can't be omitted from the equation. Repeated misses and misfires were bound to lower morale, as they had among Donitz's U-boat COs in 1940.