Quote:
Originally Posted by Bilge_Rat
yes, great book, I just started re-reading it now. The introduction is a bit excessive compared to the book itself.
The U.S. sub service did start the war saddled with unworkable tactics, but that was sorted out pretty quickly as skippers came back from patrol and shared what worked.
It was the same issue with the Mk XIV. Officially, the magnetic exploder was in use until summer 43. Unofficially and reading between the lines, you see that skippers were sharing a lot of info "off the record". Many skippers were setting their torps shallower/turning off the magnetic exploder and not recording it in their patrol log.
The skipper problem was a issue, since it generally took a few patrols until you could figure out if there was a problem, but the sub service was always careful in the choice of their skippers. Mush Morton and Dick O'Kane were exceptions.
|
The 'unworkable tactics' combined with the 'skipper problem' probably caused the poor showing in unsuccessful patrols more than the faulty Mk-14 torpedoes. Early skippers were chosen for being careful more than ones that were more aggressive. Safety of boat and crew counted higher than tonnage sunk. Also, the mission of the subs changed so fast that the 'big wigs' couldn't comprehend what was really needed to accomplish the mission. For safety, skippers were ordered NOT to sail on the surface during daylight hours when in enemy waters. Since the entire Pacific Ocean west of Hawaii was considered 'enemy waters', that would really slow the boat down just getting 'on station' for a patrol.
Unfortunatly for the skippers, if they followed orders and had a nice 'safe' patrol, they would be transferred to a desk or destroyer as 'not being aggressive' enough. "
Catch-22"