Quote:
Originally Posted by TorpX
I will agree with this up to a point, but there was a long series of failures by the USN in this matter. We know comprehensive testing was possible, since it was eventually done. Lack of funds was perhaps a valid excuse in the '30's, but not in the era when the Navy was in the midst of an ambitious submarine building program. That excuses were still being made for not doing meaningful tests, after we were at war, is almost beyond belief.
|
I think you are being a bit harsh
Remember that after the attack on Cavite , the US Navy lost a good number of torpedoes. About half in the PTO If my poor memory serves. This meant that there was a critical shortage of torpedoes in the early years of the war.
There was a choice. Fight with the weapons you have, or keep the subs berthed. During wartime the latter is not a popular decision.
There was not a lot of money or spare torpedoes for testing, even during the war. Sure with 70 years of hindsight the decision is self-evident. But when evaluating historical decisions, it is important to only evaluate them with the data that was available to the decision makers at that time.
The Mk 14 had checked out satisfactory in testing. That is a documented fact. However, as found out
later, the testing process was flawed. But at the time no one knew about it.
The Mk6 exploder also checked out satisfactory in testing. But as discovered
later, the testing was not a rigorous or as extensive as was needed. But no one knew that at the time.
It is very hard to diagnose errors in a system of systems when there may be multiple things wrong with it. Also, the shooting skill of early sub captains was rightfully suspect in the early years of the war.
Early war patrol reports showed that torpedoes simply missed. Who knows of those missed torpedoes ran deep, or had a faulty pistol?
Rockin Robins and others can tell us more than we ever wanted to know about how much the captains did NOT know about their targets or how to hit them.
Given only the information available at the time, and not having the advantage of 70 years of after action research, the Navy did not do all that bad. Were there political influences concerning torpedo development. Oh boy yes (Check out the book, Hellions of the deep). Where there bureaucratic fighting between BuOrd and ops. Double oh boy yes.
But there were no traitors involved, not even Capt English. Every one involved was making the best decision
based on the limited data they had access to.
That is the tricky part about historical research. It is so important to segregate any and all knowledge that the people you are studying did not have. This is party of my professional job and it is tough. We lose a lot of analysts who can't segregate.
Wrong decisions were made. That is undeniable. But they are also, at the same time understandable.