Randomizer

Had not perused the naval chapters of the Pacific USSBS before, thanks. Relevant entries include Nav #'s 11, 37, 45, 56 and 57.

Couple of things to note, the presence of senior officers (a RAdm) as convoy escort Group Commander since most Allied escort group commanders (as opposed to Hunter-Killer Group Commanders) were generally far more junior. As the war progressed they probably had more admirals than they could effectively employ. By nature these officers would tend to be doctrinally set in their ways and less able to cope with command problems that likely were outside their previous service experience.

Also the conversion of at least one naval ASW squadron to a Special Attack (Kamikaze) role in the summer of 1944, something that reinforces my observation re placing service interests over national interests.

Edit
@ Schwartzritter.

The problem was that Mahan's theories of sea power ceased to be relevant any time after 1905 and can be said to have been to all intents and purposes dead after the Falkland's battle, 8 December 1914 and almost 30-years to the day before Pearl Harbor. He dragged several generations of willing naval officers and more than a few partisan politicians down the wrong strategic path. Those officers that realized that Mahan had feet of clay frequently went into submarines and naval aviation during the inter-war period and they were the largely ones who rose to senior command in the crucible of naval warfare from 1939-45. Except in Japan, where even the revered Yamamoto remained an unreconstructed Mahaniac until the day he died and his replacements were doctrinally even more conservative.