Quote:
Originally Posted by Aviv
Why did air attack cause such a problem to submarine crews?
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The answer is fairly rudimentary. Aircraft could attack a submarine at any time without fear of effective* retaliation. While anti-aircraft guns could and did shoot down aircraft, the threat of bombs, torpedoes or depth charges often compelled subs to dive, suppressing the submarine. Since the snorkel did not become available until near the end of the war for the Germans, (The U.S. copied snorkels after the war ended, but had no equivalent) aircraft directly interfered with the battery recharge and air exchange cycle needed for old diesel-electric subs. Even if a plane could not take out a sub or a u-boat, it could force a dive and limit its range.
The greatest difference between theaters is the
evolution of air-based ASW. While I won't repeat what has already been said about radar, tactics evolved in the Atlantic that eventually led to the end of U-Boat effectiveness. Britain saw that 1-on-1 with a lone U-Boat was risky because of the flak gun and pilots began tag-teaming U-Boats. One plane annoyed the flak gunner while the other performed a bombing run. Unless the U-Boat was one of the uncommon models with multiple flak guns (excluding the specialized flak boats, which failed miserably), the flak gunner obviously could not shoot at both at once. If he turned to shoot the other plane, the former decoy would make the attack run. Another tactical evolution involved steep divebombing out of the sun. By the time the plane could be heard, let alone seen, it was too late. Later in the war, pilots would annoy U-Boats outside the maximum range of the flak gun and wait for reinforcements to show up to gang up on and sink the sub. The U-Boat's greatest strengths, torpedoes and underwater stealth, were useless against aircraft. All a U-Boat could do was hide, if it was able.
Another reason for this overwhelming superiority was Britain's prioritization of ASW strategy and tactics. Conversely, in Imperial Japan, the American submarine threat wan't taken seriously until the damage was already done and, in effect, too late. Imperial Japanese naval strategy prioritized surface ship combat, in accordance with doctrine established by Alfred Thayer Mahan. Likewise, this same adherence to doctrine is what made it difficult for the IJN to accept airplanes and carrier combat despite its success. In regards to ASW, Japan just didn't care until it saw the American sub fleet decimate its merchant marine. On occasion, planes would locate or annoy an American sub, but there was never any strategic or tactical doctrine regarding engaging American subs.
As the relative distances involved in both theaters was already discussed, I won't repeat that factor, either.
In short, aircraft could operate against submarines with relative impunity, with the right amount of tactics and equipment. England realized this relatively early in the war due to necessity and resource focus while Japan really did not care until it was too late to levy any real resistance.
*The term "effective" is used because of the advantages of the airplane, attacking from its medium over a submarine operating within its respective medium.