"The defects existed mainly in the Mark VI magnetic exploder which was developed under extreme secrecy just prior to the war. It was so secret that the operating submarine force was kept largely unaware of its existence. The device was tested by the experts at Newport under carefully controlled conditions instead of firings from operating submarines, and as a result it was not discovered that the exploder would only work if it passed close to the bottom of the target. When installed on torpedoes in the war zone, the exploders failed to detonate, but the operating forces were forbidden to disassemble them to look for the problem or even to conduct firing tests. The torpedo specialists refused to believe reports that something was seriously wrong with the weapons until the problem grew into a major scandal. It was ultimately discovered that the magnetic exploder, the torpedo depth control mechanisms and the contact exploder were all defective."
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The Problems
The depth control mechanism worked just fine on the Mk 13 which ran at thirty three knots. The technicians simply stuck the same mechanism on the Mk 14 when it came along. No one considered the fact that the Mk 14 would run at 46 knots at high speed. Certainly, no one thought that the difference between hydrostatic pressure and hydrodynamic pressure increases exponentially as the speed of the torpedo increases. The difference between calibration depth and real depth was twice as great at 46 knots as at 33 knots. The boys at Newport thought that heavier war heads might be the cause and suggested a three foot difference. As it turned out the submariners in the field were right. The actual depth difference was somewhere between ten and eleven feet. This meant the fish were running much deeper than what was being set on the spindles.
The magnetic exploder didn't work because the experts in Newport were at sixty degrees latitude and the boats in the southwest Pacific were operating around the equator. The difference in the horizontal component of the magnetic perturbation at the equator is effectively less than half that at Newport.
When the deeper running fish passed under the keel of a ferrous metal ship near the equator the signal simply wasn't strong enough to actuate the thyratron.
The contact exploder was crushed on impact before it could function when the strike angle was near perpendicular. The casing was flimsy and the parts not substantial enough to withstand the punch. The fast Mk 14 torpedo had a higher inertial impact that caused the firing pin to miss the exploder gap. In a typical MOT, aft, fwd spread the MOT shot was least likely to explode.
Any of these problems could have been solved were they to have been presented in singles. Submarine torpedomen scratched their heads over problems that went far beyond their ability to make a poorly designed exploder work.
The Macro Problems
Newport had its eye on economics during the years of exploder development. It used recoverable torpedoes and minimized testing.
Newport kept the exploder super secret. This kept any potential problems hidden from view until it was too late.
No facility other than Newport had any authority in torpedo development.
Simultaneous problems tend to cover each other so that an outside source for the problem is sought, in this case, the commanding officers of operating submarines."
ha-ha!
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