[TLAM Strike]

H.M.S. Spartan and H.M.S. Splendid Operations.
6
The Spartan and the Splendid sailed for the
South Atlantic on 1 April and arrived ten days later. To enforce the Maritime Exclusion Zone the
11 Spartan patrolled near Port Stanley to watch for reinforcements. In the period from 12 April to 30 April
on four consecutive days, she observed the Argentine Landing Ship, Tank AR.A Cabo San Antonio
conducting mine laying operations. The Splendid was assigned to patrol between the coast of
Argentina and the Falkland Islands.
When the naval task force arrived, the Spartan and Splendid moved to new patrol areas; to the
northeast and northwest of the Falkland Islands, respectively. On 29 April the Spartan gained visual
contact with three Argentine Type 42 destroyers* and reported this to Northwood.

From a US Navy War College Paper. Looks like if the RN wanted the war to be bloodier they could have easily succeeded.

*I assume the author means one or more Type 42 plus one or more warships for a total of three as the ARA only had 2 Type 42s.

From the ARA perspective:

AR.A San Luis Operations.
2
The San Luis departed for patrol during the second week of April
and conducted one continuous patrol during the war. She was to patrol north of the Falkland Islands
and attack British ships as her rules of engagement permitted. She claims a total of three attacks, two
of which used the German-made SST-4 anti-surface ship torpedo and the other used an American-
made Mark 37 antisubmarine torpedo. The first approach, on 1 May, was on medium sized warships
with helicopters as identified by sonar only. These warships were the H.M.S. Brilliant and the H.M.S.
Yarmouth. The attack was unsuccessful and the San Luis was counterattacked for 20 hours with
depth charges and at least one torpedo.
3
10The second approach, on 8 May, was against a submarine. Twelve minutes after firing the
Mark 37 torpedo an explosion was heard from the bearing of the target The British report no losses of
submarines and thus the torpedo may have impacted against the bottom.
The final approach, on 10 May, also done without the periscope, was on a pair of destroyers:
the H.M.S. Arrow and H.M.S. Alacrty. One torpedo was fired at the ships. This attack was
unsuccessful, but a small explosion was heard on the correct bearing 6 minutes after firing the torpedo.
Later, when the Arrow was retrieving her towed countermeasure *it was damaged - conclusive proof
that British electronic countermeasures had outwitted the SST-4's homing device.'
4
An attack on the
second ship was not conducted since the distance had opened too quickly and the ship was now out of
range.
Problems with the torpedoes and shipboard torpedo systems contributed to the three misses.
The fire control computer on San Luis was out of service and the fire control solution had to be
calculated manually. Additionally, the wires broke on all the weapons shortly after firing which took
away the ability to steer the weapon after the time of fire. These problems and the opinion that the
torpedoes were fired with the submarine too deep, had direct influence on the outcome of each shot.
5
There is also evidence that the SST-4 torpedoes were not properly prepared in the torpedo room
before loading the weapons in the torpedo tubes. This error did not allow the torpedoes to arm
themselves after time of fire. If this is the case then all shots with these weapons would only be able to
damage a target with the kinetic force of the torpedo ramming the target There would be no explosion,
just a strike like that of a battering ram. The reports of a torpedo bouncing off the hull of a British ship
and the damage, but not total destruction, to Arrow's countermeasure sled are consistent with this
thesis. In both cases, if the torpedo had exploded the damage would have been much more severe;
the sled would have been totally destroyed and the ships sunk. The small explosions heard by the
Argentines may have just been the noise of the collision between the torpedoes and their targets.

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