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Originally Posted by Stealhead
I suppose that the Japanese basically had that plan of action but they never got the chance to delay the US Navy for very long and things did not go their way from the start.I have read that the Japanese had originally planned to send an additional wave at Pearl that was to focus on destroying the fuel storage depots at Pearl but they where concerned that the missing US CVs might be near by so they chose not to.I think they made a poor decision because destroying or even seriously damaging those fuel depots would have seriously effected US Navy operational ability.
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Admiral Nagumo's operational orders were flawed in not designating these depots as priority targets in the first place. In fact, during the war game rehearsals of the attack, many of the planners stressed the importance of a quick getaway following the initial strikes. Tomioka Sadatoshi, chief of the Operations Section of Navy General Staff, had told Nagumo to get his ships home intact at all costs. Another consideration was that the morning's second wave attack on Pearl had taken the day's heaviest losses against increasingly heavy American anti-aircraft fire and had inflicted far less damage with the smoke and fires obscuring targets than the first wave had. Japan's supply of elite pilots was limited and slow to be replaced.
And as you mentioned, Nagumo was also worried about being ambushed by the missing American carriers, a fear that was not entirely unreasonable considering what would later happen six months later at Midway.