British plans, such as they were, rested on the hope of American involvement. Churchill even made invitations to Roosevelt to base US ships at Singapore. American plans on the eve of war, however assumed an initial defensive posture in the Pacific. Ultimately, due to the growing strains of a world wide conflict, British planning for the defense of Malaysia was based on inexperienced troops holding air bases for which there weren't enough planes in order to defend a naval base for which there weren't enough ships. Bottom line was that the British were in an impossible situation. Their position as an imperial power and good faith with their Far Eastern dominions required them to mount some sort of defense, but by 1941 it was an improvised and incoherent defense to which no one in London was paying much attention.
Churchill was the driving force in sending in Prince of Wales and Repulse, but realized that should war come Force Z could only survive by making itself scarce. However, he may have picked the wrong man for command as Vice-Admiral Tom Phillips was one of those who remained a true believer in the capital ship in the age of air power. Phillips was counting to some degree on fighter support from land bases and intended to stay out of range of Japanese bombers. Unfortunately, fighter support became unavailable almost as soon as hostilities commenced, and the Japanese Nell and Betty bombers had a much greater range than suspected by the Allies.
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--Mobilis in Mobili--
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