Failure to take Moscow by diverting troops South to the Caucasus was the real game changer. After that the real 'brains' in the German high command knew the war was lost.
As early as Jul 1941, the Russians knew the Germans were going to breach their defenses and threaten Moscow. On 3 Jul, Lenin's body was moved from Moscow to Tumen to prevent German capture or destruction. Little over two weeks later, on 22 Jul, 127 German bombers raided Moscow, even lightly damaging the Kremlin.
On 2 Oct 1941, Fedor von Bock led German troops to assault directly against Moscow. German advances were slower than they had hoped with a rainy fall season and later a cold early winter. As German vehicles become immobilized, the German army continued to advance, however the cold weather was affecting the morale and fighting ability of the troops to a high degree. On 15 Nov, another push for Moscow was launched, and within two weeks the Germans reached the 27km marker to Moscow, with some soldiers claiming the sighting of the towers of Kremlin.
The crucial fact was that Hitler ignored most of his generals who were pushing for taking out Moscow,which hadnt suceeded for Napoelon,and the German high command were still using his plan albeit modified for the 20th centuary to invade Russia.A daunting task in itself.Hitler was supporting a plan put together by Gen Von Losberg which aimed at driving for the heartland of Russias industry and oil,of which Stalingrad was the lynch pin.If Stalingrad fell,the way was open to the oil fields.That is why so much hinged on Hitler winning there. Stalingrad could have been won.
Hitler was rightly concerned that if he marched on and took Moscow without neutralizing the Soviet army and Ukrainian food and steel production, his army would find itself in Moscow with strong and well supplied armies on its flanks and would be forced to retreat in winter like Napolean had. The belief was that the army had to be neutralized first and Ukraine captured before a successful campaign could be mounted on Moscow. In fact Hitler changed his mind, as was his wont, several times during the campaign. Some divisions were transfered from one army group to another several times before the Kiev pocket was neutralized and the drive on Moscow begain in earnest. It is possible that the Germans could have succeded in all three goals if they hadn't had orders change so drastically, so frequently. But a drive on just Moscow might have left the Germans in an extremely exposed salient. In which case they would have been slaughtered in the Soviet winter campaign.
In my view a successful invasion of the Soviet Union would have had to acomplish four goals, with a fifth goal virtually impossible. The first four are capture of the grain and iron production in the Ukraine, neutralization of the baltic fleet with the capture of Lenningrad, elimination of the communication and transportation linchpin that was Moscow, and capture of the Baku oil fields or at least their neutralization with the capture of Stalingrad and Astrakhan. The fifth of course would be the capture of the Urals. Hitler actually did accomplish one of these. The other three he almost acomplished at one point or annother. Had the Germans been able to take and hold all four areas they probably would have won the war in the East.
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