It wasn't so much that needed tonnages of winter equipment and clothing didn't exist for the Germans as the frosts came on, as that they existed in the wrong places---at depots in Germany far from the front. The transportation infrastructure east of the Russo-German border was far less developed than that west of it., and the destruction caused by the invasion did nothing to improve it's capacity.
As the Germans got ready to carry out their final 1941 offensives before Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov they were far enough from the Reich's logistical heart to be down to mere capillary carrying capacity. In terms of moveable tonnages, Hitler was faced with the choice of being able to shunt forward enough of all kinds of supply (including winter clothing and oil) to sustain his forces for defensive operations, or push up enough petrol and ammmo for offensives ones. The decision at his well-heated headquarters far from the front was for the latter.
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