[Skybird]

These estimate are not by amateurs, but old school politicians who witnessed WWII and were seen as high profiled defence experts. You have to take into account that the GDR attack would have chosen time and opporutnity, and their plan was uniknown to the west (else the risk for nuclear war - because the GDR was seriously preparing a preemptive attack on West Berlin - would have raised so seriously that the history books would have learned it by know). You also maybe ignore the laypout of the city. Each of the three garrisons was strictly separated, and the Brits already isolated themselves from the rest of the city when choosing Gatow - the wide river Havel (VERY wide) is a natural obstacle that you cannot bridge with ponton bridges or anything (and they did not have them in big nu,mbers anyway). the Laiserdamm bridge would have been object of a dedicated attack by elite forces that outnumbers all three garrisins together - and the Allied defenders would not have the opportunity to ready their three separated small forces and unite them into one big force - for that, you need time, and the infratsructure. the better the infrastructure, the shorter the time it takes. But in a surprise attack from almost 60 directions, by elite fordces that for 20 years have trained nothing else but just this taks of securing vicotry in their assigned combat sector of West Berlin, and the needed key node of infrastructure - the Kaiserdamm bridge - most likely falling to the enemy within the first 1-2 hours, or being destroyed, chances are that the combat bunits of the three allies would have been scattered around, desperately fighting for their survial and their tanks being taken out one by one by an onslaught wellprepared, by well-equipped and very well-trained forces. In many areas, the socalled Stadtautobahn in berlin is set inside an artifical canyon, an articial valley, it is several meters below the city's "sealevel". Beloieve me, I live din berlin for ten years, and I have driven on the Statdautobahn with my father and later alone very oftenb. Without key bridges, you seriously are in trouble if you want to move British forces from Gatow to the rest of the city, or want to move French and American forces from their garrisons into the center to unite. You could only do that at the price of moving them very slowly on secondary routes (so that they cannot fight united and with providing mutual support, or by exposing them to lethal fire when sending them into that artifical canyon that much of the Autbahn is - it essentially functions as a killing bag.

Anyhow, I'll see the docu this night, and then tell you about my impressions. The material is basing on surving notes and scripts by GDR officials, because the GDr tried to destroy eviodence for these plans before reunification. The authors of the docu are no nobodies. They are known for doing thorough researches. On the US Berlin briagde, I refer to Fred Franks (and Thomas Clancy's) book "into the storm", about the war 91. In the biography descprtion Franks tells how he took commandign post in Berlin at some time of his career - and was not impressed by the shape the bridge was in. He compared it to a theatre group, and took quite some effort to try turning it into combat group. I personally knew two American soldier famiklies back then, mwehn I was young and live din Berlin. A rare event, allied families and germans did noit meet usually and did not establish social contacts oftenb, but kept seperate. Back then I was maybe not aware of it, but seen from the perspective and with the mind of today I must say that they certainly did not expect to ever needing to fight in Berlin. But the GDR meant it bitterly serious, and it kept mobilised massive forces of elite grade for a longer time to turn its plans into reality. The Eastgerman forces were of better training and command standard than the standard Russian troups. I think you underestimate them. Also take into account that the airmobility of the Allies was limited, very very limited. And the GDR had reserved considerable airmobile units per objective.

I cannot see how the Allies, if being surprised, could have hold out for longer than jujst a couple of hours indeed. half a day I gave them, 12 hours, if the attack was decisive and a surprise. Many West- and Eastgerman insiders estimate just 6-8 hours. the Berliners themselves - did not trust the Alies' brigades anyway, they expected the city to fall within one day if the Soviets or Eastgermans really meant serious business. The airlift during the blockade really must have moitivated the GDR army. They would have moved all heaven and hell to prevent that story from repeating. I remember that bets were held in jokes which brigade would give up first and second. The bets were scaled in hours, not days.

Oh, and add two things to the overall situation of Fall X: the east would have had undisputed artillery superiority and total air superiority over Berlin.