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Leandros · 01-26-10, 09:37 AM

How the boat was run would normally depend on the tactical situation. First, there was always the stress to get to the assigned patrol area to hunt for a specific target or to join up with others in a watch line. That was the central strategy of Dønitz. The boats were to be controlled for joined efforts. During the transport stretch you didn't go under to listen for potential targets, but went as fast as you could - that is on the surface. Bad or good weather, it was expected that the U-boot lookouts would see the higher-profiled adversaries first. When radar was developed in any numbers the situation changed radically. While the boats got radar warning receivers the German development was always behind in time. For example, soon the development of British radar made the first German RWR's unusable as frequencies were changed radically. Still, the urge to make a patrol area in the best time, or catch up with a lost target by going surfaced, increased losses considerably in 1943. Much of this was due to the increased Allied air surveillance. Even in the dark with the combined radar and Leigh-light technique.

While on station, or cruising in an assigned patrol area, submerged operation would usually give better detection of approaching vessels. Particularly in bad weather. A balance of submerged/surfaced positioning would then cater for the longest endurance of crew. And I do think that point was considered. As the war proceeded more and more of the time was spent submerged - because they were forced under by the increased presence of the Allied forces. Not just because these were so many more than before but also because of their improved aids which made them so much more efficient.

As you might know U-boot operations in the Atlantic were practically suspended in May '43 due to the heavy losses inflicted by the increasingly effective naval hunting groups and Allied air surveillance. First then the "Electric" U-boats - XXI and XXIII - were developed in earnest. Even if these could have become operational in any numbers they wouldn't have solved the real problem - that of finding their targets. Only an improved cooperation and increased number of air surveillance units could have solved this. At that time of the war the resources simply weren't there.

But, that is another story.

01-26-10, 09:37 AM	#8
Leandros Seasoned Skipper Join Date: Jul 2008 Location: Stockholm Posts: 676 Downloads: 17 Uploads: 0	How the boat was run would normally depend on the tactical situation. First, there was always the stress to get to the assigned patrol area to hunt for a specific target or to join up with others in a watch line. That was the central strategy of Dønitz. The boats were to be controlled for joined efforts. During the transport stretch you didn't go under to listen for potential targets, but went as fast as you could - that is on the surface. Bad or good weather, it was expected that the U-boot lookouts would see the higher-profiled adversaries first. When radar was developed in any numbers the situation changed radically. While the boats got radar warning receivers the German development was always behind in time. For example, soon the development of British radar made the first German RWR's unusable as frequencies were changed radically. Still, the urge to make a patrol area in the best time, or catch up with a lost target by going surfaced, increased losses considerably in 1943. Much of this was due to the increased Allied air surveillance. Even in the dark with the combined radar and Leigh-light technique. While on station, or cruising in an assigned patrol area, submerged operation would usually give better detection of approaching vessels. Particularly in bad weather. A balance of submerged/surfaced positioning would then cater for the longest endurance of crew. And I do think that point was considered. As the war proceeded more and more of the time was spent submerged - because they were forced under by the increased presence of the Allied forces. Not just because these were so many more than before but also because of their improved aids which made them so much more efficient. As you might know U-boot operations in the Atlantic were practically suspended in May '43 due to the heavy losses inflicted by the increasingly effective naval hunting groups and Allied air surveillance. First then the "Electric" U-boats - XXI and XXIII - were developed in earnest. Even if these could have become operational in any numbers they wouldn't have solved the real problem - that of finding their targets. Only an improved cooperation and increased number of air surveillance units could have solved this. At that time of the war the resources simply weren't there. But, that is another story.