$0.02 worth of opinion before departing this discussion…
The entire Bismarck episode is certainly an epic worthy of Wagner but the very drama of the common narrative tends to camouflage many aspects of the events. Any novelist taking the story to his publisher would, in all probability, be shown the door, hallway and the street in quick succession.
Every historical event gets spun in a way to benefit the side relating those events. Usually when two sides are compared this spin is considerably different and so discussion centers on the differing points of view. In the case of the Bismarck myth it behooved Britain and Germany to spin the story precisely the same way and so the narratives reinforce each other.
It certainly benefits the German telling that Bismarck was a superior warship capable of wresting control of the sea-lanes from Britain and winning the war. This hides her short legs and design shortcomings since if these are admitted, the question would be: Why was a capital ship so unsuited to operations against commerce be sent on such a mission?
The logistical problems of achieving and maintaining sea-control without a maritime choke point to canalize shipping or air superiority cannot be admitted for the uncomfortable question: How would a single battleship sortie actually stop convoy traffic for long enough to starve Britain into surrender?
The uber-battleship myth allows us to ignore these questions or consider them irrelevant but the actual mechanism by which Bismarck would realistically ‘win the war’ has escaped all but the most rabid Bismarck fanboys. It also allows responsibility for what happened to be placed on Adm Lutjen’s shoulders, effectively absolving OKM and providing the illusion that their strategy was really sound had it been properly executed. Commerce raiding by surface ships could never be decisive without strategic sea-control and German battleships could never establish this in the North Atlantic except on the most local and transient basis.
Ironically the uber-battleship narrative also benefits the Royal Navy for we tend not to look deeper and ask uncomfortable questions such as:
Why was Hood sent into a surface action with some nine tons of rocket fuel stored in sheet metal lockers directly forward of X-turret and on the deck-head over the above water torpedo tubes? (Her 4” UP anti-aircraft rocket ammunition)
Why with two-fold superiority in gunnery firepower and ten-fold superiority in ship-killing torpedoes available, did Adm Holland bungle the action at the Denmark Straights so badly? With almost 15-hours of daylight ahead the precipitous advance on Bismarck and Prinz Eugen was as unnecessary as it was unwise as was detaching his destroyer flotilla during the night. Concentrating on Hood’s alleged weaknesses allow Holland’s actions leading up to the engagement to be ignored.
Why did Adm Wake-Walker handle the shadowing of Bismarck in such a pusillanimous manner? Particularly when compared to the shining examples of Harwood’s pursuit of Graf Spee in 1939 and Kelly shadowing and even actually engaging SMS Goeben and Breslau in 1914 with HMS Gloucester.
How can the Admiralty explain the comedy of errors that was the movement of the Home Fleet following the loss of Hood?
The conventional narrative largely ignores or glosses over these questions and many others probably because the answers might show the Royal Navy operation in a very unfavourable light. There is no disrespect intended but an objective telling should include warts and all however the nature of the Bismarck drama ensures that it has been largely shorn of its warts so that the leadership of both sides emerge with great credit rather than being managers of a complete naval fiasco.
Winston Churchill, who must bear considerable responsibility for the British actions during Exercise Rhine once wrote: “I know History will be kind to me for I intend to write it.”
This is certainly true of the Bismarck myth.
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