Two points I'd like to add here.
Some argue that it had been Hitler's intention from the start to use the Czechoslovakian question as a pretext for beginning 'his' war, so it would have been intended to start it as early as 1938. Only due to Mussolini's mediation had Hitler been persuaded to abstain from a military solution. Needless to say that if Germany was insufficiently prepared to go to war in 1939, that applied even more so to 1938.
As for the appeasement policy of Chamberlain and the others: I agree to a great deal with the general assessment of it, viz. that it turned out to be outrageously naive at best. But think of this: World War I was caused precisely due to a reluctance of all the European great powers to resolve a crisis by diplomatic means. They all felt like sitting on a powder keg and had been almost relieved when it finally ignited.
I think that the Munich Agreement of 1938 could be seen attempt to avoid yet another Juli Crisis.
Needless to say, they all underestimated the monstrosity of the German invasion schemes (which, ironically, had already been laid out clearly in Hitlers 'Mein Kampf', though nobody bothered to take it seriously). Still, worth to think about it in my opinion.
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