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Originally Posted by August
I'd say the numbers of partisans would be directly related to the way the civilian population was treated just like what the Germans experienced in the Ukraine.
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That directly relates to how the population is treated by the Nationalist government, and that wouldn't be under the control of the Allies.
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Originally Posted by August
Impressive, but that was an unopposed movement all tied to one rail line conducted after the cessation of hostilities. We'd have the ability to bomb that line along great stretches of it. Indeed we'd have the ability to severely hamper their movement out of Europe as well.
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Good point, but railways could be repaired and expanded, especially with the massive forced labor manpower the Soviets had from gulag-dwellers. Also, this would use to hamper troops from getting there, but there was already a considerable Soviet military presence in the area.
Likewise, Allied convoys could be bombed by the VVS, of course this wouldn't be very effective until a reliable 1-engined long-range escort fighter was introduced (The La-11, historically, but in wartime the Soviets could probably work up something faster). And their supply lines in the east would quite undoubtedly harassed by partisans in China. Also, had the war lasted long enough, the Soviets could bomb Allied railways with the Tu-4, a copy of the B-29 (Though I doubt it would have lasted as long).
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Originally Posted by August
The climate is, imo, your most valid point. Still, if one had to invade Russia, and this discussion assumes there was that need, the way to overcome "General Winter" or at least lessen it's impact would be a three pronged offensive from the east, west and up from the south. Deny the enemy the ability to keep withdrawing into the hinterland. That was napoleon and hitlers mistake.
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The withdrawl strategy is only nessecary if the Russians cannot fight the enemy head on, which is not the case. I doubt the Allies had the manpower to gain the numerical advantage needed to attack from all 3 directions, or even 2.
American troops have very little experience in winter warfare. They were struggling with the German attacks in the Ardennes and in Alsace, which aren't nearly as nasty as in Russia and Siberia. The Russians were much more experienced in the winter, so any Allied attack up to Siberia would be useless unless attempted in the summer, and that would only allow the offensive to begin in either May or June, 1946, leaving plenty of time for the Soviets to bring up reinforcements and/or win on other fronts.