[Skybird]

It shows deficits in Germany's law enforcement forces. The calling off of the attack could be understood as a sign of weakness that now makes German crews possible prime targets for pirates ands hijackers.

http://www.spiegel.de/international/...622766,00.html

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The Americans had lent the Germans one of their ships, the USS Boxer, to use as their flagship in the planned attack -- and a fleet of German Navy vessels flanked the enormous helicopter carrier. The ships had been patrolling near the Hansa Stavanger for days, waiting just beyond the horizon to evade detection on the pirates' radar screens.
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Although the dramatic narrative of the cancelled rescue operation is an example of great resolve on the part of German and American authorities, it also points to deficits. It shows that, in such extreme situations, the German government is essentially incapable of deploying its law enforcement authorities in a purposeful way. And even if the mission had proceeded according to plan and had been successful, it is worth noting that there are parts of Somalia where even Germany's highly sophisticated, elite forces would be ineffective -- places where such operations would be nothing short of a Mission Impossible.

The cancellation of the freighter rescue operation represents a heavy setback for German Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, a Christian Democrat (CDU), and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, a Social Democrat (SPD). The two ministers were intent on ending this hostage crisis militarily, if at all possible, and they had the backing of Chancellor Merkel, who had asked for regular updates. Schäuble and Steinmeier, weary of the dollar diplomacy of the past few years, were eager to set an important international precedent -- to let the world know that the Germans are no longer willing to pay up when blackmailed by gangsters and terrorists, and that they are capable of a more forceful response.

German citizens have been kidnapped and taken hostage on numerous occasions in various remote parts of the world. Since 2005, a crisis team at the German Foreign Ministry has been called upon to resolve more than 20 such cases, with money exchanging hands in almost every instance.

The government was determined to break this pattern but, as it turned out, it had overestimated its capabilities. What began as an effort to send a signal of strength ended up, in the Stavanger case, as a sign of impotence.

This could have serious consequences. German sailors can now expect to become prime targets for pirates, in contrast to their French or American counterparts, whose governments have not hesitated to use force to rescue their citizens.

The German government's handling of this crisis was not exactly serendipitous. This time it was not the usual political spats within Merkel's Grand Coalition government of conservative Christian Democrats and center-left Social Democrats compounding an already tricky mission, but quarreling among the relevant government agencies. In the end, it was both the qualms of the Federal Police and the new administration in Washington that nixed the operation. There are undoubtedly senior ministry officials in Berlin who are grateful to the Americans for halting an operation that could very well have ended in disaster.

Although there was no shortage of resolve in Berlin, the Germans did lack the means to complete the operation successfully. There is a vast divide between Berlin's sensitivities and the raw reality of African pirates, who care very little about turf wars among German bureaucrats. The case exposes serious deficiencies in the Germany security apparatus.

Although the GSG-9 is constantly being trained for maritime missions, it lacks the logistics for speedy operations beyond German borders. The German military, the Bundeswehr, can provide the logistics, but it in turn lacks a sufficient number of readily deployable special operations forces. There is poor cooperation between the two organizations, while strategists are hampered by legal restrictions. And in some cases the Germans simply lack the necessary equipment. In the case of the Hansa Stavanger, the German government had to borrow aircraft and an American helicopter carrier to transport its close combat experts within range of the freighter. But by the time these preparations were complete, three weeks had already passed since pirates captured the ship on April 4.
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there can be no doubt that such a mission would have been a high risk operation indeed. But there are alternatives, and that are to syetmatically strike and destroy the pirates strongholds on land, sink their boats as soon as spotted to go onto the attack (as long as they do not become active you can't differ them from peaceful fisherboats), and try to kill as many of them as possible. That'S why for the latter purpose a much greater number of rocket-equipped helicopter gunships are needed in the area.

the called off operation ha smade things worse, no doubt. On the scene in location, but also polit-strategically for Germany (and German travellers) in general.