Up to page 13 so far, and it's a good read so far. A little dry, but I like dry, I watch C-SPAN for entertainment.
Up to this point I would like to point out, something that you have pointed out to this point, but can be expanded beyond piracy ...
non-state actors are able to grow and act freely where a nation's sovereignty (laws) are not enforced. Pirates, are non-state actors, acting in accordance to their own individual and private wills. We don't call State vessels assigned to attack merchant shipping pirates, we consider them merchant raiders who are part of a navy, or if they are private individuals with contracts from the State they are termed Corsairs or
Privateers. Even in areas where there is poverty and high unemployment, as long as the sovereignty of the state is enforced, piracy is lowered.
This I assume supports the theory that failed or failing states is a leading factor in piracy. In cases such as Iraq which you stated as an example of a failed state with low piracy events reported, there are still active groups enforcing a law based structure (coalition, and to some extent militant islamist, forces).
Will add more as I continue to read.
Page 29:
"Long period of growth and prosperity in East Asian markets was shattered in 1197 with an unprecedented crash in values of currencies and stocks coiciding with a spike in privately-held debt."
Hmmm ... Sounds familar, but unrelated to your purpose of writing this essay. Moving along.
Great section 6 by the way. Jurisdiction analysis, force make up, and cooperation between the maritime nations in the region, all well done.
I have to wonder though whether older admiralty laws still apply for navies that had them, or can be extended.
Furthermore, although there is an acting UN backed government in Mogadishu. Where there is no State, how can another nation violate the sovereignty of a State that doesn't exist, unless it can be argueed that the UN backed government in Mogadishu is the sovereign one, and thus couldn't it then give authorization for forces other than their own to assist it in policing its territorial waters?
(Making comments at about page 46) Piracy and Terrorism, Section 7. Hijacking & Kidnapping by Abu Sayyaf. Something else you can look at, also in terms of how often it has happened in the past, and how it has declined or is different (with the "pirates" only taking people due to the target for the authorities that the ship itself creates for domestic authorities) from those within, and originating from, Indonesia and Somalia.
Also, something relating to security effectiveness. Is it possible that due to the lack of Navy and enforcement and protection of Panamanian and other Flag of Courtesy Vessels form those nation that are supposedly responsible (the flag which the vessel is registered to) for them, does that increase the likely-hood of those vessels being targetted. Where as, for example, there is a known risk of bring the wrath of the Royal Navy or US Navy against your pirating group, when targetting UK or US flagged vessels. For even in a foreign nation's waters, the nation which a vessel is registered to still has a certain authority to act on those vessels behalf (much in the same way, in the air, the laws of the nation which the aircraft is registered to, are the laws that are enforced upon that aircraft).
(made at page 51) The question is, and thus a big policy debate between enforcement types and economic/rehabilitation types (which is debated in areas outside of Piracy, and which we have seen here on these forums), which is more cost effective? Economic elevating of a coastal region (thus the lack of need of piracy), or the lack enforcement of laws against piracy (thus the increase of risk associated with the act).
Overall a good essay. To bad you couldn't use or cite some of the discussions from Subsim forum in your essay (I know, it would decrease the professional look of the paper). But can you toss us a collective bone? Maybe include us as proof readers? ;-)