Interesting Psych Article
 

Military commanders from Julius Caesar to Norman Schwarzkopf have paid as much attention to the group psychology of their opponents as to the quality and quantity of their arms. National character and shared temperament, after all, bear directly on a population’s fighting spirit.

Such moral and psychological judgments of our Islamist enemies are currently off limits to our strategists and commentators, however; whether accurate or not, they are considered to smack of ethnic profiling, a contemporary sin. But in wartime, hard-won street smarts about national character are a military resource that should not be ignored, and at present we keenly need intimate knowledge of Islamist radicalism.

Human societies can be loosely divided into two groups: those governed by shame and those governed by guilt. Though often conflicting, guilt and shame are both normal functions of the human psyche. In different individuals and societies, how-ever, one or the other may predominate.

Guilt-dominant individuals tend to mistrust their own native aggression, and they will act to protect others from it.

When they are in the majority, they tend to maintain societies that will go to war only after they have been attacked. Tolerance, moderation, and charity are the official virtues of “guilt” societies, and play a part in shaping their educational practice, legislation, and foreign policy.

By contrast, shame-vulnerable individuals are constantly vigilant toward aggressions of others against their sense of honor. If insulted, they feel humiliation and rage. The shame-prone willingly submit only when the external power appears so invincible that there is no alternative but surrender. Beneath their outward defiance, the shame-prone often hold unconscious yearnings to be submissive; the seemingly omnipotent conqueror allows them to be passive without shame.

The cultivation of victim-hood is common in shame societies. Shame-prone men will look for malign external agents to rationalize any humiliation, for the victim is, by definition, not responsible for his own troubles. And the claims of victimhood eliminate any guilty inhibitions against aggression, and unlock the fury that drives the terrorist legions of shame-based societies.

There are no pure shame cultures. But both Sparta and the Confederacy were societies dominated by the avoidance of shame and the quest for honor, as were the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan in World War II. The most extreme shame-based societies have always been associated with ruthless warfare.

At present, the Islamic Middle East is where we see shame-based cultures in their purest form. The war against terror puts us in conflict with the most militant factions of highly shame-avoidant societies. While we are told much about the economic, ethnic, and sectarian influences that motivate these opponents of America, psycho-cultural elements of their radicalism have been neglected.

In this essay I will use my knowledge as a clinical psychologist and my own experience in Middle Eastern war (as an ex-member of the Israeli Hagana) to consider some of the ways in which these shame-avoidant societies may wage battle against us. Bear in mind that I am not describing all Middle Easterners, but only group tendencies that are prevalent there today.
Middle Eastern Arabs in particular are currently suffering from a deep crisis of shame. Their physical, scientific, and economic backwardness in relation to the West is mortifyingly evident. Their military defeats at the hands of the Israelis and of the various coalition forces in Kuwait and now Iraq are plain to see. Throughout history, when Arabs have gone to war, it has not primarily been for strategic or economic reasons but rather to escape the stigma of shame. By prevailing in battle, they export shame to the defeated enemy. Today, Arab agitators insist that their honor has been taken from them and replaced by shame. They call for whatever means will get honor back.

Shame societies are most likely to attack an enemy who appears weak, rather than strong and threatening. The weak enemy is corrupt, effeminate, and ready to surrender his honor. The enemy’s perceived weakness is like catnip to shame-mongers, as they fantasize about the foe’s humiliation. Since 1947, Israeli-Palestinian relations have oscillated between war and peace, depending on whether the Arabs saw the Jews as shamefully weak or as intimidatingly strong. A brief history of that conflict tells us much about Arab management of shame.

Prior to the 1947-48 Israeli War of Independence, the Palestinian leadership viewed the Israelis as terminally puny--“Children of Death”--and rejected a U.N. plan that would have divided the Holy Land into Arab and Jewish states. Believing that they, aided by the surrounding Arab armies, could easily drive 650,000 poorly armed Hebrews “into the sea,” the Palestinians refused partition, and initiated a war of extermination. But while the Hebrews stood their ground, paid their heavy butcher’s bill, and prevailed, most Palestinians fled, to become homeless refugees. They have never recovered from the shame of that flight from the despised Yahud.

Churchill once remarked of the Germans--another shame-prone people--that “The Hun is either at your throat or at your feet,” referring to their tendency to fight like hell until soundly defeated, and then to vegetate torpidly under the conqueror’s heel.

Similarly with the Palestinians: From 1949 until 1987 there was no significant Intifada. As long as the Israelis had the reputation of military supermen that they earned in the Six Days War, the Palestinians could tolerate a relatively peaceful co-existence under Jewish dominion.

After almost 40 years of relative Palestinian quiescence, however, profound degenerative changes in Israeli society shook up the relationship. The decline of the Labor party, the unpopular Lebanese war, and the growing political clout of the Orthodox led to social disunity and a decline in the military effectiveness of the once mighty Israeli Defense Force. An emerging anti-war movement preaching “Land for Peace” added to the impression of Israeli decadence. The pacifism shown by guilt-prone Israeli peaceniks was not read as morality by the shame-haunted Palestinians, but as evidence of weakness and lack of resolve: The Jews are fed up with war; kill some of them and they will plead for terms. The first Intifada of 1987 was thus not in response (as is endlessly claimed) to Jewish settlements and brutality, but to perceived Jewish weakness.

The precipitate Israeli retreat from Lebanon in 2000 probably gave the real coup de grace to the Oslo peace process. “The Women in Black”--mothers of Israeli boys who had died in Lebanon--ululated on the border, demanding immediate and unconditional withdrawal. Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak complied, pulling out his forces so quickly that they dishonored themselves, abandoning equipment to Hezbollah and putting Israel’s Lebanese Christian allies at grave risk.

Arafat seems to have drawn the predictable conclusions from this debacle. The Jews could not tolerate casualties, weepy women set their military policies, and determined guerillas could make them run. Arafat brought these conclusions to the Camp David meetings with Clinton and Barak in the summer of 2000. The Jews offered hitherto unthinkable concessions: a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, control of the Temple Mount and 95 percent of the West Bank territories. Yet Arafat remained rigid. Each Israeli concession seemed a further sign that the Jews were begging for terms. If he turned up the heat, he might get even more.

In addition, the residue of Palestinian shame from 1948 would not let Arafat passively accept a state handed to him by the Americans. The Palestinians should not only gain their state, but shed their historic shame. They would win Palestine as the Jews had won Israel--through an ordeal of blood and fire that this time around would leave the Zionists shamed and dispossessed.

But Arafat had mistakenly confounded the Peace Now crowd with the entire Israeli population. Not all Hebrews were fearful and guilty; some were angry as hell about being terrorized. Ariel Sharon, the hawk from Israel’s own “shame” party, Likud, was elected by a large majority to replace Barak, the dove from the Labor Party “guilt” faction. Soon after, the IDF went back into the West Bank in force to root out the jihadi nests.

The decisive battle was fought in the Jenin refugee camp, where the Israelis negated their own shame by dispensing with their advantage in heavy weapons and fighting a man-to-man infantry battle with the dug-in Palestinians. Despite taking heavy losses, the Israelis broke the back of the resistance in Jenin and other West Bank cities. They also dispatched the illusion that fuels much of the Intifada--that the Israelis are cowards who hide behind their tanks and cry for their mothers. Since Jenin,a new note, less delusional, less boastful, and more introspective, has appeared in the Palestinian rank and file, and among some of the leadership.

According to the Israeli and American doves, all-out military action would only accelerate the cycle of violence. They were wrong. While suicide bombings do continue (at a reduced rate), there are finally open expressions of discontent with Arafat. The post-Jenin Palestinians are finally admitting that some of their own leaders, not just the Jews, are corrupt and wrong. There are open attempts to replace Arafat, though he has so far beaten these back with support from the Palestinian terror factions and the Europeans.

Israel is learning what Americans discovered earlier when fighting shame societies. The Union found that only total war would defeat the Confederate shame-and-honor society. Half a million men had to die, and Sherman had to burn his way through Georgia, before the proud Southerners put down their arms. And when we fought Germany, Italy, and Japan in World War II--all of them flagrant shame societies--we again had to put aside the pieties of our own guilt society and wage utterly bloody war.

The militaristic, authoritarian Germans and Japanese would not give up their fantasies of global conquest until the “decadent” democracies destroyed their armies, burned and atomized their cities, and sunk their fleets. Their arrogant, shame-obsessed rulers had to be jailed, or hung, before more sensible leaders could be installed.

Paradoxically, these total wars did not lead to a cycle of violence and enduring hate, but to lasting peace. After waging pitiless war, we showed great mercy to the former Axis powers and helped rebuild them from a rubbly waste into our major economic competitors. But in order to win their hearts and minds, mercy had to follow might, not precede it. When mercy shows first, the shame-prone will view it as a sign of guilt and weakness; but when generosity follows total war, it is like Allah’s mercy, a blessing from a power of unquestioned omnipotence.

Unless we use the leverage of the Arab shame dynamic, we are not likely to impose the Pax Americana on the terrorist states. Terror--the one form of war in which they outdo the West--is the default military option for Islamic militants, and one which they eagerly take up after their regular armies have been humiliated. Terrorism can be, after all, a more efficient means of shedding and exporting shame than outright war. In the shame calculus, the guerilla is like David talking on Goliath: Morally speaking, he never loses. Thus, defeatist reporters document a “quagmire,” and driven by unmanly fear, the enemy’s civilians may begin to demand an end to the costly struggle. Like the French in Algeria, the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the Israelis in Lebanon, the humiliated enemy, defeated by a numerically inferior but spiritually superior force, will carry the weight of Arab shame with him as he slinks away.

America cannot allow such a show of weakness in Iraq. The terrorist organizations must be smashed, and their sponsoring nations made to pay the price. If we withdraw in feebleness, triumphant Islamic terrorism will increase catastrophically.

Al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and their clones will never completely disappear, but like the Afghan Taliban, they can be suppressed long enough for democratically inclined rulers to surface. Secured against the traditional Middle Eastern politics of assassination, more rational leaders could consolidate military power and popular support to the point where they are able to prevail against extremists. The example set by such new Iraqi leadership could spread rapidly across this troubled region.

But only American forces unhampered by guilt and refusing to be shamed can bring Allah’s mercy to the Middle East.


David Gutmann is professor emeritus of psychology at Northwestern University Medical School.

Good find. :up:

I didn't read all of that, but I read enough of it. Part of the problem is "moral equivalence". You can see the Associated Press' and Reuters' photos are all from destroyed Lebanon areas, and CNN as well as the New York Times and Los Angeles Times carry these photos, nearly exclusively. Look at the damage wrought by the Jews. Never mind the damage wrought by the muslims. This brings guilt onto the liberal western democracies -- guilt of supplying the evil forces with bombs that caused all this destruction.

The "guilt" is second to the need for oil. Guilt isn't the primary weapon of the jihadists.

There is also flat out fear. Fear of moslem riots and retaliation, all over the world, for saying anything critical about their global jihad and caliphate. It's fear of the oil being shut off, but it's fear of physical violence, as well. The NYTimes and CNN will get kicked out of Saudia Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Burma, Indonesia, and China...if they don't play by the rules specifically set by those countries. This is where the "guilt" comes in. It's easier to side with jihadists, because you know the western liberal democracies are less violent toward it's citizens.

Stockholm syndrome. You are safer if you're aligned against the people who won't kill you. This is the "guilt" that inhabits the west, the NYTimes, CNN, and all the other dhimmi. General Patton called them "yellow bastards", and I have come to the conclusion that he was right.

So, I do agree that psychology in warfare is important. But in this specific war against islam -- islam as it is currently being taught in the madarassas all over the world -- the element of psychology is less "typical" than the western liberal textbooks have it defined.

I also support the Great Khan's philosophy (and Churchill's). Crush your enemies. See them driven before you. Gloat as the women and daughters wrap themselves about your breast, bewailing their lost men. However, rather than gloat, I'd tear down most of the historical monuments (in the case of islam, I'd tear down all of the religious monuments and actually leave the cultural monuments standing [not like there that many of them which are seperate from the religion, mind you]), rebuild all the infrastructure, then make mandatory learning instiutions -- complete with corporal punishment -- that focused on medicine, engineering, mathematics, and to a lesser degree, art.

I also thought about this on a personal level, and given the choices I'd fall into the shame category.

How would the rest of you categorize yourselves? Should be a poll I guess.

This has to be the most bizarre piece of "academic" tripe that I've ever read anywhere:

I think the good psychology professor should stick to psychology and leave the macro sociology to the sociologists.

So the author also happens to be a former member of an Israeli para-military organization - not exactly the disinterested, unbiased perspective that a serious academic essay demands, but that isn't what this is anyway. It is just another piece of simplistic, generalized, inflammatory anti-Islam rhetoric masking as scholarship.

Terror is the default option because they have no regular armies, it has nothing to do with a "shame complex", and everything to do with the fact that where there is a will to fight then the fight will be waged with whatever weapons are most readily available.

What is this guy on? Iraq is called a quagmire because that is exactly what it is and there is nothing defeatist about calling a spade a spade. And the enemy is neither slinking away nor defeated as far as I can tell, if he was then, in his example of Hezbollah, Israel would not again be fighting the same group it fought two decades ago and will probably always be fighting, though the name and locale of the group may shift around.

A little late for the pep talk now. This guy needs to come out of the lab for some air and turn on the news. Iraq is now a failed state, civil war is only unofficial, and widening the front to include say Iran or Syria isn't going to change matters in Iraq one whit at this point. I would argue that it was opening Pandora's Box in Iraq, and now in Lebanon, that will increase terrorism catostrophically (the U.S. will declare victory in Iraq and go home at some point, its no longer an if only a when) but hey - why not completely destabilize the region anyway.

You can't put Hezbollah, Hamas, and Al-Qaeda in the same category as the Taliban; the first 3 are all loosely knit geurilla/terrorist organizations and with no ties to any one state, but rather are covertly sponsored by multiple states and individuals. The Taliban, on the other hand, was the governing organization - with some recognition as such - of the failed state of Afghanistan, and as such they can (just as they were) be deposed or overthrown while the first 3 cannot. And as to the "democracy" thing, if Afghanistan is his shining example of democratizing the ME then I'd encourage him to take a vacation there and enjoy this new democracy where the Afghani PM is no more than the mayor of Kabul and where we've been bogged down for the last 4 years atttempting to secure a country and having about as much success as the Soviets had.

This guy really is on drugs. What is Iraq on now, its 3rd or is it its 4th PM (and this newest guy they simply appointed)? The only thing the Iraqi leadership is an example of is how vulnerable and powerless they are and I doubt any other country is going to be itching to emulate their "leadership" or what little of it they're able to exert.

I have to wonder, after reading this total pipe dream if the good doctor is self-medicating, because this essay is just.... delusional. :down:

Remember, scandium, this article is from 2003. The guy doesn't have the benifit of three years of hindsight. I posted it to give a possible explaination, not neccesssarily the only one, as to what may be happening. The example doesn't apply to the middle east only.

One could argue about details, but the general message makes sense. "Shame and guilt" are no new view at things, however.

Skybird,

This is from 2003. And as I reminded scandium the author didn't have the benefit of three years hindsight.

The argument seems susinct a plausable. Please,if you can contribute more do so.

Please keep it short and to the point b/c if it's worth a damn you donnot have to ge into any minucia.

No need to shake your rattle here, waste gate. I am not interested enough in this theme as if I would care to write another one of my infamous long essays. :lol: But it's not the first time I have red about this perspective at societies.

I also cannot remember that our paths ever have crossed before, but let me tell you the basis of having red your recent postings here that you do not know me and thus I assure you there is much lesser reason to challenge me on your views than you might think. ;) just like in the other thread you just had missed that I was pulling your and Subman's legs ;)

If I misinerprted your meaning Skybird, I apoligize. I used to work for Boeing and have had contact with other Deutchers. Often it is hard to read through the language and understand the meaning of what is being said by both sides.

I meant no disrespect. I was only attempting to make my position known to everyone, in the event anyone was unsure.

Thank you for your attention
waste gate

Written language communication always holds risks of misunderstandings that would not take place when talking vis-a-vis. However, as far as I'm concerned, nothing serious had happend. I just felt that we maybe were set for a debate that simply is not needed.

Cool.

That only proves that he's one of the delusional neo-conservatives who bought into, hook, line and sinker, their disproven (by facts) "dominoe theory of democracy" in the ME; this was one of the prive motives (long before WMD ever became center stage) of the Iraq war that was pimped by such true-believers as Wolfowitz and Perle, who theorized that if you liberated Iraq, at gun point, the grateful Iraqis would forget the sectarian animosity that only Saddam's police state kept in check, forget the fact that 2 decads ago the US played both sides in the 8 year Iran-Iraq war, forget that only a decade ago the U.S. crushed and humiliated the Iraqi army in the Persian Gulf War, forget that in the aftermath the U.S. encouraged an uprising then merely watched next door in Kuwait while Saddam ruthlessly crushed it, forget the decade of sanctions imposed upon all Iraqis for Saddam's transgressions, and in their "shock and awe" greet their liberators with flowers and candy anyway. And then from that shining example all of the ME dictatorships and theocracies would fall like dominoes to be replaced by Jefforsonian democracy.

By the way I didn't need 3 years of hindsight to know the democracy dominoe theory was bunk or to predict that "Shock and Awe" could have anything other than nasty long term implications given the history and the method. And the same goes for the author's simplistic and ethnocentric "Muslim shame" theory he dreamt up to explain why the dominoe democracy theory would take hold in the ME when it hasn't.

I certainly did not post this to change anyones mind. It only gives another point of view. I'm sorry if you can't see it. Fighting your battle doesn't cut it with many rational people. I think you have to do more than attack the author.

Please do not forget Rwanda, Sudan and Darfur. Please, shall we mention Bosnia. The U.S. had no economic stake in that fight.

It was faught under the auspices of NATO which by their own admission did not want/nor were they capable of fighting that war.
I Europe/UN can't deal with their own proplems why bring NATO into it? I'll tell ya why. The guilt theory the author submits.

If you have another theory please submit it. But try to keep it simple and on point w/o all the blabber wich marks the stance of a......... well you know.

Thank you for your attention
wast gate

Therein lies the problem: there is no simple one size fits all theory to explain global events. And the bunk that author wrote wasn't even a theory, it was an agenda with a nice neat little theory dreamt up to support it. If you have any real interest in sociology, then I recommend the primer 'Capitalism and Modern Social Theory' by Giddens, who is an actual expert on social theory rather than your author's field of clinical psychology (they are very different fields). As the primer runs about 250 pages I recommend you pick it up on Amazon because I won't be doing any summaries of it here.

By the way, as a warning: if you decide to venture into this realm you will find it one of many conflicting, unproven theories and no clear cut answers; but it does provide a worthwhile perspective all the same.