USN to concede the littorals?
 

Just wanted to run this by some of our resident experts.

I've been reading on Information Dissemination that the Navy has decided it will not allow amphibs within 25nm of the shore; in essence, conceding the littorals.... even though our latest efforts (SSN 774, LCS) are specifically designed for the littorals. (The short version of the link is essentially that the USMC needs faster, bigger landing craft to be able to accomplish their mission because of this concession--but like everything on that site, it's worth reading from beginning to end.)

Is anyone here familiar with who articulated this policy/strategy statement, with a more precise formulation of the policy than ID could provide, and most importantly, why we feel we can't win in that environment?

I'm waiting patiently for Sea Queen to give her input. :rock::rock::up::up::yep::yep:

Looks like Wired picked this up too, getting this on Subsim's front page for today.

This has been the trend since the development of the LCAC and Harper's Ferry LSDs. It makes sense to keep the big stuff as far from shore as possable and just send in LCACs with a few LCS and mine sweepers to clear the way, losing an LCAC would be bad (they can carry 2 M1 Tanks or hundreds of troops) but its not a something that would defeat the US Forces. All thats missing is a BB to lob shells from a distance but I guess thats going to be the job of the new Rail Gun armed ships.

Which we're only building 2-3 of... and quite honestly, the decision to cut back to 2-3 of them was probably a prelude to scrapping the program altogether.

I've seen some videos on railguns on youtube, but it all seem VERY far from actual deployment. Any new information ?

http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=34718

By the way, I'm partially wrong about the DDG-1000 being the platform for the weapon. The DDG-1000 is being considered as a possible platform, but that's not decided.

I have to point out that "weapon ready for supply to and deployment on actual warships, with its various inevitable teething troubles removed, or reduced to such a level as not to impede operation particularly" is a hell of a lot different from "we fired one of these - ain't we clever?" The aforementioned article itself speculates that a propotypical railgun will arrive by the latter part of the forthcoming decade; being a cynic, and viewing such pronouncements with more than a little circumspection in the light of certain other development times (TSR-2, the old Soviet Hotel class, Chevaline...), I'd say even that was rather optimistic.

Anyway, where was I? Oh, yes. Interesting article. Perhaps one could call this phenomenon Kilophobia, if one wanted to be facetious. Personally it strikes me as an over-reaction to a problem which has very seldom been particularly dangerous, and is likely becoming less so as time goes on; I can only assume that the USN has looked at the way the wind's been blowing over the past 25 years or so, and concluded that the threat from SSKs, AShMs fired from shore, FAC(M)s and possibly even lunatics with RPG-7s in motor boats is now so severe as to make shore landings untenable. The logic behind that sort of thinking seems to me obscure; obviously there are threats, but I can hardly imagine that the old Styx is going to improve with age like a fine wine. Mind, Chateau la Raduga definitely has a certain ring to it.

Shore landings aren't going away. They're just going to be done over greater distances.

I guess we just feel safer with the bad guys shooting RPGs/ATGMs at AAVs and LCACs than with them shooting ASCMs at AWS ships.

Small Wars Journal posted a presentation by the Commandant where he touched on this a little.

Oh if only you said 'Kilophobia' a year ago, I sooo would have used that as the title for my Kilo Guide! :yep:

"The littorals" as the Navy uses the term constitute a much larger area than just 25nm from shore, and amphibs don't need to go closer than that in order to accomplish their mission. Bare in mind, the HMM squadron equipped with MV-22s on an LHD can deliver a company sized air assault element 200nm from the ship. Additionally there will be fixed wing aircraft and attack helicopters, all of which have operating ranges greater than 25nm. Just because there's not a ship there doesn't mean you're conceding the space. A capital ship like an amphibious ship controls a significant space around it with it's aircraft. Additionally, it's escorts equipped with AEGIS, guns, more helos, tomahawks and harpoons add to the firepower. In the future there might also be LCS, with more missiles, helos and guns.

Additionally, the surface assault element doesn't need to be right up against the shore either. LCACS and EFVs will be able to quickly tranverse that distance.

Finally, they don't do amphibious landings without air superiority, so there's probably going to be all kinds of carrier and land based fixed wing aircraft to patrol that space.

Now... there ARE a lot of issues and contraditions with the USMC's Ship-To-Objective-Maneuver (STOM) doctrine, which probably need to be rethought. The 25nm policy isn't really one of them, though.

Someone has to cross through that territory. Maybe you fly over it in a helo, maybe you drive an LCAC through it, maybe you park the ship on the shore. One way or another, someone needs to cross it. And the Commandant doesn't seem happy that the Navy has decided it's going to be up to the Corps, and if the Commandant isn't happy, then I get concerned too.

So I guess my question is, what is the threat that can kill an LPD that can't kill an Osprey/SeaKnight/LCAC? That's the part of this that doesn't make sense to me, because if there isn't a good answer to this question, it looks like the Navy is just passing the buck.

Aircraft and missiles are great for blowing stuff up when you have a clearly identified target, but they can't control territory. Unless you put ships in that 25nm belt, I think you have conceded that territory. Which means your landing craft, when they run through it, are going to have to deal with the possibility of ATGMs fired from what were previously rather inconspicuous ships, as well as swarming attacks and ASCMs fired from the coast.

The LCS, which is being built with the material standard of an auxiliary instead of a warship, and which carries only a RAM launcher for air defense, apparently isn't meant to operate inside this 25nm belt either (it wouldn't survive there). It seems it would deploy USVs into the area while itself standing off. Just like aircraft, unmanned platforms cannot control the territory either.

I don't see how this isn't a concession of that territory by the USN. Maybe the Marines can control it, but their craft don't have all that much capacity to exercise control until they get onto land. Or am I missing something?

Just because they're not putting amphibs close in doesn't mean they're not putting other ships and aircraft there. That whole space is nothing to an MH-60R with Hellfires. LCS is fine in there. CRUDES are fine in there. All of that space is nothing to a fixed wing fighter-bomber. The idea is to put the high value amphibs behind a screen of CRUDES, helos, fixed wing and LCS.

My sense of things is that it's probably about putting enough space between the shore and the high value units that they feel they could eliminate any raid from shore based ASCMs or small boats with CRUDES, LCS, helos and TACAIR.

25nm is less than a two hour's drive for a warship. For people who think about transit times in terms of weeks, it's nothing. By aircraft's standards it's even less. I mean, really, amphibs aren't really powerful offensive warships. They have just point defenses. They don't control anything. Think of them as basically pickup trucks for hauling USMC gear. The one exception is an LHD because it carries fixed wing USMC fighters, but unless pressed they're prefer to save those for USMC CAS. The Marines look at bombing warships as a Navy job. They know how to do it, because they're team players but really, when it gets right down to it, the Marines look at their aircraft as their private toys and using them to defend warships is sort of doing the Navy guys a favor.

The warships that control space are their escorts, who also think of 25nm as a trivial distance. For them to effectively protect the amphibs, they need a little bit of space between them and land so they can see things coming and figure out what to do about it.

You wouldn't target an LCAC with an ASCM. You also wouldn't even bother to attempt landing an LCAC on a hostile beach. That's what EFVs are for. You also wouldn't attempt an amphibious landing in the abscense of air superiority and sea control. That means that surface combattants and aircraft will have been checking out that space before LCACs do anything.

First off, to a surface combattant, 25nm is a trivial distance. The Marines don't need to control it because by the time they actually get around to landing both the sea and the air above it will have been worked over by surface ships and aircraft because the two preconditions for amphibious assault are sea control and air superiority. Without them, it's a no-go. Thirdly, the amphibs don't need to go in so close for the Marines to do their job. Fourthly, if for some reason, they decided to go in the abscence of sea control and air superiority, that 25nm gives the amphibs a bit of space to react to the (non existant) threat.

Okay, I guess I was assuming that the escorts would also be back with the phibs, if they go in then this works a bit better.

Of course we don't have the EFV yet. This navy doctrine is the reason why the Commandant says we need the EFV in the first place.

That's not true.

Honestly, right now, the USMC and the Navy are in sort of a strange position of having adopted a doctrine that nobody has really tested, namely Ship-to-Objective-Maneuver (STOM), and when you start really looking at the documents describing STOM with a critical eye, you start to find contradictions.

For example, it's not really clear whether they intend to prepare for an opposed landing or an unopposed landing. If it's opposed then they need more EFVs, but if it's unopposed then LCACs are fine. It's also not really clear in STOM why they need an MV-22 to go 200 miles inland either. There's OTHER stuff out there I can imagine that range is good for, but supposedly STOM is the whole justification for the MV-22 and the other stuff is pretty much unaddressed.

I'd argue that STOM's a bad case of the devil being in the details like most of these vague doctrinal documents.