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Thoughts after Russia's recognition
The last Ossetia-threads somewhat derailed into emotional venting, and even straight propaganda and nationalism. If you want to continue with that attitude, go back there - but don't start again here. Of yourse you can disagree with my views, but if you make that known, do it in a neutral way, like I post neutrally as well.
The news of the day is clear, Russia has created facts and installed itself as the major guarantor for stability of the status quo in the Caucasean region again. Several questions arise from this which I want to adress point by point. I just had a long talk with an old colleague from my travelling times, who still works in the foreign correspondent business at times. We exchanged plenty of views and philosophies, this is what brought me to writing this. Much of it is more a structuring of what has been on my mind before. ***************** |
1. Is this the beginning of a new cold war?
No. The ideological mission to spread the Soviet system and global communism is missing on the Russian side. Also, the Russian economy is strong by it's oil exports and gets wealthy by high oil prices, it is not strong by it's exports of goods and items. The Russians can afford to modernize their armed forces, maybe even to slightly increase them, and they can afford to produce more ICBMs than a US missile shield could protect against, and by that "flood" any such defense system. But they cannot afford to enter a new arms race and produce military goods at the frequency and quantitity they did during the USSR era. Thus, there eventually will be a cheap nuclear arms race, but no conventional one - just a constant modenrizing of Russian forces. However, the diplomatic tone and relations between West and East will change drastically, and as a matter of fact already has. but even with the language of the cold war, the military situation will not qualify to allow such a description if it is used to compare to the historical first cold war. 2. Are the Russians acting illegally? It has been reported very early on that the six-point peace-plan of the EU that Sarkozy was negotiating were not accepted by the russians before some deletions were made and some phrases chnaged or added. These give them the right to station troops in the bufferzone, and to patrol in areas of Georgia, additonally they refer to an old treaty deriving from the earlier conflict in the 90s that so far they had not made use of, but now do, which again gives them the right to set up patrols and checkpoints. It is stunning with what obvious opportunism this is hidden by western leaders now when they made their hot speeches and powerful demands - they refer to a peaceplan, as they call it, that the russians never accepted and actually have alterred - and that is a known fact that no gets ignored for propaganda reasons. The russians also refer to the example of the Iraq war having been illegal and a violation of international war (a fact on which a vast majority of lawyers for international law agree), not authorized by the UN council, but indirectly excused by the Americans by going back to years-old resolutions that neither included any specifics that could be brought into conformity with the Iraq war, nor were authored with such an explicit intention at the time they were created. Tit-for-tat, think the Russians. 3. Kosovo and Georgia - also a tit-for-tat? From a Russian perspective, yes, and they mean it serious, not just opportunistcally as an excuse. And I tend to agree with that. The West argues that the West's recognition of Kosovo's independence is legitimitae because they have consulted the Russians via the UN (which nevertheless did not change the fact that the Russians did not agree), and becasue it has been the UN allowing it. But still the principle of the sovereignity of an independent state - Serbia - and the principle of territorial integrity which now is so often used to attack the Russians over Georgia, both got violated in the same way russia ignores them today in Georgia. I would even say in case of Kosovo the case if worse, becasue in the years after the Kosovo war Albanians from Albania moved in huge - in decisive! - numbers into Kosovo and massively shifted the ethnic balance there - and then made a demand to become independent: a manipulation of ethnic realities on the ground which the West nevertheless was not irritated to accept. The ethnic structure in Abkhasia and Southern Ossetia has not been shifted in this way, and both populations have been victims to Georgian repression and brutal Georgian nationalistic violence. Russia therefore rightfully refers to Kosovo having created a precedence setting a standard that now is claimed by the Russians with even more right, it seems, than the West claimed over Kosovo. 4. Baltic states, Poland, Ukraine, and Finland I see the Baltic states not in danger of being invaded by russian troops with a goal of such an assault of recapturing the Baltic - if NATO doesnot move into the Ukraine. I see Poland not in that kind of military threat as well. Is see Finland not in that kind of military threat as well. I think the Russains have accepted that they have lost these grounds. They have accepted it - but they are detemrined to not lose anymore ground. these nations nevertheless for historical reasons are both a bit paranoid and hate-driven regarding Russia. But much of what has been seen from them during these weeks of crisis bordered sheer irrationality, imo, especially Poland, and i do not mean the Kaczynskis only, whose nationalistic paranoias towards both Russia and Germany is well-documented by now. If Putin will not crush them, then Merkel's army of Lebensborn-offsprings will invade Poland - that is the image they are driven by. Irrational idiots. They have made themselves legitimiate target of mockery and disgust throughout the EU. This brings us to the Ukraine. I see the conflict about a.) the Black Sea Fleet and it's bases, b.) the many Russians living on the Crimean peninsula, c.) the importance of parts of the Ukraine for energy trafficking, and the fact that d.) for Russia it is strategically totally unacceptable that NATO gains the ability to field missiles, sensors and striking capacities in the Ukraine, as holding enough conflicting energy that a hot war between Russia and the Ukraine can result from this. It must not be, but it could be. Russia has played the Georgian match straight and undestracted, and this is a sign that they do not accept BS anymore and will not be intimidated by provocations and bluffs. If I were the Ukraine, I would play it more cautiously than this Trottel Saakashvilli did, and would not try any more provocations like demanding the Russian fleet to repoprt to Ukrainean command - not only for Russia but for any Western nation as well this is tiotally unacceptable, even more so if such a decree is signed in times of war. A Ukrainean move towards NATO will not reduce but increase the risk of war. A NATO diplomatic offensive to get the Ukraine involvedd in NATO will not reduce but increase the risk of war. And a too challenging provocation by the Ukraine also will not reduce but increase the risk of war. for the time being, since the ukraine cannot move and relocate like an aircraft carrier, best advise is to let any provocations and any moves to the West rest, and try to consolidate the status quo and preserve it over sufficiently long time that eventually a cautious feeling of stability (avoiding the word "trust" here) on russian side will emerge after longer time. To accept to pay ordinary market prices for gas and oil from Russia, like all nations on the makret must do, also could help. that would be a n expensive move, but it could be wortzh it if it evades war and a lost of the Crimean, as well as as much occupation as is needed to prevent Ukraine moving into NATO. The West must understand that Russia will not accept NATO at the ukrainean-russian border - period. It will bnot happen, no matter the cursing, yelling, gestures, feet-stomping and whatever. Russia cannot afford that. to realise and not challenge vital self-interests of an opponent is part of Realpoltik. Ignroing it did not work in Georgia, and it will not work in the Ukraine as well - you can take that as granted. 5. Would NATO fight over its small allies in the East? (Ignoring that a war with Russia means war with a nuclear superpower. You better have damn good reasons to start destroying the world.) Probably not - currently it lacks the capacity. The American military is overstretched on a global scale, the European military is too weak. The US has no interests that are locally limited, and defines the whole globe as the justified sphere of influence for the "American century". this leaves them unable to respond with sufficient force at every place around all the world. A shortening of the front would be much in need, but currently to American thinking that sounds like sheer treachery where in fact wanting it all is sheer megalomania. By wishing to defend all the US has or could have, America will loose more in fact. The consequence must be that the Europeans invest far more money into increasing both quality and quantity of their conventional forces. the EU is overestimating it's diplomatic weight by far, which is especially apparent in case of trying to make the Iranians comply (with zero effect since years), and also in their demands to russia to comply with regard to Western demands for Georgia. Let's face it - currently the Kremlin does not take the Europeans serious anymore. And if we are honest to ourselves, we must agree that they have indeed little reason to worry about the EU. Which brings us to the question of ... |
6. Is Russia or the West more vulnerable?
The West threatens to block Russia's access to the WTO. that is no threat - because as an exporter of energy and basic resources like ore (that the Indians and Chinese would be happy to buy in Europe'S place), not being a great exporter of produced goods and items, WTO membership is, as a Russian paper put it, more "a box to be ticked by routine", but not really important. The West just raised illusions about WTO being important to Russia, by that imagining that they could get more influence over russia once the Russians are in and must stick to the rules. Much the same can be said about membership in the G8 and one or two more organisations and conferences the West has "threatend" to exclude the Russians from. All these are considerations for the Russians, but no real concerns and surely no worries or threats. They calculated them, and judging by the outcome of that calculation and their ultimate action they value them not that high. Also, Europe is heavily depending on Russian gas and oil. these cannot be replaced all of a sudden, or even in the forseeable future. On the other hand it is not understandable why some Wetserners assuje goods and highteczh the russians do no longer buy in europe can't be bought on the world market by them. again. Here lies no threat for the Russians. In return, russia is in a strong position, and has nthe potential, as the Prawda put it, to hit the US very strong below the belt. I quote the Prawda here not because I just believe the Prawda (in general it is a very bad and heavily biased, government-friendly piece of journalism), but becasue these points are exactly my own considerations as well. Quote:
7. NATO's reputation As I have argued in my old and long separate essay "Trapped in the Afghan maze", NATO'S reputation already has massively suffered from the Afghanistan war, and I would say that parts of it after this crisis now lies in open shatters. the past twenty years of failing reorientation over the alliance's meaning and focus, and the open rift between the US and it's new Easteuropean allies who wished to raise in America's percpetion by orginally uncritically moving under it's policies and supporting them without questions, and the arrogantly labelled "old Europe", now pay off in a negative way. too many cooks in the kitchen who spoil the brew, too many variating voices, often interacting with nation's positons inside the EU, egoism, and different attotudes towards war and low spendings for prepariong to wage war if needed, have led us to the current mess: an alliance unable to react and unable to offer an ything more than just empty phrases, meaningless threats, and lots of hot air. Like the Moscow Times essay that I linked already asked: one has to wonder if NATO really would be willing to start military action over an attack against the Baltic, and if there really is a cost-effect-calculation possible that even would justifiy that, because wars not only are run by ideals and catchphrases, but need to be payed for in solid money and enormous economic investements that in case of war with Russia could seriously cripple European and American economies and bring global economies down to it's knees. seeing it realistically and without any moral sentiments or national sympathies I answer both questions with "no". and this raises questions about the intelligence of provoking the Russians that seriously by moving NATO eastward in violation of promises made by two american adminstrations to president Yeltsin, and also with regard to the wisdom of bringing the ukraine into NATO. Our good-hearted well-meaningness easily could bring our heads onto the block, for the chances for war on the Crimean peninsula are real, and they are not small. Have we really all reason to assume that all NATO nations would be willing to engage in full war against Russia over something as far away as the Ukraine? Don't let your emotions form your answer, think about it with a calm head. You'll see that at least you come to an answer of "I have my doubts". 8. Conclusions There is a gap between what the West claims, and what it really is capable in carrying out. the limits of these claims we have learned in recent years, in Iraq, in Afghnaistan, and now in the Caucasean region. The status quo is not acchieved by realpolitik, but the absence of it. realism and unbiased perception of both side's vital interests is needed. And on both the west has proven to be running low since the end of the cold war - we were drunk of ourselves, celebrating our "victory", and thinling we cann afford to ignore the apparent loserin this conflict, and that we now can have our ways, unhindered. the Kremlin now leaves us no other choice than to realise that these times have come to an end. and that may even be a healthy lesson for us, before we entangle outselves in even more potentially self-damaging adventures. I see the Caucasean situation even positive after the russian recognition. the situation now is clened, and clearer than it was in the years before. the lines have been set out in fresh and bright colour. russia has established itself as the one great ordering power in it'S backyard, and after chechnya and Ossetia and Abkhazia this will be remembered in the several other troubled former USSR provinces that are threatened by internal unrest. Medwedew has accepted a risk by accepting the independence of the two provinces - he has created a precedence that could be taken as an excuse by other provinces to fight for their independence (again). However, he seems to think that the display of force by russia reduces this risk so far that the gains of accepting Ossetian independence outshine the risks. since i am not blind enough to assume that democracy "made in the West" necessarily is a model that would or could work in all parts of the present world, I tend to cautiously agree with his calculations when seeing it from the Russian's side. Seeing it from the West's side, all considerations currently are meanignless, since we are not in a position to do anything about the new status quo anyway. the americans would be well-advised to let this Georgian Uber-Trottel Saakashvilli fall, and not to try smuggling weapons via their warships in the Black Sea. If they would get caught in doing that, things could become ashaming at best, and really nasty at worst. The russians will not give up control of the harbour in Potin. They would be stupid if they would. Without europe investing seriously more into defense, and winning in military capacities again that are solid enough in selection and quality to handle the Russians on a grand scale, the EU can forget to be recognised as a diplomatic negotiation partner that needs to be taken serious. the european self-impression of being accepted for being a word-superpower only, is wrong. Since Europe did not do it's homework and won in milizary strength, and since america left it to word-guarantees for Georgia only without making sure it was always able to back them up by deeds, one would, if this were a sports event, necessarily conclude that the Western team not only lost this match, but also would not have earned the win. Mocking the other team before the match started and bullying it's players on several occasions in advance, therefore proved to be a PR boomerang. In that conditon, and with it's back against the wall in Afghanistan as well, NATO does not impress anybody. It needs to readjust it's focus on more realistic goals of much more limited range and scale. "Frontbegradigung" and "Frontverkürzung" it is called in German. In other words: we are far too scattered, around areas of the globe maybe America thinks for self-related reasons it has an interest in - but NATO has not. More conflicts inside NATO are preprogrammed - with open end. Game, set and match for Russia - but we must not like it. |
Is there a cliff notes version to this wall of text? :D
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Really, it's pretty good if you read all the way through it. Having no real knowledge of Georgia's people, and never even having heard of South Ossetia before the war, I don't have anything to say about it, but it's a nice piece. |
Real good job, Skybird. Kosovo made this situation to be happened. Also ambitions of Putin, Saakashvili and Abkhazia and South Ossetia Leaders.
********Some facts************* -Georgian majority(~52% different numbers) was pushed out from Abkhazia by Abkhazian separatists in 90th; -Georgian minority (~20 % different numbers ) were pushed out from South Ossetia by S.-ossetian separatists in the same 90th. -Allmost all of s.-ossetians and Abkhazians were issued russian passports during last 10 years. -Technically they are russian citizens. -Tskhinvali (South Ossetia 's capital) was attacked by Georgian forces using multiple-launch rocket systems GRAD (!!! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/9K51_Grad ). Can you imaging using rocket against city; GRAD works by squires. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H8XI2Chc6uQ -Saakashvili can be a good prime minister( he is a good manager but not a president,and look at this ). http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=26Hfh72CGbc |
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Regarding Georgia and even more: the Ukraine, there possibly will be strong promises and invitations and a roadmap for NATO membership indeed - but without a definite timetable. Germans who listened may have noted that not only did Merkel avoid to talk about timetables during her press conferences and meetings in the Baltic, but in her appearance on German TV on Sunday evening evaded repeatedly the interviewers direct questions for binding timetables. Seen that way, the German position has not changed much, and tries to square the circle by what this coalition government in so very good at: doing nothing and labelling that as decisive action. and like germany, also France and even the US have indicated that the communication with Russia should not be interrupted. I think many western leaders know damn well the difference between the talking they give to the mikes and cameras, and the real substantial interests of their nations. Just some, like the Kaczynskis, may do not - and may find themselves ignored sooner or later. Also, technically the famous NATO paragraph 5 for mutual assistance in case of one member being attacked does not explicitly oblige all members to go to war in support of the attacked member (it allows military action, but does not automatically declare it mandatory for all) - it speaks of assistance only on whose quality every member individually decides, and says that all other members must offer assistance to "restore" the attacked member's former security status. In diplomacy and amongst lawyers, that leaves a wide open prairie of free space for interpretations. There is much freedom to eventually leave such assistance to moral support, wellmeant condolence, tough rethorics, aid deliveries or diplomatic "pressure" on the aggressor. The inclusion of military force is left to the individual assessement of nations - something that is somewhat hidden in the text and not obvious to most people. Quote:
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New borders of Georgia
http://s59.radikal.ru/i165/0808/6a/8f05c2897381.jpg Prez Saak's dream Georgia for Georgians is coming true :rotfl: Russia acknowledged - that what really matters. Hamas acknowledged - sure, Georgian Minister of Defense is Israeli citizen :rotfl: Year, and the guys from self-mechanizing Vostok battalion happened to be Muslims as well. |
Russia cannot afford to be a bad neighbour
The Kremlin hawks may be in the ascendancy now, but in a world of global trade they will pay a price in the end I feel sure that a debate is going on between the hawks and doves in the Kremlin. I am confident of that because such debates always do exist. There must be equally patriotic Russians, in senior official positions, who see the Georgian campaign as part of Vladimir Putin's restoration of Russian self-respect or as dangerous adventurism. In times of crisis, decision-makers inevitably divide into hawks, regarded by critics as “reckless warmongers”, and doves, regarded as “cowardly appeasers”. Such divisions exist in the EU and in the US. In Russia, there is no doubt that the hawks are in the ascendant. The leading hawk is Mr Putin, the Prime Minister. One should remember that all politics is ultimately domestic. Mr Putin wants to impress Russia's neighbours with its power and armed might. But he also wants to impress the electorate. The hawkish leaders refuse to accept Russia's humiliation at the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union. Their policy is popular with Russian public opinion. This naturally strikes fear into former Soviet countries, such as Ukraine or Georgia. No one now will lightly challenge Russian power; the Russian people like that. We do not know who the doves in the Kremlin may be, although President Medvedev uses more moderate language than Mr Putin. So far, the hawks have been winning the argument. The Russian people feel that they have been treated with disrespect for too long. Their military action in Georgia has been a rapid and decisive victory. The Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, never popular in Russia, has been taught a sharp lesson in the realities of military power. Nevertheless, the doves in the Kremlin also have strong arguments. Russia is a major nuclear power, comparable with the US. Russia may be the only nuclear power with the capacity to obliterate the US. Yet this would lead to the total destruction of Russia itself. That does, however, mean that Russia understands the reality of the situation. The Russians have a sophisticated knowledge of their own vulnerability to nuclear attack. Like the Americans, they know that they cannot afford to go to war with the other nuclear superpower. This was established over 40 years of the Cold War. A certain level of nuclear capacity actually limits a major power's freedom of action. In the time of Russia's greatest strength in the mid-20th century, between victory in Europe in 1945 and the death of Stalin in 1953, Russia still had a powerful Marxist-Leninist ideology that attracted support around the world and even conquered China. Stalin believed Marxism-Leninism to be a scientific explanation of history that was bound to prevail against “capitalist imperialism”. He devoted substantial resources to promoting international revolution. Even his more moderate successor, Nikita Khrushchev, warned the West that “we will bury you”. Russia is no longer a Marxist-Leninist society, although there is some popular nostalgia for the old days. Socialist idealists of the Third World no longer look to Russia as a model society, or even an attractive one. Marxism-Leninism had a strong appeal to political militants. That no longer exists. For better or worse, Russia is now just another capitalist country, and not a particularly efficient one. The price that Russia is paying for the invasion of Georgia is increased isolation. The major regional powers of the modern world are the US, China, the EU, Russia, India and Japan. Since the Georgian invasion, Russia has had strained relations with the US and Europe, and no major friends. Russia is a large Asian power, stretching to the Pacific Ocean, but the three most important Asian powers, China, India and Japan, do not have close or trusting relations with it. Of the six world powers, or groups of powers, Russia is seen as the least reliable, the least friendly. President Franklin Roosevelt felt that the US in the 1930s had become alienated from the South American countries; to correct that, he established the “good neighbour policy”. Russia is increasingly isolated from its “near abroad”. To Georgians, Ukrainians or citizens of the Baltic states, Mr Putin's Russia appears to be following a “bad neighbour policy”. For the Russian voter, Putinism may appear to be reasserting Russia's position in the world; to its neighbours, Russia is now an ugly threat. The West, particularly the US and Europe, has tried to prevent Russia's isolation by inviting the Russians to come into the tent. This policy was not consistently pursued; there are still Western anxieties from the Cold War, just as there are similar Russian anxieties. But the general policy was clear and was symbolised by inviting Russia to join G8 meetings. Russia has essential interests in common with the West. Global trade, a stable European market for oil and gas, resistance to Islamic terrorism, avoidance of military conflict, investment in modernisation. It was hoped that Russia and the West could build on these interests to cement good relations and strengthen the global economy. The first European reactions to the invasion of Georgia showed that Europe hoped to protect this co-operative policy. Had Russia limited the Georgian operation to the protection of South Ossetian refugees, but kept troops out of Georgia proper, a co-operative policy might have been maintained. Instead, there has been broad Russian aggression against Georgian territory. The delay in the ceasefire and the extension of the invasion far beyond the boundary of South Ossetia has created a very different climate, made worse by threats to target nuclear weapons against Poland and, it appears, Ukraine as well. In a world of global trade, Russia cannot afford to be isolated. No doubt the Kremlin hawks are riding high now. Yet as Sir Robert Walpole said of a mid 18th-century war: “They now ring the bells, but they will soon wring their hands.” http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/com...cle4552510.ece |
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Seriously, I'm waiting for these whining little tarts to condemn Russia's "Unilateral" actions, condemn Russia outright for not using the UN as the vehicle to solve international crises, and last but not least....I'm looking forward to the comparisons of Putin and Medvedev to Hitler. Oh, I know we won't get it. But I hope it shows the useless idiot UN whining protesting fools of the USA, Canada, and Europe for what they are. It's clear as a bell to me who these losers are. On your other many points, it's all nonsense. Russia has done everything they can to back themselves into a corner. They have pushed all the states they wanted in their orbit directly into NATO's sphere of influence, have helped the USA ink the missile defense deal they desperately didn't want, and are simply screwing themselves with nominal trade relations with the West. Something they cannot afford to do, despite your contrarian views. This whole thing will be bad for Russia in the coming months ahead. Russia has only one link of leverage with the West (well Europe anyway). And that's their energy trade. The Russians will not screw up this relationship. They simply cannot afford to. You don't truly see the whole picture. What about other things that Russia relies on the West for as well? Do you think China's gonna clean up their nuclear dumps? What about Western medical suppplies and technology that goes into Russia? What about raw material imports? What of food imports? What about Western commercial contracts with them and the money from those? No, Skybird. The West actually has alot of power here to screw over Russia actually. It's actually the opposite of what you think. I know you're a fatalist and believe everything tragic about the West, but in this case, Russia screwed themselves over big time. Wait a few months and see. Right now, the Russians got a little pride. But I think in the end, it won't be worth it to them. |
Just to demonstrate the looney leadership both Putin and Medvedev are both capable of, here's a nice link. Apparently Mr. Medvedev "isn't afraid of a new Cold War". Oooohh. He's tough. :roll: Not. If he was actually a man with common sense and intelligence, he would be.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26403580/ |
I agree in that EU has to work to cut its energy dependency and create a conventional military capability. EU has known this long before this crisis, this should be the point, after these will be pursued with determination.
Im a big supporter of nuclear energy, this has been the Finnish solution with the first EPR reactor under construction and two more planned. Europes energy market also needs some unbundling as the Comission has suggested. The monopolies and lack of co-ordination hamper competiton and efficiency. The increase in defence isnt a problem for EU if it so wishes, it can easily use some 400 billion on defence. Even creating global reach and projection of power. Something Russia cant match without it having effect on their economy. EU is like US prior ww2, a sleeping giant waiting for a Pearl Harbor. |
If politicians on both sides carry on like this, we will have war within 10 years.
Then Happy Times can be a hero and the forces of good will triumph Hurrah :damn: |
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Europes role in the future isnt going to be Russias bitch in energy or security, no matter if some would be willing for that. |
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As far as energy, we all have many options to power our nations. You're right. Unfortunately, we have stupid/shortsighted people in NGO's who think their "well-meaning" acts of "environmental protections" which actually accomplish little, trump national security/national energy policy. We need real energy solutions combined with real balance. If push comes to shove, that's exactly what will happen. You can guarantee it. This is something I know the Russians know as well. At any rate, the Russians can't afford to truly screw you Euro's up with energy. They need your money and other stuff from both Europe and the USA as well. |
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