Why did the IJN lose most all sea battles?
 

Hi all,
I've been watching the History Channel's Battle 360 series about WWII's Pacific Navel battles.
In most cases, 'we' (USA) were out numbered, out witted and out skilled yet we won. WHY did the IJN lose most all battles??? I don't understand. :o They were better then we were most of the time.
It puzzles me...

Waddaya think?

Thanks
:)

Smart ass answer.
Jesus.

Actual answer.
ULTRA.
:/\\k:

One of the reasons I heard was that the Japaneese rigid hierarchy worked against them.
If a shell hit a Japaneese ship and the section commander was killed, the crew did nothing because they were allowed onyl to act on orders from superior officers. Before a CO could assign a new commander the ship would already fill with water.
Amercian crews were allowed a lot of self initiative. The hole was pluged before the new commander was assigned.

But this could be busted, It was just something I heard in a documentary.

ULTRA, lack of decent command and communications, lack of decent radar.

Basically, once they got to a battle they were very good, but actually getting to the battle and not being jumped first was the biggest problem.

I don't know if I would call the US out numbered. The first carrier battle at the Coral Sea was basically a even match two fleet carriers versus two fleet carriers. One US carrier was sunk, but the two Japanese carriers were scratched from the upcoming Midway operation. And Midway was a far closer battle than most would think. You could really qualify more as a carrier ambush on the Japanese than the miracle it was often described as.

Certainly one huge US advantage was the ability to out-produce and replace losses. Every Japanese ship that went down often had no replacement available in the wings anytime soon. For example, the US put 65 carriers of every size and shape into the water in 1943. Japan, just two. Mere attrition wasn't going to serve Japan well.

One of the things that often gets cited in the context of Japan's overconfidence in the IJN is:

"It takes the Navy three years to build a ship. It will take three hundred years to build a new tradition." -Adm. of the Fleet Andrew Cunningham

In terms of actual losses, the IJN came out pretty evenly in the few major battles they had parity with the US navy, with the obvious exception of Midway which they lost due to a combination of intelligence, poor planning and general luck on the American side. When they had the right conditions on their side, they even managed a couple of clear victories (Savo Island and Tassafaronga being the obvious examples). By the end of the Guadalcanal campaign, they were clearly outmatched in technology, training and numbers and had very little chance of any sort of victory.

I think rigid ideology and command structure was the downfall of both japan and Germany as there are many examples where soldiers were unwilling or not allowed to think for themselves and do what needed to be done to win during battles and instead were forced to wait for orders of what to do and let many opportunities for victory slip past them.

I think a lot of the reason we did so well is because we are used to being unorganized and not rigid to following orders to the letter so we adapted to things as they happened which was not allowed to happen with our opponents soldiers

One of the most succinct statements that came from the Japanese naval authorities after the war was that they lost by "battling " instead of "warring" --"We conceived the war with America on a far smaller scale, studied it as a battle. We never became aware of this mistake, much less outgrew it."

The misapplied and probably out of date doctrines of Alfred Thayer Mahan and the concept of the "Decisive Battle"certainly came back to haunt them. They kept chasing for that decisive battle until they had no fleet left.

We seem to be bumbling bozos that never give up. We were a proud nation back then.

:)

Nah, admit it Raptor, they kept rolling ones. :03:

"I fear we have awoken a sleeping giant and loaded his dice." :D

http://boardgamegeek.com/camo/810395...5f6d642e6a7067

The dice were loaded! The cards were stacked!

I still haven't gotten revenge for the Marshalls, have I?

:sign_yeah:

The melted down beer cans they used for shells didn't help much either. :O:

The IJN just didn't have the numbers in assets and their failure to catch our carriers at Pearl was also an ingredient in the recipe for failure.

We have only succeeded in awaking a sleeping giant.
Admiral (I think I'll take a trip in a Zippo plane) Yamamoto

As far as post-1942 goes, I imagine having superior numbers, reliable radar, better surface fire control, vastly superior damage control, and ULTRA probably gave the USN a decided advantage. Having a massive industrial base and the ability to easily replace losses didn't hurt, either. During the Guadalcanal campaign, the USN lost almost twice as many cruisers and more destroyers than the IJN, along with two aircraft carriers. However, the Japanese had completely lost control of the sea around Guadalcanal by February 1943. The sinking of the battleships Hiei and Kirishima within 24 hours of one another were the kind of crippling losses the IJN just couldn't recover from.

I know I've mentioned it before, but anyone seriously interested in the Pacific War needs to read Shattered Sword. It explains the inner workings of the IJN and the Japanese naval mindset in way more detail than I could ever hope to do in a single message board post. :yeah:

Indeed, the battle that I won and then retreated from... :oops:

I've got a copy. As someone who grew up on Walter Lord's book, Incredible Victory it certainly has forever changed the way I see the Battle of Midway. From an American underdog win to Japan basically sticking it's head in a noose for lack of imagination on how to further prosecute the war.

Yup! IJN's thinking, of course, was shaped in a lot of ways by their experience of the Russo-Japanese War and the quasi-Mahanian victory at Tsushima. The IJN certainly took to heart the reasons for their own triumph, but failed to grasp the real reasons for Russia's humiliating defeat. To them, it was an example of a European empire falling to tactical brilliance and superior morale, all under the command of a genius admiral and his ultra-disciplined subordinates. In that, they totally disregarded the fact that Tsushima had virtually no impact on the war's outcome, or that Russia's war effort collapsed from the inside, for systemic reasons unique to Russia.

So their myth of the decisive battle was born, and built on layer upon layer of flawed assumptions that were held up as doctrine for the next 40 years.

The Russo-Japanese War played a part, but I suspect that a rarely discussed factor is the warpage caused by Washington Naval Treaty. I won't call the "Fleet Faction" unrealistic - they knew well enough they can't really get parity, so they were trying for 70%, which as I understand it is actually defensible by then contemporary naval theory as the approximate minimum mark they need to win.

The 70% is roughly adequate for (according to then naval theory):
1) Mutual annihilation with the Americans, should it gather up its entire force and move across the Pacific, since they are expected to lose 30% combat power while swimming over.
2) The defeat of the American Navy, should it commit its Pacific Fleet first, then the Atlantic in-turn.
3) The defeat of a theoretical British/American allied force if the issue is such that they'd only commit their Pacific Fleets.

Overall, these aren't extremely unreasonable goals or "excessive sufficiency."

The Americans and Brits crow about their "Two ocean theory" but let's fact it, the Brits are only defending their colonies and America is more or less self-sufficient even without oceanic trade at that time, so their justification is, in objective terms, much weaker than Japan's whose trade relates to the very survival of their core nation. There's also the fact that American and British national power is in the long run much stronger and so the Japanese will have to think really hard before getting too cocky, even if they did get an edge in the Pacific.

The Fleet Faction even read America properly that they would be reasonable and concede to 70%. Well, that is, until the moronic Japanese Foreign Ministry decided to send messages suggesting that 60% would be acceptable to the Japanese government. The Americans decoded the message and failed to consider the real consequences of forcing a treaty that's just below what they needed. The fact the decoding tends to be dominant factor in American accounts would suggest that really, the 60% was a nice to have rather than a critical necessity as far as the Americans are concerned.

Because of the idiocy of the Japanese Treaty Faction (yes, the idea of some kind of treaty is definitely a good one for Japan, but the Fleet Faction actually read America's limits better that time) and America's "Take When You Can" policy, the rest of Japanese naval construction and tactics throughout the 20s and 30s are a desperate attempt to make up for that "missing" 10%. You can tell how a navy feels about its position by how overloaded its ships are :-)

In a sense, it may actually have been better for the Japanese Navy had a deal where they are limited to say 30 or 40% of the American Navy was shoved down their throats. With the gap so great, the goal to beat the American Navy (on a tactical level) would be completely off the table, and a different development can take place. It also gives them a firmer ground to demand decisively different terms for the next treaty.

It didn't help when in the next Treaty, the Americans and Brits came up with the brilliant tactic of banning the "Special Type" destroyers, which really are a defensive measure. Sigh...

I have not seen the history program, but it is not accurate to say the IJN lost most battles.

You can break it down into time periods:

-phase I: dec. 41-april 42. In phase I, the IJN won almost every battle, scored some spectacular successes, including the Java Sea battles, destroyed most of the ABDA/Asiatic fleet and captured SE Asia. This was the peak of the IJN in terms of leadership and competence;

-phase 2: may-november 42, the carrier battles. Much maneuvering, 4 actual CV vs CV battles: Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz. Midway was a IJN loss, but the other three were tactical draws. At the end, the loss table was the same, 4 CVs lost by both sides. In this phase, due to losses, the quality of IJN pilots detoriorates quickly;

-phase 3: aug. 42-nov. 43, Guadalcanal/Solomons Islands. Almost exclusively surface night fighting. At the beginning, the IJN is excellent, good tactics, equipment, optics. They score a spectacular success at Savo Island, sinking 4 Allied CAs. At that time, the U.S. is only average, poor radar equipment and over reliance on it, poor night fighting techniques.

The USN improves its tactics in the next 3 battles: Cape Esperance, and Guadalcanal I and II, which are all U.S. tactical victories.

At Tassafaronga, the U.S. suffers a defeat when 3 CAs are heavily damaged and 1 sunk, all by torpedoes.

However, the U.S.N. kept improving its equipment, by mid-43, the U.S. radar was generally better that IJN optics, they keep improving their leadership/planning, radar fire control, damage control, torpedo evasion and attack tactics. The IJN does not however, and its skill level declines over this period. IMHO, this has more to do with the fact that the IJN is badly overstretched and running out of competent personnel.

The IJN does score some occasional successes such as Kolombangara in july 43, where 3 U.S. CLs are heavily damaged by "Long Lance" torps.

The last major battle is Empress Augusta Bay in Nov.43 where the tables are completely turned from Savo. A scratch IJN force of 2 CAs, 2 CLs and 6 DDs try to intercept the Bougainville invasion fleet. Rear adm. Merrill only has 4 CLs and 8 DDs to stop them(much weaker than the allied force at Savo), but his group is intensely trained, knows exactly the battle plan and are all combat veterans. His radar picks up the enemy quickly, firing is started quickly and kept up at a frenetic pace (the IJN admiral thought he faced a much bigger force because of the firing, which totalled 10,000 6" shells) and Merrill keeps his force constantly going through 180 turns to throw off IJN torpedoes. At the end, the IJN loses 1 CL, 1 DD and are driven off, Merrill does not lose any ships.

-phase 4: jan. 44 on. Not much to say, "Turkey shoot".