Death and valor on a warship doomed by its own Navy.
 

It's the dead of night, and the USS Fitzgerald is on a secret mission to the South China Sea.

The sailors on the $1.8 billion destroyer are young, tired and poorly trained.

Disaster strikes at 1:30:34 a.m.


https://www.subsim.com/radioroom/att...4&d=1581641086




.....

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This makes, IMO, a pretty strong point for a rethinking of the USN's OOB, to switch from a full capital ship navy made mainly of AB and Ticos to a mixed fleet with capital ships and smaller frigates, that allow the execution of the still important flag showing and presence missions while reducing drastically the load in terms of crew mobilisation. Assuming similar numbers of sailors, the numerous missions that do not require WW3 level of combat - and even some of those that would - could be executed properly with smaller and less crew-intensive ships. Even BMD missions can be done seriously with frigates, these days.

We'll see if the USN's FFGX program will take this into consideration and whether they'll make the choice of deactivating enough Burke and Tico to man these new ships rather than pushing the pressure even harder on the human elements.

What about radar
 

Wouldn't there have been an officer and crew on watch with radar?

Read it, there was.:yep:

Well , apparently USN officer didn't have a lot of real naval training before being commissioned, they are thrown on ships and learn on the fly.



In France (and I think in many other countries, they spent a lot of time on ships before being Officer, from bridge simulator to rowing boat to LHP)



here an old paper from the USNI

https://www.realcleardefense.com/art...ps_112891.html

The big issue is one of personnel availability, from my understanding of things. The Pentagon gets more and more ships to do more and more missions given by the political leadership, but doesn't get enough crews and support to fill all of these. Thus my opinion that mothballing part of the AB/Tico (I'd go for mothballing all Ticonderoga and specializing some AB in the coordination/ABM roles), freeing a lot of people for the remaining ships and then getting the rest on smaller frigates that would show the flag, provide ASW support, do some ABM, etc.

The notion of overkill is a very real one, and the US isn't going to solve these issues by shoving more money at it. It's either this or cut down the missions of the USN.

great article, thanks for posting.

yes, many mistakes were made, many by the officers on watch, but also many by the U.S. Navy and DoD.

but what I love about these stories are the heroes, enlisted men and officers who step up and take the actions which are required to save lives and save the ship, they are the backbone of the Navy.

On the 32 mandatory course for the 4 years cursus at the US Naval Academy, only 4 (one per year) are about seamanship with only one practicum (with labs on simulators not on ships!) so whatever the cause, the officer at the end of the 4 years have no practical knowledge about real ship handling.

I would point out that USN is stretched thin as it is with it's current global comitments, cutting down ship numbers is not going to work.

Having ships more adapted to these "commitments" (to which I personally fail to see the interests, as there aren't such things as guided missile destroyers flying the Jolly Roger in the 21st century) would be more sensible. The vast majority of missions where the USN deploys a DDG could be done entirely by a FFG. Arleigh Burke crew: 300+, FREMM (European MultiMission Frigate): 130.


And, hell, for many, many missions, even a FREMM would be overkill, so the USN could still do what the politicians want from it while saving a lot of bodies, if it switched from a full DDG/CG format to a mixed FFG/DDG/CG one. I mean, imagine if the USN tried to win the Pacific War by acquiring nothing but heavy cruisers, battleships and aircraft carriers.

I personally, from what I know which is not much, lay most of the blame on Mabus and Clark. This is the companion article, on USS MCCAIN, just as informative:
https://features.propublica.org/navy...-cause-mccain/

I believe Davidson, I have worked with leaders like Mabus who are closed to input.


Yeah, only a moron of the highest order would alter proven training methods so radically and expect it to work.

Plus, I suspect the caliber of sailors has changed over the years. Our society has changed.


My generation wasn't as tough as my father's generation. The current generations are softer yet. It's not a thing to characterize as blame or denigration, it's just a result of our success as a society. We're nicer, more thoughtful, and more understanding and supportive of each other. We're just not tough warriors anymore.

Wow! I'm only a few pages in and this is some REAL journalism. Love the way it is presented as well. Thanks so much for bringing this article to our attention! Very fascinating read. Back to the article!

While I agree with you that many of those missions can be completed with FFGs the problem is that US needs to maintain dominance in naval theatres which means that they need all those DDGs and if anything I think that the decision to focus on them was a good one given limited USN resources post Cold War.


As to the crews - USN is known to deploy intentionally larger than normal crews as this makes at sea maintenance and the like easier.

Thanks for posting that article.
But your closing statements caught my attention even quicker.
This:
[QUOTE=Onkel Neal;2649555]
Plus, I suspect the caliber of sailors has changed over the years. Our society has changed.
My generation wasn't as tough as my father's generation. The current generations are softer yet. It's not a thing to characterize as blame or denigration, it's just a result of our success as a society. We're nicer, more thoughtful, and more understanding and supportive of each other. [/QUOTE

Both my father and uncle were USN towards the end of WW2, late 1944. My father was on a destroyer in a csg. My uncle was on a tender in another fleet.
They both saw action but won't talk about anything but the fun times.
From what I have gleaned over time both saw some boats sunk and don't want to talk about the details.
They were/are both farmers before and after they served. And still the two toughest men i've ever met.

I followed my fathers footsteps and went into the USN at 20 years old. I spent 5 years patrolling for Somali pirates. We sunk more than a few and brought them onboard (brig) and dropped them off to the local authorities. Fairly sure they were all likely executed by firing squad after a VERY short trial. The (at least then) somali government didn't like them any more than merchant ships did.

I did get to go to a lot of exotic ports getting to/from patrol area though.


Speak for yourself :03:


But yes, my nephew (my sister passed away) seems to think I owe him something. I've told him the only thing I owe his lazy Millenial self is a swift kick in the ass. He can't even hold a job at a fast food restaurant while saying he is a "Chef" and won't work for anyone until they appreciate his ability.
I've suggested to him his only chance is to become a military cook because he runs out of his moms money in a few more months.
And i've let him know in no uncertain terms he won't get a penny from me unless he proves himself a man.

See? I am softer and kinder. I likely will make you walk the plank but I won't shoot you in the back to get you to swim, I'll just yank the plank out and find out if you can swim or not. :arrgh!:

I should add, most or all countries are suffering from the "Millenial" problem.
Young people were grown up thinking they didn't have to win, they only had to show up to get the same trophy as the winners.
Most of them know very little about courage, honor, or anything related to actually being that type of person.
Your statement of the population being kindler and gentler is correct.
As fortunate as that is in regards to less racial division and so forth, it WILL have the downside of peoples that would seek to end the USA realizing they might be able to, from within.
I won't speak to religions or politics, but i'm quite sure you know what i'm saying without saying it.

"Children are now tyrants, not the servants of their households. They no longer rise when elders enter the room. They contradict their parents, chatter before company, gobble up dainties at the table, cross their legs, and tyrannize their teachers."

Hard choices, I know. But then the better path to increasing the number of crews with the same pool would be the more automated rather than smaller ships, for example compare Russian and US submarines. This choice makes even more sense when you consider the division of labour between US and allies, with countries like Japan providing suplimentary capabilities like SSKs.


As to the economics - it was mostly about doing all three of Gorbachev's policies at the same time (now for the history quiz - what were they?) rather than the size etc.

Consider that Russian submarines don't have much of the same missions as the US', they aren't trying to patrol all the oceans en masse at all times, so the patrol length is probably quite shorter. As for allies, that would require a sustainable diplomatic posture ensuring reciprocal loyalty, which, to use an euphemism, isn't exactly the trend taken at the moment by the civilian leadership in the US.

The size of the economies matter, and keep in mind that the US isn't in a shiny situation either, economically-speaking. Infrastructure is in a very had state, governmental healthcare spending is still growing without result, the educational system is increasingly dependent on foreign-born students to fill the needs for STEM graduates, the base industry lacks competitiveness and the management is infamous for its short-sightedness (Boeing, for example). I'm not saying that the US is going to implode à la USSR, but IMO, these military ambitions are becoming increasingly unsustainable due to internal tensions, disengagement from allies thanks to US diplomatic choices and pressure from China to push for higher defence spending.

Going for a frigate/destroyer navy would seriously reduce the costs while keeping capabilities pretty similar. After all, from what I understand, the US hasn't produced as many missiles for its ships as it has VLS cells in the USN. The AB on their own have roughly 6 500 cells (more if you count the ESSM in quad packs), and I kinda doubt they've produced as many Tomahawk, SM-2/3/6, ASROC and ESSM. Then there are the Tico.

Man, I come on here to check for a mod, and see this hot potato.

Here are my two cents:
(1) This is a manning problem. I witnessed first-hand how the Surface Navy uses up sailors, then expects them to conduct super-human feats of prolonged alertness and performance. Folks, the human body is similar to a machine; when the battery starts to get low, it needs a recharging, or it will start to malfunction. I know: I have been so exhausted before that I was hallucinating, a quality you do not desire in a watchstander at sea or anywhere. Somewhere along the way, some high-ranking muckitymuck convinced the Navy they could get away with a certain level of reduced manning because "muh computers," and my experience has been that this was a swindle. Anyone who has been to sea with the Surface Navy has seen the empty racks down in the berthings. These ships were built to carry a certain amount of crew. As long as there are exhausted sailors due in part to pandemic under-manning, there will be mishaps at sea. Further, I am under the unpopular opinion that even with perfect manning, the chance of a mishap remains. Risk can be minimized; it can not be completely eliminated at sea. Godspeed the fallen.

(2) False. I cannot speak to what goes on at the Naval Academy; I came into SURFOR via OCS. Immediately after commissioning, I attended Surface Warfare Officer School for three weeks. The course included shiphandling, COLREGS, navigation, and simulator time. We practiced getting underway, landing to the pier, underway refueling, anchoring, man overboard drill, and operating in dense traffic and low visibility, all while learning to monitor sensors and manage the bridge team to develop a surface picture. Once I reported aboard, and while underway, I was placed on the bridge watch to learn under instruction of the OOD.

(3) I don't think every SWO has the same training experience, and the lack of uniformity in training is problematic but likely unavoidable. For example, some newly commissioned SWO's report to ships going into the yards, and you can learn some stuff at the simulator labs, but you can't beat learning at sea. Another difference is every commander is different. One way to fix this is to divorce crews from ships, turn over the ships fully to the yards, select and train a crew for deployment, issue them a ship like you would issue a Marine a rifle, they sail on it, then turn it over to the yard when done. But the Navy leadership will never go for this; they are content to have a crew moldering on a dry-docked ship for two years or more (think about nuclear refueling for example). I have some radical ideas on how to fix these issues plaguing SURFOR, but I am allowed to because I now command an armchair. ;D
=== BT ===
(4) The notion that the root cause is some generational problem is a whole cloth invention. These are the hardest working people I've met, and may I propose that if this were a lazy generation: there would be no volunteers!


(5)Regarding funding, you could audit the Pentagon and the DoD contracting milk wagon and find enough money to launch and man another 500 ships. The whole apparatus is riddled with waste and needs to be leaned up, but enough lunch tickets have been issued that it is politically untenable to clean it up. Maybe I am overly pessimistic on this, oh well.

Amen with this, oversoul. I've experienced similar levels of physical and mental exhaustion a couple of times (civilian here, my most memorable 'the hell is happening to me' was after days without sleeping and working on my PhD thesis, at which point I was becoming aware of my brain's unability to focus even as I tried to push through). Without rest, the alternative is hard drugs as it was done during World War II for soldiers, some of whom being given early versions of meth to remain active in combat situation after too much time without rest.

It shouldn't come as a surprise that this isn't a sustainable doctrine for management of the forces. As for the waste in resources, you'd have to rework entirely the incestuous relation between the Pentagon, the MIC and the Congress, which is pretty infamous all over the globe for the revolving door policies between all three. These lead to absurd amounts of waste and program mismanagement. Of course, I really don't see any change happening there without a massive military/political disaster caused by it.