I think the point August is making, which I agree with is that it was not obvious in the first few months of 42 that the US had already won the war.

The basic Japanese strategy was to fortify the pacific island bases, pack them with troops, airplanes, ships, submarines and make any US offensive so costly that the US would have no choice but to eventually sue for a negotiated peace that would leave the Empire with most of its gains.

It is very easy to say in hindsight that, on paper, Japan had no chance, but wars are not not fought on paper, they are fought on the ground, by human beings who can become discouraged. In a war, anything can happen. Just look at Vietnam, on paper, the North Vietnamese had no chance...:ping:

The difference with Viet Nam was a combination of national will (we had it in spades post PH), and geopolitical reality. With VN, it was a proxy war with the Soviets, and we were highly constrained by the realities of that time period (unable to escalate without precipitating a wider conflict with the CCCP).

In the case of ww2, we had a free had to do anything we wanted, and did.

In the PTO, the outcome was in hindsight a foregone conclusion, and to the high US brass, it was also assumed to be as well, just a matter of how many lives and how much treasure it would cost.

In terms of when they knew the end was coming sooner rather than later, by late 1943, US intelligence assets in SE Asia were already working on post-war efforts (securing US trade in the region vs the Brits, which became a bone of contention later ;) ).

Pretty much, yes, we'd have been forced to follow geopolitical reality. Look at US foreign relations post-Revolution. We were skating on thin ice. Any liberties we took in that area were predicated on the reality that we were far away from Europe (the world was far "larger" in that time period (age of sail) than it was during ww2).

Japan itself thought, before the war, that their chance of victory was 10%, with a 90% chance of "national death." This comes from meetings of the IGHQ, in interviews with guys who were there.

So the sanguine, jap view was a 90% chance of losing the war. I say sanguine because if you look at other japanese estimates of how things would play out, they institutionally overestimated their own abilities, and underestimated the US. They thought their oil would last 2 years at war. It wasn't even close—their use estimates for modern warfare were ridiculously low. They cheated during their own wargames as a matter of course. They thought they'd be embraced as liberators (they partially were), but failed to include any downtick in opinion after they, you know, started murdering locals wholesale.

So, in 1940-41, the Japs, being grossly optimistic estimated their own odds at 90% for a US win. The US estimated it's chances at better than 90% to win—generally, 100%.

The US and Japan were both in agreement that it was the US's war to lose. Japan counted on one thing—lack of US will. That's IT. They assumed that they'd beat us up, then sue for a negotiated peace because Americans were weak-willed, and we'd take that. Note that for this to be plausible, we'd have to sue for peace before the in-progress ship building program started churning out a navy the size of the rest of earth's nations combined in 1943.

So even if you assume that there is a chance that the US would have done this before PH, was their ANY chance after PH? I'd say zero chance.

I need to reiterate this in a less long-winded way.

The japanese war plan was not ever predicated on military victory, but a victory of WILL. No jap victory could stop the US from winning—they thought that a US defeat would break our spirit and we'd sue for peace. How'd their one big victory (in the "decisive battle" sense), Pearl Harbor, break our spirit?

What I said above was that high US brass—Admiral King, et al, plus the political leadership—thought that the US chances in the PTO were certain. The US brass would have estimated the US MILITARY chances. Not will. King assumed we had the will. Political will was not his job.

So can you say there was some >0% chance of a failure in US will? Sure. Was it the brass's job to worry about that? hell no, they'd have told FDR, "we'll crush them once all those new ships we got you to pay for hit the theater" and they would have believed it, too.

You totally ignore the fact that in 1942 those ships still had to be built.

Natural disaster, political upheaval, game changing secret enemy weapon or just plain old bad luck, many things could have occurred to scupper the most solid of plans.

Until those ships are built, until the people are motivated, until millions of men are equipped, trained and transported around the globe, and they win the fights they are sent there for, only a fool believes that victory is assured.

From the few times the US actually came closest to being the poor side of this situation, say the War of 1812 or the Confederacy in the Civil War, a disadvantageous geopolitical situation hardly deterred war. In those cases, the gamble wasn't that different from what Japan chose, that 1) the enemy's will was finite, and 2) that ultimately they aren't that interested (like Vietnam).

I'm ignoring nothing, I said that the HIGH BRASS felt it was certain. I then said in hindsight, it was also certain.

There are NO plausible scenarios, or even highly implausible but possible where Japan succeeds after PH. None, zero, zip.

In 1942, the ship for '43 were already being built. They had been planned for a couple years. It was in fact that building program that had the IJN backed against the wall—not the trade stuff, that was temporary. It was that they knew the 8-8 fleet they wished would soon be not nearly enough. The US ships were already under construction.

The US had zero chance in 1812 of defeating the RN. The problem for the UK in 1812 was that one, their pressing policies were in the wrong, flat out, and two, the economic impact on British industry (wanting American raw materials) was huge, and negative. Japan had no economic leverage vs the US at all. They basically didn't matter one way or another. Their only leverage was fighting, and somehow making it so costly we'd blink. Apparently the US blink level was pretty high, at least as high as the total ww2 US body count.

Besides, again, the situations were very different in the age of sail. Japan might in fact have won a ww2 like situation in the age of sail, but NOT in 1941. Not possible.

They had zero chance for MANY reasons.

Some of which include:

1. US will. Post PH, we were POed, no possible way the war ends in the first year, and that is pretty much required for a jap win. Maybe into 1943. After that, they are toast.

2. No industrial capacity to wage the war they started.

3. Not nearly enough merchant shipping, particularly tankers. Jap merchant shipping was not enough even with ZERO USN submarine action. I have the stats in a book, but the % in repair was high, and the IJN and IJA conscripted virtually all able-bodied men, and the stevedores were decimated. Unloading and loading ships was incredibly screwed up and massively decreased the efficiency of the limited merchant marine (more trips is just as good as more hulls, and they had neither). All the best shipyards were pretty much only working for the IJN, so repairs soaked up the remaining limited resources... really ugly.

4. Horrible pilot training paradigm. Pilots were effectively irreplaceable. By fall of 1942, the pilot situation was in fact hopeless already. A handful of great pilots is not nearly as useful as countless good pilots.

5. No policy or culture (in the IJN) of protecting the merchant fleet vs submarine attack (grossly exacerbating #3 above).

6. A really bad war plan on the strategic level.

7. Sigint and code failures (huge, really huge)

The list goes on, really. All the initial expansion went great, but for the most part everything fell apart when they started to extemporize.

Actually no. Research I've done has always been dedicated to the machinery. I know practically nothing of politics and policies.

Nope. I've done a cursory study of the Stinnet papers and read the rebuttals, but all my knowledge of the time is general at best.

No, I have no challenges or rebuttals, just curiosity. You don't need to go into any great detail, just a general outline of what the papers say and specific references (as in the names of the books). If it shows that Roosevelt was actively trying to get us into the war, great.

The only absolute proof I will demand is that of Roosevelt's prior knowledge of Pearl Harbor, if that is your contention. I know they expected an attack, I just find it hard to believe they expected it there.

So no, I'm not setting you up or leading you on. I just like to see proof (or even good evidence) when claims are made that go against my preconceptions.

Suggested reading related to the start, and larger strategic picture (I'm not pulling this out of my ass ;) ):

Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 by David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie

Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941 by Mark R. Peattie

Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II - by John Prados

The Japanese Merchant Marine in World War II by Mark P. Parillo

Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942 - by H. P. Willmott

Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies, February to June 1942 - by H. P. Willmott

Soldiers of the Sun: The Rise and Fall of the Imperial Japanese Army by Meirion Harries

They were banking on us being soft and rolling over.

I think I've read this before. It was a very intersting read.

In a nutshell this was the entirety of the "grand strategy" to the extent they even had one. Roughly, smash the USN, take the NEI (the whole point of the war), then fight "decisive battle" vs the US (after attriting the USN as it moved West), the result of which (victory for the IJN due to the superior fighting spirit of it's men!) would force us to sue for peace.

It was ridiculous.

Look, a series of meteors might have taken out DC, and all our industry, leaving us open for Japanese invasion—you never know! That's about it for likely scenarios of a Japanese win in ww2 ;) No military reversal could have changed things in the first year other than delay the inevitable.

I'm not arguing it as a sideshow, it was in reality the real war in US terms since they started it.

On a side note, I think it's funny how (back then and now to a lesser extent) we, the US, were praranoid about a Japanese invasion in the mainland. There's no way that would have happened. I just laugh at some of those "what if" scenarios, that people take seriously.

Maybe something for the history channal.....:har:

I really should get a copy of that Kaigun book. If I recall, it went into detail about the developement of all of their ship classes (ie carrier force, destroyers, etc) It was interesting to see the debate between the "old guard", the Mahanian-BB big battle strategy and Yamamoto's line of thinking focusing on air power.

It also talked about, in great detail, about the developement of the long-lance. That's worth the read right there.

For the last time tater. You may have the means to build something but you still haven't done it until you actually do it. To think that success is assured before it actually is only leaves you unprepared when you get blindsided by an unforeseen event, and contrary to the black and white view of the world you like to promote it very rarely works out like that in real life.

What if the Japanese had managed to secretly stash away a hundred times as much oil as they had?

What if the Japanese had backed up the air attack on Pearl Harbor with troop landings?

What if Japanese had managed to block the Panama canal?

What if their German allies had developed The Bomb before we did and not only shared the technology with the Japanese but also sent them a few functional devices the Japanese could use to Kamikaze into Pearl or worse, San Diego and/or San Francisco?

What if the Japanese and Germans discovered that we were reading their coded signals and changed their systems to something we couldn't?

... I could keep going here if I wanted to spend the time but you get the point I hope. You can't tell me that these type of thoughts were not worrying doubts in the minds of the US "High Brass" in early 1942.

They didn't, and the vast majority of jap oil came from... the USA. We knew what their reserves were at least in order of magnitude. Again, the US brass was pretty confident at the time, this is not controversial at all, it was in fact their opinion in 1941.

In every post, I have said there is no plausible scenario AFTER PH. An invasion at that time (directly following the attack) could well have been successful, though it would have been a huge stretch. As it was, the IJN needed to bug out to refuel, they had no capability for the Kido Butai to hang off Hawaii for more than a few days. Really.

Doesn't matter in the long run, Hawaii was too far away for Japan to supply, it would have been an albatross. In addition, they simply lacked the troops to take and hold Hawaii, AND take the souther resource area (NEI). As it was, troops in the jap expansion were reused, hence the well-planned time tables. Take Malaya, get put in a ship then take the next place. they reused troops.

Had the PH attack included an invasion, the "Germany first" policy—which was largely in place because King, et al were so confident about kicking Japan's ass—could simply have been put off a little. Operation Torch was largely FDR posturing—it was supposed to take place just BEFORE the elections in the US instead of just after. Those forces could have been thrown into Hawaii. BTW, look how long the Philippines held out, even under their (poor, IMO) generalship.

LOL. It would have been fixed, it's not like they could hold the canal, lol. Regardless, ships could take the longer route if needed for the weeks required to fix it.

I said plausible. The germans were no where near having the bomb. Not even close.

This is plausible at least. Yeah, that would have decreased a massive force multiplier we had. But think about it, the US was massively more powerful than Japan, AND had a force multiplier. So minus the force multiplier, we're still ahead. Heck, maybe they'd have changed it before we whacked Yamamoto! Had he lived, the war might have been shorter (he is perhaps the most overrated admiral in history, IMO).

Doesn't matter, their confidence is still a known entity.

You are arguing what-if, when in fact they WERE confident. Again, their confidence is not controversial, and their choices for how to prosecute the war show this out as the fact it is.

Regarding invading Hawaii, I granted it might have been successful right after PH, but the more I think about it, the less plausible that is. How would they keep air support? How? The Kido Butai could not have stayed there. They had few oilers, and fleet replenishment was actually a new thing to the IJN. That means after a few initial attacks, an attempt to invade Hawaii with no air support, and zero ability to support in any way other than CVs.

Not only is this crazy, but it would have been diametrically in opposition to IJN doctrine. remember, you fight like you train, and the IJN planned for years to fight the decisive battle in home waters. It's like Midway—that would have been a disaster for the IJN had they won. Why? They'd have to defend the place, FAR from home.

http://www.coverbrowser.com/image/be...006/2110-1.jpg

:yep: