I agree there, although I would put the Soviet infantryman first.

Here in the US, when I was in elementary school (the 1960s), the overwhelming focus in our classroom studies was on D-Day and the fighting in the Pacific. Sadly, we were taught very little about the contributions of the USSR. I don't know how history is taught today in American schools, but IMHO our "learning" in the 1960s was far, far too US-centric. And I say this even though my father and uncle served in the US forces in Europe.

It wasn't until the early 1970s when I began doing my own research that I discovered that "other countries" had contributed mightily to the war effort.

But getting back to the topic of U-boats, when we talk about "what ifs" I don't think we should assume the result in real-life 1945 was necessarily the only one the leaders on the allied side would have accepted. A force of 600-700 Type VIIs, with 250 on patrol at any given time, might have starved Britain into making a deal with Hitler before the US could bring itself to enter the war openly.

Then what? One possibility is that Hitler could have reached an understanding with the UK and the US on the "real" enemy of "the West" and moved east with the tacit approval of the Anglo-Americans. Remember, before 1941 there was no love lost between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviet Union.

The possibilities are endless.

I thought I should start by stating that Hitler wasn't quite right in the head, which didn't help. :doh:

He just wanted too much and he underestimated the Russians which was a major mistake, though from what I've heard and read, the Red Army would have never been able to sustain their fight without aid from other countries, especially the USA.

Hitler's grand ideas put his country in a position where they had to fight too many opponents. He became overmatched. Without the involvement of the Americans or should I say with less involvement from the Americans, I think Hitler could have achieved many of the goals that he wanted, but his ambition wasn't realistic.

Edit: I just realized this topic is about where Hitler went wrong with the U-boat campaign. I'll have to get back with you on that one. :hmm:

Rather than wasting time building a navy, the Brits should have just had a lot of bouys with a large Union Jacks upon them instead. This would have killed the Germans due to sheer fright.

Just kidding!

Hitler was insane. It wouldn't matter what he woulda/coulda/shoulda done, he would have lost. The only way he could have won would have been to never start a war. To play the devils advocate, he could have used diplomacy alone to succeed.

Given the supposition that re-arrangement of the deckchairs on the Titanic would have made a difference in whether or not it sank, several good points were made about the war plan being circumvented by having the war starting years earlier than the Z plan called for.

Had the Z plan been completed, it still would not have guaranteed any victory but it would have made for a longer war. If Germany would have had more submarines at the start of the war, then again, it would have only prolonged the inevitable demise of Germany.

If they would not have used the Donitz idea of using radios with or without the beloved Enigma machine, they would have had a better chance of surviving in the Atlantic because the Allies found out where the subs were just when they used the radio to call headquarters. Yea, it may have decreased the effectiveness of the subs by removing the wolfpack attacks but that would make one wonder if the wolfpack ideas really made a difference in the Battle of the Atlantic. After all, if stealth is the key to the success of a sub, why tell everyone where you are with a radio signal that the Allies triangulated and used to find the subs in the first place?

Well we were speaking to the u-boat operations. But yeah, too many good quality opponents was the recipe for ultimate defeat.

Still, the u-boats were an unconventional weapon that Germany used with great affect against the England in both Great Wars. I think there's enough evidence to support that Germany had a real opportunity to deal England a crushing blow early in the war by smashing their supply lines. Yes England's fleet was awesome, but it was a surface fleet, and at the time it didn't have many counter-measures against u-boats. Besides, I don't think battlewagons stand a chance against subs anyway.

Hitler told his Admirals to expect a war around 1946, so the navy's production was geared to produce a balanced fleet according to that time table. Of course that didn't happen, and the u-boats - albeit a potent weapon - was all Germany had to really take decisive action at sea against England. But like in so many other instances Hitler didn't have the leadership qualities (or sanity as others have said) to follow through. 3/4 of his u-boat sailors died as a result.

Maybe it's because I'm Irish that I've always wondered -- what if the German high command had made a greater effort to strengthen ties with the 26 county Irish state, particularly early in the war against Britain, playing on the old adage that "England's difficulty was Ireland's opportunity". Surely, Ireland could have played a huge strategic role in the outcome of the U-Boat war, not to mention the obvious advantage to the Luftwaffe. The Irish Government of the day was by no means entrenched following years of civil unrest and if de Valera was to be replaced from within, so be it. Having suffered years of turmoil, extended periods of civil war and the English problem, Ireland may just have been the perfect place for National Socialist sentiment to catch on. The IRA remained actively opposed to much of de Valera's policies at this time. Ireland's position was uneasy to say the least.

Ireland had the strategic location and the ports which may have allowed the Kriegsmarine to effectively blockade Britain. Any opposition from the British in the North would surely have been shortlived in the face of large numbers of German troops deployed in the country.

Throwing this in to see what the reaction is.

Hitler's mistake w/u-boats--sending them in 1939 to operate against britsh!:nope: ---i remember reading somewhere that even if sealion was a victory there were plans to relocate U.K. goverment and royals to canada. thus hitler would of been atomized in 45. Also remember reading that even without the destruction of the germany heavy water plant in norway, the germans were far behind in atomic reaerch and did not even really concentrate on it with all the other wonder weapons.

(sorry -read lot of military history for hobby and interest but not academic enough to back up my claims:rotfl: :rotfl: )

That's a interesting point there Irish, like you say if Ireland had done a deal with Germany and allowed German UBoats and Fighters to launch from there it would have put a different spin on things, how much I don't know...

Am just glad that Germany did lose the war,for if it didn't my mother's family and my dad's family would have been killed and I wouldn't be here writeing this.

It's always struck me as odd that the German high command didn't explore the idea past making token gestures and what appeared to be half hearted plans to land troops on Ireland (Plan Green). I think the lack of an Irish front was a huge oversight on the German part. Of course it would have drawn British resistance, but Ireland had long been accustomed to a British military presence on the island and had a long history of resistance. Ireland at this time must be separated from the Ireland of today. A vast number of Irish people in 1939-40 were hardened towards the British in a way the current generation are not. At this point there was no Barbarosa, and it can only be said that abandoning Operation Sealion was a huge mistake and a turning point in the war. Modern historians have a tendency to understate the importance of the Battle of Britain and the U-Boat war. Moves towards the Ukraine and a Russian front would surely secure materials for the fighting of a war effort, but they'd also consume more than would be returned. Efforts really should have been focused on Sealion and the Irish front would have been crucial to this end. Apparently the idea was high on the mind of Hitler at the time when the British appeared poised to make moves towards the Irish Free State. Whether a bluff on the part of Britain or not, evidence suggests Hitler was aware that an Irish front could hasten the end of the war, but would only be possible if Ireland requested German assistance. Perhaps this was the reason Britain treaded carefully when it came to Ireland.

Neither of you are right. Largest fleet in 1939 was United States', closely followed by Great Britain's (on paper they were equals...actually the US navy was better quality wise, and in carriers there was no comparation possible) and third (in roughly a 5/3 relationship between US and Japan), Japan. ;)

UK had sustained war losses (2 CVs and one BB...if we count 1941 in, all the worse because mediterranean losses and Hood's debacle) and had a risible carrier force (when compared with US and Japan).

Japan was limited by the tonnages awarded by Washington and London's treaty. She was far behind both US and UK in most regards except for their carrier force, where they were somewhat ahead of the US Navy in number of hulls, yet not on numbers of carried based aircraft, where they were equals to the US Navy.

Of course the IJN was an elite force and the Kido Butai the Elite between the Elite, that's why it kicked so much butt up to May'42... but on paper they were inferiors to RN and USN in everything but carrier forces.

Japan DID had a deep interest in 'northen' strategy. So much that in during some stages of the Russian civil war they actually sent troops inside siberia (which they had to retire later). IN the 30s there were many border clashes between Japan and the USSR, and one full-fledged war (where do you think Zhukov earned his stars? ;)).

Japan was very interested in siberia as a source of their very much needed natural resources. The main problem they found was the soviets. There were very few foreign soldiers the japanese respected, much less feared. After the 1939 war vs the URSS, the japanese developed a very deeply felt respect, if not downright terror, towards the soviet soldier. What did happen?- they turned their attention south.

However, their initial focus was north. North there was their traditional enemy: Russia. South there was a neutral nation's colonies (the Dutch) and Britain's possessions...and between Japan and UK there had been a long-lasting alliance and friendship until 1919.

The japanese initially wanted to take Siberia to secure their resources. The problem is that the soviets gave them a lesson or two and forced them to run with their tails between the legs. And the Japanese learned the lesson so well that when they joined the Axis they specified in the statutes of the pact that all the Axis pact's clauses about alliance, self-defence, etc, were unappliable for them in what respected to the USSR.

And then they secured a non-agression treaty with stalin. Just in case.


They simply didn't want to have anything to do with the soviets again.

One last thing I have to say.

It's been said that soviet production during the war totally outclassed that of Germany. That's true.

It's been said that Lend Lease ammounted for a relatively small quantity of Soviet production. Thats true with reserves. On certain areas it is not. No less than 600.000 lorries and trucks were sent via lend lease which was an AMAZING quantity and well over russian total production during the war...

Same goes with radio equipment. Virtually 75% of the soviet radios in the 1945's Red Army were of western origin.

it's unclear how a mechanized army could do without that ammount of transport, and wether they would resort to smoke signals or tam-tam to coordinate their forces without proper radio equipment...but oh well...we'll let that aside for a second.


It's been said that before the war the URSS production already was over Germany's. That's also true.



However there are here 2 vital factors which are being totally overlooked.

1- Germany NEVER -and I say again, NEVER- went into war economy. Even in 1945 there were industries producing luxury goods...go figure in 1940. Germany never declared herself to be in total war (meaning they didn't turn their economy to a war one) until 1943, but that was also merely cosmethic. As I said: Germany NEVER went into war economy, not even in May 1945.

Unsurprisingly...everyone else outproduced them (well...except italy, lol).



2- pre-Barbarossa soviet production was very high. Post-Barbarossa was minimal. The immense majority of the soviet heavy industries were based on the "european" side of the USSR, they had to be moved beyond the Urals to be reconstructed. That took mor than a full year where all production from those factories was lost. Subsequently, Soviet production during June 1941-June 1942 was critically low.

Other side of the problem was the Red Army. They had stood the worse shock an army has even suffered. Millions of dead and captured, no less than 29.000 tanks lost. Dozens of thousands of trucks and vehicles gone. Hundreds of thousands of guns lost. Millions of Rifles, submachineguns, ammunition, volatilized. THousands of aircraft shot out of the sky or blown on the ground.


Again, it's been said here that the Germans threw their last 1941 potential breath at the gates of moscow. Again, that's true.

What's not said is the the Red Army had at that moment already reached the point of exhaustion and had went well past it. They had one only ace left- the siberian troops brought in a hurry. Soviet winter counteroffensives did less harm to the germans (who retired from an overextended front to a more normal one, which was actually good for them) than to themselfs (soviet losses were horrific in those offensives).

Summing up, in december 1941 the germans could give not a single step forward anymore. But neither could the soviets, except for the Siberians...and those had burnt their card for early 1942.


Then came Case Blue. German offensive on Southern USSR. I won't enter into explicit things here. Let's say Hitler did the best choice he could strategically at that time: to totally abandon the fight for Moscow (which at that point had the most fortified approaches to any city in the world-ever...except for Kursk in 1943), keep the Centre and North fronts on the defensive, and launch a major push on the south in a bid to reach the Caspium sea, cutiin the Volga line on the way, and with that cutting what the Soviet Industry and Army needed: the supply lines of the oil coming from the caucasus.

However Hitler did the worse job he could operationally. He spilt his advance in two, because he wanted to capture the caucasus fields (something totally out of German reach) as much as cutting the vital Volga Oil connection.


Case Blue failed because of this (well, and because he repeated many 1941 mistakes ---then he halted guderian's advance towards moscow...here he halted Kleist's advance towards Stalingrad, when it was held only by little more than a regiment of infantry...--- and that was just one of MANY stupid decisions, like putting a Panzer Army Group withing an INFANTRY ARMY!!!!!...and a long etcetera), because soviet stiff resistance, and because the Uranus (and the forgotten Mars) counter-offensives.


Now I ask myself and I ask the concurrence of this board.

How could an army built mostly from scratch because of previous year's grievous losses (1942's red army), be...well, be BUILT, if 90% of their heavy and armaments industry is paralized because it's on the move towards the other side of the Urals?.

answer: there was an appreciable ammount of soviet production during 1942, but the VAST majority of the equipment of those forces came via Murmansk.

In other words: No Murmansk, no stiff resistance by the Red Army in 1942. No Mars. No Uranus. No heroics in Stalingrad. Volga oil line cut from Soviet industry.

Soviet industry left without most of it's oil-Knock Out most of the soviet production.

K.O. most of the soviet production- Union of Socialist Soviet Republics bites the dust.

HItler wins in the east.




In short: Had the germans cut murmansk in 1942, the Russians would've mostly done.

After that date (late 1942) everything was said and done in the East. The war at that theater had already been won by the Soviets before Kursk: they had all their heavy and weapons industry back on line and working 24/7 at top speed. There was no longer a threat to their energetic main reserve. The question was not "who will win the Eastern Front war" any longer, but "when will the soviets win the Eastern Front war".


But in 1942 Germany had victory well within their reach...and one of the vital spots of the battles fought at southern russia was at the northern tip of it: murmansk. Cut Murmansk, you kill the soviets.

So yeah, indeed...Stalin and the USSR DID win the war in the east because the Murmansk convoys. Without that, they would've been blown away in 1942.

I’m coming late to this party, but I’ll throw in my $0.02.

First and foremost, I believe the main reason Germany lost WWII was that Hitler was at the helm. Thank goodness they didn’t win, as the Nazis weren’t exactly the most tolerant group. I certainly wouldn’t want to live under Nazi rule, or even have them as neighbors. I’m not much on any sort of totalitarian state for that matter.

This said, I think that Germany could have won WWII with a different leader and subsequent different mindset. Some key mistakes that could have been corrected:

1. Abandonment of the “Z” plan in favor of U-boats and fast surface raiders: Not starting the war until Doenitz had his 300 operational (VII and IX) boats. The other big blunder was not significantly modifying the U-boats over time to either incorporate or attempt to defeat the available technological advances.
2. Development of a large strategic bomber. The HE 111 and DO 17 weren’t up to the task. Hitler was far too focused on dive bombers, which botched up a whole host of developments, including the ME262 jet fighter.
3. Avoidance of targeting civilians during the battle for Britain and focusing on air superiority. Whether or not the RAF was weeks away from collapse when this shift occurred is immaterial: Targeting civilians removes the pressure from aircraft factories and airfields, as well as solidifying the resolve of the civilian population.

With Britain in a U-Boat stranglehold and the Luftwaffe focusing on air superiority, I believe Britain could have been defeated with a massive invasion prior to 1943. The key here would be to take out Britain quickly enough that the US wouldn’t have time to adequately intervene. Given the US response to Operation Paukenschlag, I don’t see this as outside the realm of possibility, but everyone is entitled to their opinion.

As many have pointed out, opening a second front with Russia wasn’t exactly the brightest move. The real blunder, from what I have read, was how the Nazis treated the Ukrainian people during the invasion. I read that the Germans were initially hailed as liberators. If you have read about the purges under Stalin, the logic of this is apparent. If, and this is a big if, the Germans had embraced the liberator role and brought the Ukrainians in as allies and offered sovereignty to each subsequent region, things might have turned out very different.

For those who insist that German couldn’t defeat Russia, keep in mind that the Russian Revolution of 1917 resulted in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Germany and Russia, essentially taking Russia out of World War I. The plight of the Russian peasants was absolutely horrible prior to the Revolution. Imagine, if you will, being told that you are going to advance against German lines with one rifle (containing only a few cartridges) for several men. The first soldier would run with the weapon until he was shot, then the next man in line would pick up the rifle and continue the charge. Now imagine doing this in freezing weather while wearing inadequate clothing and being half starved. Life under Stalin wasn’t any sort of picnic, either. If the Russian people were offered a significantly better standard of living, who is to say that a second Revolution wouldn’t have taken place?

All bets are off, at least in my mind, when it comes to conquering the US. Despite the blunders of the US administration and its very poor preparation for WWII, the logistics of traversing thousands of miles of ocean and then having to conquer and hold thousands of miles of territory were probably beyond the scope of WWII technology, at least until nuclear weapons were developed.

When all is said and done though, none of what I have written here could have come to pass. Hitler was an egocentric nut and taking on the role of liberators wasn’t compatible with the Nazi belief that the Slavic people were inherently inferior. Thank heavens we are fortunate enough to not be under Nazi rule… but the war “What ifs” are certainly fun to think about.

Actually it was some what simpler than that.

If only OKW had properly planned for the contingency that Fall Gelb would have been as huge a success as it turned out to be....and had the needed invasion barges onhand and ready.....the Wehrmacht could have followed the BEF from Dunkirk and neutralized England in a short campaign. In other words the German High Command envisioned France might fall but they never once considered that England would withdraw BUT not sue for peace. So no preparations for a war plan that called for an invasion of England was ever made....or if it was...it was not assigned the resources to carry it out. By the time it became apparent that only invasion would force British submission , they had recovered sufficiently to probably thwart any attempt.

The Royal Navy on the defensive in the narrow Chanel was never much of an obstacle, for obvious reasons, and the RAF having to fight away from their bases, and out over the channel, would have taken away that advantage they enjoyed. It is doubtful that given those conditions the RAF could simultaneously battle the Lufftwaffe while styming a waterborne invasion.

With not much more than a poorly equipped home guard to defeat, the British Isles would have fallen in short order.


So...given all that.... you are correct in assuming that concentrating resources from capital ship onto a large U-Boat service would probably have resulted in a different outcome. But one must also consider what would have happened in the Norway campaign without a sufficient surface fleet to carry out Weseruebung and how long Germany could have sustained it's war effort without Norwegian iron ore. Could it have defeated England before that factor became a dominant handicap?

Yes it certainly is tantalizing to contemplate all the "what ifs" isn't it?

Guys stop giving tactics on how to win WW2?!? What if some1 goes back in time with all these ideas and tells Hitler? Come on guys look at the bigger picture!