The IJA would have withered on the vine (as the island hopping campaign did to many units). It had no means to support itself with the home island isolated (as it was near the end). The war was a foregone conclusion one way or the other - Japan was lost - by VE day. Sure the IJA could have gone assymetric - but that would have only been prolonging its agony.

Well perception is everything and I doubt eventual victory was nearly as clear in 1942 as it is today.

Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold Stark said to the Japanese Ambassador to the US, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura in 1940:

For a picture of what the high brass though before the war...

Nomura knew it was true, too, as did the IGHQ.

I too have noticed the trend among some folks to attribute a greater importance to the War in Europe. I don't usually mind it, as it's most prevalent amongst Europeans and, ya' know, if parts of the war took place just down the street from where I'm sitting, I can absolutely understand why it might seem more important and present in their minds.

Memories of the American Revolution and the American Civil War are still pretty sharp in my country, after all.

Sometimes, though, I encounter the attitude from someone, usually a younger someone, who is just sort of talking out their ass...they've never really picked up any knowledge concerning the PTO, and it shows, yet they have this attitude that the war between Japan and the US was just 'something else that happened'.

These folks are usually gamers, and I actually DO blame some basically meaningless details for part of it. You will never convince me that part of reason for PC wargaming's 'Axis cult' is not the fact that the Germans had sharp uniforms and cool lookin' tanks and 'high-tech' equipment that in the real war was actually of little impact or importance.:)

Many people here are better with their history, and even those who describe the PTO as being of secondary import seem aware of the huge scale of the forces engaged in the conflict and the losses sustained by all the country's involved.

For me...well, I had relatives in both theaters, and war is hell wherever it's taking place, so I refuse to say anyone's sacrifice, ordeals, etc, are more important than anyone else's.

From a historical perspective, though, I quite honestly find the PTO to be utterly fascinating and the ETO to be less so (but still fascinating). This may be because the early actions were fought on such a shoestring on the part of the Allies, or that you had such a contrast between very modern warfare (entire battles fought between task forces that never saw each other) and very primitive (jungle melees in New Guinea).

Mostly it's because the PTO was so very much a naval conflict, and both the navies and the battles they fought there were so far out of scale when compared to Europe. I've always thought it so odd that such fame has been afforded to the capabilities of the Bismarck and the Tirpitz, for example, when in the Pacific, they'd have just pretty much standard issue.:)

Anyhow, the PTO was as world shaping a conflict as the ETO, and it's importance should never be downplayed. J

ust like in Europe, so much of what happened then affects what happened there today...I believe another factor in why these consequences are not seen as so important by some, is simply because those of us in the 'Western World' are often presented with an analysis of history that seems to forget that the Pacific and the people who live there exist.

That is a myth we all grew up with, myself included. In reality the AVG's first combat didn't take place until December 20, thirteen days after Pearl Harbor.
http://www.flyingtigersavg.com/tiger1.htm

Actually, a lot of the Japanese industrial capacity came from Manchuria, so the Kwantung Army would most likely have been able to supply itself to some extent without the home islands.

I wouldn't take that as a true picture of what the high brass thought before the war. After all it's not like Stark would tell Nomura "Boy I hope you guys don't attack us as we're way unprepared for war". You don't tell a prospective enemy your true feelings, you present a confident front.

Dec. 7 was a huge shock to US/UK military leaders who had seriously underestimated Japanese military capabilities. They had assumed that Japan could only strike at one place at a time, probably the Philippines, that they did not have the capability to attack PH and that their weapons/personnel were inferior to their own.

Instead they found the japanese could attack not only PH, but PI, malaya and many other places at the same time and that their planning, logistics, weapons, planes and pilots were as good or better.

Another shock came on Dec. 10 when the Prince of Wales and the Repulse were sunk. Most navy men had assumed that Battleships maneuvering freely at sea would be fairly safe from air attack. No one expected that the Japanese would sink them so easily.

Early in the war, there were serious estimates floating around washington that it could take 10 years to defeat Japan.

Within the Japanese military establishment, there were very diverging view of the US before the war. A fair number of Navy officers had travelled to the US, some had been educated there, many spoke english and they tended to have a healthy respect for US capabilities. Most Army officers however were insular and few had any direct knowledge of the US. They tended to dismiss the capability and resolve of the US. Unfortunately, the Army had the biggest influence in the government in 1941.

It's exactly what the brass thought—and how we prosecuted the war. It's not a surprise that the PTO played 2d fiddle to the ETO, it did because they were confident of winning the PTO. That made the first year even harder on the guys at the sharp end as they were forced to wage a shoestring war.

Note that the ship building program which pointed to our inevitable victory (even to the japs, who required the war be over before that point—it was supposed to be a short war with a negotiated peace before their 2 years of oil reserves ran out) would start having ships off the ways in 1943.

I'm not downgrading the PTO, it's my favorite theater, but the outcome was a foregone conclusion.

"I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve." - Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto

One of the few things Yamamoto (perhaps the world's most overrated admiral) ever said or did. That said, his view was not a lone voice in the IJN, or the IGHQ. In fact, it was pretty widely held. The IGHQ themselves, when getting ready for the war to start gave themselves a 10% chance of victory, with a 90% chance of (their own words): "national death."

Bottom line is that they knew that the USN building program (started before the war, and it being the US, the exact count of ships etc was simply published in the newspapers) would render the IJN impotent after 1943. They felt they had to act, since they had convinced themselves that the USN was their primary foe.

Actually, he didn't say that, or at least there is no record of him saying that. However, his view (and indeed, as you say, the view of more than a couple in the IJN) was that to win one major battle against the US would be nowhere near enough and that to truely win any war against them, you would have to subdue the US mainland.

Maybe that's indeed how they thought but you haven't proven it. Stark would have said that to Nomura even if he thought we'd loose if it came to war.

And beating the Nazis was the priority because they were seen as the more dangerous adversary of the two. That does not mean defeating either one was a given.

He said what is in effect the same thing in several private letters, though the wording was not poetic. He said that he could fight the US for 18 months, then later changed it to 6-12 months, after which he was not sanguine about the outcome. His private letters also show he was stuck planning for a war he was opposed to since he said flat out that they could not beat the US. His later statement that they'd have to march into Washington to win the war was sanitized and used as propaganda, lol.

But, yeah, the sleeping giant quote is apocryphal.

Well, it WAS a given in retrospect. 100%. PH destroyed ANY chance of Japanese victory—because they required a negotiated peace, and quickly. PH ruined any chance of that (and would have, even had the Declaration happened on time). The "sneak" nature of it, even with Declaration in DC, then moments latter bombs still would have incensed the US population (as it did). Game over, Japan.

Regardless, the proof is in the pudding. The US took a Germany first policy, and the deliberations of that are known. It was not simply germany was deemed the bigger threat—because germany was no threat to the US at all, just US interests in the ETO—meaning the UK at that point. It was because they knew they could win the PTO, and the Europe situation going forward was an unknown at the end of 1941. The idea was to temporize in the PTO until the naval building program started coming into play. Which is exactly what they did.

That at high levels the US was confident in the PTO is not at all controversial.