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Jimbuna 02-26-23 03:06 PM

We have to make sure that we are as powerful as possible both informationally and diplomatically, - Zelensky

President Volodymyr Zelensky met with the "United News" TV marathon on the occasion of its anniversary and emphasized the need to make Ukraine’s information and diplomatic capacity as powerful as possible and its position absolutely clear in all parts of the world.

As reports Censor.NЕТ, this was stated in his evening video appeal.

"Today, I met with representatives of our Ukrainian television, the Ukrainian television marathon "United News". Journalists, editors, producers. It was a very informative online meeting. The reason for the meeting was the anniversary of the marathon and gratitude to everyone who worked on it. But the content was much broader. We talked about strengthening the information work of our state and society. This is especially true for those parts of the world where our diplomacy has not been represented for decades for various reasons," Zelensky said.

According to him, "now we have to make sure that we are as powerful as possible in terms of information and diplomacy, so that Ukraine's position is absolutely clear in all parts of the world."

"This is important in our work to ensure the de-occupation of the territory and our planned active actions. The more people know about Ukraine, the more they understand Ukraine, the more they support Ukraine. And the closer our victory becomes," the Head of State emphasized.

He thanked everyone who works in the marathon and creates "this information foundation of our national unity."

"Thank you for the constant search for new methods of work for those who are now in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, for finding new ways to access our people in Donetsk, Luhansk, the south of the country and Crimea. It is very important that Russia has not managed to shut down our people and our land in the part of Ukraine where the terrorists' tricolor is still present. We have to do everything we can to ensure that our people have more access to truthful information," Zelensky said. Source: https://censor.net/en/n3402359

Dargo 02-26-23 03:11 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Skybird (Post 2855183)
13,000 participants, and the Nazi and conspiracy ideological slime to be expected. The Daily Mirror:
------------------------------


Old familiar or new movement?: Who the "Uprising for Peace" actually attracted

Sahra Wagenknecht and Alice Schwarzer dream of a new peace movement after their demonstration. But it is unclear what this would look like in concrete terms.

At the end of their joint gathering, Sahra Wagenknecht and Alice Schwarzer dream of something much bigger. "This is clearly the beginning of a citizens' movement," analyzes Schwarzer, a women's rights activist. People now want to start organizing, announced Wagenknecht, a left-wing politician.

According to police, about 13,000 people followed the two women to Berlin's government district on Saturday to demonstrate for an immediate stop to German arms deliveries to Ukraine and diplomatic negotiations. Both Wagenknecht and Schwarzer see the demonstration as the starting signal for a new political movement. But what would this look like in concrete terms?

To answer this question, it is helpful to take a close look at the participants in the Berlin "peace demonstration." Particularly striking was the advanced age of many demonstrators; young people were hardly to be seen. Similar to the protests of the Querdenken movement, the so-called boomer generation predominated in the spectrum of participants. Thousands of supporters of the Left Party and members of the peace movement gathered in front of the stage in particular.

Not necessarily dominating, but nevertheless present and tolerated in relatively high numbers were conspiracy ideologues and lateral thinkers. Thus, numerous symbols of the "Basis" party were to be seen, individual demonstrators demanded on posters the release of Querdenken founder Michael Ballweg.

Participants carried flags of the far-right "Free Saxons" or the Brandenburg offshoot "Free Brandenburgers". In addition, there were well-known actors of the scene such as the Dresden head of Querdenken, Marcus Fuchs, the Berlin doctor Paul Brandenburg or Putin propagandist Vyacheslav Seewald, who stretched a flag of the Soviet Union into the sky.

At least a thousand former participants of the Wagenknecht demonstration joined another protest at Potsdamer Platz after the rally ended. This was dominated by right-wing and conspiracy ideological groups and was apparently also registered.

Although an attempt was made at the beginning of the Wagenknecht demonstration to push the editor-in-chief of the far-right "Compact" magazine, Jürgen Elsässer, out of the demonstration, this did not really work. A little later, "Compact" flags also appeared in front of the stage on the Straße des 17. Juni.

At the same time, numerous AfD politicians, such as the Saxon state chairman Jörg Urban, the Berlin member of parliament Gunnar Lindemann, Hans-Thomas Tillschneider from Saxony-Anhalt and the Brandenburg members of parliament Lars Hünich and Lars Günther, were on site. On some posters NS-glorifying slogans were to be read.
Racist insults against Ukrainians

Although the Wagenknecht demonstration remained peaceful on the whole, there were always clashes with pro-Ukrainian counter-demonstrators, especially during the arrival and departure.

In front of the Russian Embassy, there were not only verbal conflicts, but also physical attacks on people with Ukrainian symbols.

In addition, there were racist attacks against Ukrainian refugees who were demonstrating on the central strip of the boulevard Unter den Linden. Several times the phrase "**** off from our country" was heard.

Overall, the audience at Wagenknecht and Schwarzer's event was reminiscent, at least in part, of the spectrum of so-called "peace vigils" that marked the beginning of a cross-front from the right and left in 2014.

In this respect, it is at least questionable whether Sahra Wagenknecht and Alice Schwarzer's demonstration on Saturday actually marked the start of a new peace movement or rather brought an old, long-forgotten one back onto the streets and united it.
-------------------


Meanwhile, the Nazi and AfD state chairman Björn Höcke has offered Sarah Wagenknecht membership in the AfD.

Is that pool not the same we have seen with Covid protests in the Netherlands we see them trying to coopt new protest not for those new causes but only to protest their own idea's

Jimbuna 02-26-23 03:11 PM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EGJOF9nsLVo

Skybird 02-26-23 03:14 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Dargo (Post 2855244)
Is that pool not the same we have seen with Covid protests in the Netherlands we see them trying to coopt new protest not for those new causes but only to protest their own idea's

Yes it is. Over here they are called "Querdenker".

Jimbuna 02-26-23 03:18 PM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cmLKMkURu7U

Jimbuna 02-26-23 03:23 PM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZb9TFftY6k

Rockstar 02-26-23 05:08 PM

People Forgot How War Actually Works

Armed conflict is never straightforward. Weapons are not power. National identity matters.

By Phillips Payson O’Brien


https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/ar...entity/673192/

Quote:

FEBRUARY 24, 2023, 5:30 AM ET

Although the consequences of Russia’s terrible war in Ukraine will unfold over decades, three lessons from the conflict are already clear—and, in retrospect, should have been apparent all along. When the invasion began, a year ago today, much of the outside commentary focused on Russia’s advantages. President Vladimir Putin’s military was widely said to have overwhelming airpower and firepower, a fast-moving ground force, and extensive cyberwarfare capacity—all of which supposedly meant that Russia would rapidly conquer its neighbor. Its purported strengths seemed so great that when Russian forces were only just crossing the border, some analysts were musing about which pro-Moscow Ukrainian politician might lead a puppet regime in Kyiv.

Yet the first lesson of the past 12 months is that war is rarely easy or straightforward—which is why starting one is almost always the wrong decision for any nation. The United States has made war look simple at times, most obviously in 1991, when Operation Desert Storm dislodged Iraqi forces from Kuwait in a month and a half. Yet that victory was possible only after a decade-long U.S.-military buildup and with the deployment of the world’s most advanced military technologies. Even then, a defining feature of the Gulf War was that the U.S. did not try to occupy another society. When the opportunity to march on Baghdad presented itself, President George H. W. Bush’s administration held back.

In the three decades since, the United States, despite boasting the world’s largest economy and most powerful armed forces, has generally proved unable to translate its dominance into quick victories, ending up instead in protracted conflicts with at best mixed results. Wars start quickly but end messily. No one really knows how armies, technologies, and economic resources will behave when thrown into kinetic competition. Plans fail, confusion takes hold, and military advances give way to periods of stalemate.

Read: How and when the war in Ukraine will end. https://www.theatlantic.com/internat...-later/673159/

The past year in Ukraine is far more typical of war than Desert Storm was. Russia’s overwhelming power was anything but; instead of unleashing modern war on the Ukrainians, Russia relied on antiquated weaponry and command structures. Instead of taking Kyiv within weeks, Russian forces experienced major system breakdowns. Since then, Russia’s problems seem to have gotten worse. Putin has changed commanders like socks, equipment quality has degraded, and the number of casualties has skyrocketed. Now Russian and Ukrainian forces are facing each other in long lines of blood-soaked trenches, and Putin has little prospect of ending the war on his terms.

And though one side in a conflict almost never simply overpowers the other, the risk of failure is especially high for a deeply flawed power such as Russia. The second lesson of the current war is that military power is not the foundation of national power but rather the product of the economic, technological, political, and social factors that shape a nation’s armed forces. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is sometimes portrayed as pitting a great power against a small power. In Western policy circles, the dominance of Russia experts—many of whom have spent their career viewing Russia as a regional hegemon and its neighbors primarily as post-Soviet states—contributed to this framing of events.

Russia is indisputably a nuclear power, but by virtually all other measures, it lags considerably behind its reputation. Russia’s economy is seriously flawed. Its GDP ranks about tenth in the world and is less than one-tenth the size of America’s. Creating much of its wealth through resource extraction, Russia makes few high-technology products and indeed little else of any real value. Socially, Russia—where the population is shrinking and life expectancy is relatively low—exhibits signs of great distress. Politically, it has ossified under a dictator who has consolidated his hold on his country by tolerating corruption among those close to the throne.

In other words, today’s Russian military is the product of a declining kleptocracy, not of a great power. Yet even observers who perceive the factors sapping Russian power underestimate their importance relative to the squadrons of military equipment that the country’s decaying social structure has managed to create.

By overlooking Russia’s systemic weaknesses, Western analysts helped create the mess that democratic nations find themselves in today. The presumption, based on weaponry counts, that Ukraine was far too weak to resist Russia in open combat delayed the provision of significant military aid to the beleaguered nation. This was a perverse circular argument: Because Russia is strong and Ukraine is weak, we should withhold assistance from Ukraine.

Fortunately, that argument has proved impossible to sustain. A third lesson of this war—and many others since 1945—is that underestimating the importance of national identity leads to military disaster. By conventional criteria, Ukraine is far stronger relative to today’s Russia than Afghanistan was relative to the U.S.S.R. in the 1980s—and than North Vietnam was to the U.S. in the 1960s. Both Cold War superpowers were humbled by their attempts to suppress local resistance by force, and both had to withdraw.

Eliot A. Cohen: Military history doesn’t say what Ukraine’s critics think. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/ar...arison/673053/

Nevertheless, in the prelude to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and for much of last year, many in the West failed to appreciate how much Ukrainians value their independence and their democracy. Some Russia-focused scholars seemed to have accepted Moscow’s view of Ukraine as a weak, artificial entity with shallow popular support. Skeptics of NATO support for Kyiv focused on Ukrainian corruption (while conveniently ignoring the impact of corruption on Russian power). In the most extreme cases, some analysts even doubted that the Ukrainians would care enough to sustain an insurgency against Russian military occupiers.

Such judgments and doubts now look foolish. Ukrainian identity was strong and resolute from the start. Many analysts overlooked the military advantages that democracies—even imperfect democracies—have over dictatorships. Although the former frequently appear messy and divided when they are under threat, they can react more forcefully, flexibly, and intelligently in part because their citizens feel empowered to improvise and show initiative as combat circumstances change. That pattern has held true in Ukraine. Despite initially having fewer advanced weapons, Ukraine fought back hard, inflicting deep consequences on Russia, which has lost an estimated half of the main battle tanks it possessed at the start of the war.

The results are so stark that certain commentators who previously downplayed Ukraine’s chances seem to have changed their mind. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who has argued that the nation should remain neutral between the West and Russia, was insisting last year that Kyiv make territorial concessions. Earlier this year, he expressed support for Ukrainian membership in NATO.

The three lessons of the past year—war is never straightforward; power is not based on weapons; national identity has military value—should come as a relief to supporters of democracy. The great tragedy is that they had to be relearned in the first place.

Jimbuna 02-27-23 06:01 AM

How Russia took the south - and then got stuck

By Abdujalil Abdurasulov
BBC News, Mykolaiv

When Russia invaded Ukraine a year ago, one of the biggest successes they achieved initially was in southern Ukraine. Within a few days Russian troops attacking from Crimea had seized an area of Ukrainian territory bigger than Switzerland.

Ukrainian authorities are yet to explain what went wrong in the south in those early days. To help uncover what happened, the BBC has spoken to military officers, politicians and activists.

On 22 February 2022 at 19:15, the secretary of Ukraine's security council Oleksiy Danilov received a red folder with secret documents. They warned that the president's life was under imminent threat. Immediately, Mr Danilov contacted the head of the security services, the interior minister, prime minister and President Volodymyr Zelensky himself.

But Ukraine's leadership stopped short of declaring martial law, for now. There was no mobilisation of troops. Just a few weeks before, Ukrainian authorities had described Western warnings of Russian invasion as "manipulation" and called on everyone to remain calm.

Mr Danilov says the government had detailed information about the planned invasion, including its dates. "We expected it on 22 February," he explains, rolling out a secret map of the Kyiv region. Taken from a Russian commander, he says it confirms intelligence reports that Russia's initial plan was to invade two days earlier than they actually did.

"Our goal was to avoid any panic inside the country. So, it was crucial to keep it all secret."

If the Ukrainian authorities knew so much about Moscow's plans, why were Russian troops able to sweep across the Kherson region in the south so quickly?

A strait and a narrow strip of land separate the Crimean peninsula from the Ukrainian mainland, and they were natural obstacles for Russian troops. So too was the extensive network of irrigation channels in the Kherson region.

Ukrainian forces just needed to destroy all bridges there to slow down the Russian advance. But that did not happen.

Mr Danilov says the authorities are currently investigating this, and until that process is over they cannot give an answer: "But we are not hiding this fact, we are not putting it away in a drawer."

The Chonhar bridge which crosses the strait between Crimea and Kherson had been mined, Ukraine's general staff confirmed after the invasion. But it rejected suggestions that the explosives had been defused, saying Russia's invasion force was 15 times the size of Ukraine's defence.

Critics have argued it was precisely because of that Russian dominance that the bridge should have been destroyed.

It is clear Ukrainian forces were not prepared for a scenario in which Russian troops easily crossed into the southern Kherson region.

As a result, they had to retreat from the region right from the start. As they withdrew, it took two hours for columns of military vehicles and troops to cross the Antonivskiy bridge near Kherson city, according to Senior Lt Yevhen Palchenko, who defended the bridge over the Dnipro river.

That indicates Ukraine had concentrated a large number of troops near Crimea. But with the bridges still standing, they were quickly outnumbered and outgunned.

"How can you contain their offensive when we had no air defence?" Lt Palchenko explains. "Their fighter jets flew in and dropped a whole bunch of bombs, blowing up everything. We lost a lot of men and equipment there."

Speed was crucial for Russian success. Their tactic was to bypass large cities, encircle them and move on. They planned to take Mykolaiv in two days and Odesa in three days, says Maj Gen Dmytro Marchenko, who was sent to organise Mykolaiv's defence. But the Russian plan ended in failure.

When Gen Marchenko arrived, there was still no plan to defend the city. "When I asked where it was, I was told that they still hadn't put together a map," he said.

He took a road map, divided it into four parts and appointed units and commanders responsible for each section. They announced mobilisation and quickly signed up thousands of people. Many of the newcomers had previously served in the army.

They set up anti-tank groups armed with grenade launchers and organised signal posts to warn when Russian tanks approached. In contrast to Kherson, bridges across irrigation channels in the region were destroyed by hastily set up special forces led by MP Roman Kostenko.

Ukrainian troops fought fiercely to slow down the Russian advancement near the Antonivskiy bridge. At midnight on 25 February, Russian forces went on the offensive. Lt Palchenko and his tank battalion were there to stop them.

"My tank took a few hits, and the system was down. So, we had to do everything manually, like in T-34 tanks during World War Two."

The Russian forces were overwhelming, so Lt Palchenko and his battalion had to retreat from the bridge. But he went back there several times that night. His tanks covered Ukrainian paratroopers and their task was to prevent Russian troops from crossing the bridge.

The then-23 year-old was later awarded the country's top military honour, Hero of Ukraine.

Their resistance gave Mykolaiv a few more days to prepare its defences. Co-ordination and communication between military and civilian teams meant that the time was used well.

"[Mykolaiv Governor] Vitaliy Kim was amazing at communicating with people to organise help," Maj Gen Marchenko remembers. "We needed excavators - they quickly went and dug [trenches and ditches]. We needed concrete blocks and anti-tank 'hedgehogs' - in half a day, it was all done."

Local citizens constantly monitored the movement of Russian troops and passed co-ordinates to Ukrainian gunners. Ordinary people destroyed armoured vehicles and took prisoners, says Maj Gen Marchenko.

"We stopped Russia's forces because the people rose up," he adds.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64718740

Jimbuna 02-27-23 06:23 AM

How Putin's fate is tied to Russia's war in Ukraine

By Steve Rosenberg
Russia Editor, Moscow

I keep thinking back to something I heard on Russian state TV three years ago.

At the time Russians were being urged to support changes to the constitution that would enable Vladimir Putin to stay in power for another 16 years.

To persuade the public, the news anchor portrayed President Putin as a sea captain steering the good ship Russia through stormy waters of global unrest.

"Russia is an oasis of stability, a safe harbour," he continued. "If it wasn't for Putin what would have become of us?"

So much for an oasis of stability and safe harbour. On 24 February 2022, the Kremlin captain set sail in a storm of his own making. And headed straight for the iceberg.

Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine has brought death and destruction to Russia's neighbour. It has resulted in huge military casualties for his own country: some estimates put the number of dead Russian soldiers in the tens of thousands.

Hundreds of thousands of Russian citizens have been drafted into the army and Russian prisoners (including convicted killers) have been recruited to fight in Ukraine. Meanwhile, the war has impacted energy and food prices around the world and continues to threaten European and global security.

All problems of Titanic proportions.

So why did Russia's president set a course for war and territorial conquest?

"On the horizon were the Russian presidential elections of 2024," points out political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann.

"Two years before that vote [the Kremlin] wanted some victorious event. In 2022 they would achieve their objectives. In 2023 they would instil in the minds of Russians how fortunate they were to have such a captain steering the ship, not just through troubled waters, but bringing them to new and richer shores. Then in 2024 people would vote. Bingo. What could go wrong?"

Plenty, if your plans are based on misassumptions and miscalculations.

The Kremlin had expected its "special military operation" to be lightning fast. Within weeks, it thought, Ukraine would be back in Russia's orbit. President Putin had seriously underestimated Ukraine's capacity to resist and fight back, as well as the determination of Western nations to support Kyiv.

Russia's leader has yet to acknowledge, though, that he made a mistake by invading Ukraine. Mr Putin's way is to push on, to escalate, to raise the stakes.

Which brings me on to two key questions: how does Vladimir Putin view the situation one year on and what will be his next move in Ukraine?

This week he gave us some clues.

His state-of-the-nation address was packed with anti-Western bile. He continues to blame America and Nato for the war in Ukraine, and to portray Russia as an innocent party. His decision to suspend participation in the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between Russia and America, New Start, shows that President Putin has no intention of pulling back from Ukraine or ending his standoff with the West.

The following day, at a Moscow football stadium, Mr Putin shared the stage with Russian soldiers back from the front line. At what was a highly choreographed pro-Kremlin rally, President Putin told the crowd that "there are battles going on right now on [Russia's] historical frontiers" and praised Russia's "courageous warriors".

Conclusion: don't expect any Kremlin U-turns. This Russian president is not for turning.

"If he faces no resistance, he will go as far as can," believes Andrei Illarionov, President Putin's former economic adviser. "There is no other way to stop him other than military resistance."

But what about talks over tanks? Is negotiating peace with Mr Putin possible?

"It's possible to sit down with anyone," Andrei Illarionov continues, "but we have an historic record of sitting down with Putin and making agreements with him.

"Putin violated all the documents. The agreement on the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the bilateral treaty between Russia and Ukraine, the treaty on the internationally recognised border of Russia and Ukraine, the UN charter, the Helsinki Act of 1975, the Budapest Memorandum. And so on. There is no document he would not violate."

When it comes to breaking agreements, the Russian authorities have a long list of their own grudges to level at the West. Topping that list is Moscow's assertion that the West broke a promise it made in the 1990s not to enlarge the Nato alliance eastwards.

And yet in his early years in office, Vladimir Putin appeared not to view Nato as a threat. In 2000 he even did not exclude Russia one day becoming a member of the Alliance. Two years later, asked to comment on Ukraine's stated intention of joining Nato, President Putin replied: "Ukraine is a sovereign state and is entitled to choose itself how to ensure its own security…" He insisted the issue would not cloud relations between Moscow and Kyiv.

Putin circa 2023 is a very different character. Seething with resentment at the "collective West", he styles himself as leader of a besieged fortress, repelling the alleged attempts of Russia's enemies to destroy his country. From his speeches and comments - and his references to imperial Russian rulers like Peter the Great and Catherine the Great - Mr Putin appears to believe he is destined to recreate the Russian empire in some shape or form.

But at what cost to Russia? President Putin once earned himself a reputation for bringing stability to his country. That has disappeared amid rising military casualties, mobilisation and economic sanctions. Several hundred thousand Russians have left the country since the start of the war, many of them young, skilled and educated: a brain drain that will hurt Russia's economy even more.

As a result of the war, suddenly, there are a lot of groups around with guns, including private military companies, like Yevgeny Prigozhin's Wagner group and regional battalions. Relations with the regular armed forces are far from harmonious. The conflict between Russia's Ministry of Defence and Wagner is an example of public infighting within the elites.

Instability plus private armies is a dangerous cocktail.

"Civil war is likely to cover Russia for the next decade," believes Konstantin Remchukov, owner and editor of Moscow-based newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta. "There are too many interest groups who understand that in these conditions there's a chance to redistribute wealth."

"The real chance to avoid civil war will be if the right person comes to power immediately after Putin. A person who has authority over the elites and the resoluteness to isolate those eager to exploit the situation."

"Are the Russian elites discussing who the right man or woman is?" I ask Konstantin.

"Quietly. With the lights off. They do discuss this. They will have their voice."

"And does Putin know these discussions are happening?"

"He knows. I think he knows everything."

This week the speaker of the lower house of Russia's parliament declared: "As long as there's Putin, there's Russia."

It was a statement of loyalty, but not of fact. Russia will survive - it has managed to for centuries. Vladimir Putin's fate, however, is linked irrevocably now to the outcome of the war in Ukraine.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64744197

Jimbuna 02-27-23 06:52 AM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6pr69w9_LbE

Skybird 02-27-23 07:46 AM

I found this in FOCUS. It is a very relevant topic, that we understand that Putin started with a war of prostration, and when that failed, has shifted to a war of fatigue. And that is something Western nations are psychologically only ill-prepared for.
--------------------------------------

Many still do not understand Putin's true war strategy


by Herfried Münkler

Many Western governments still believe that Russia is pursuing a strategy of defeat in the Ukraine war. Yet Putin is clearly waging a war of fatigue. This detail is crucial to understanding how the war in Ukraine will play out in the medium and long term.

In 1890, the Berlin historian Hans Delbrück distinguished between a prostration strategy and a fatigue strategy in a widely acclaimed essay. The former is the strategy of rapid warfare, as preferably planned by the general staffs of land powers; the latter is the strategy of naval powers, who opt for it when a decisive battle seems too risky. They then aim not at the enemy's armored fist but at his blood and nerves; their aim is to render the fist powerless by the means of trade blockade and economic warfare.

Small-scale warfare (guerrilla) also follows the dictates of the attrition strategy: partisans avoid engagement with the regular military, lay ambushes and commit raids to wear down the opposition and force them to surrender. And finally, the fatigue strategy plays a role when a war does not reach a quick decision, even though both sides had set out to do so, and at least one side relies on exhausting the enemy, as was the case in the First World War.

In a war of fatigue, the advantage goes to the side with the greater reserves

In the war in Ukraine, we can currently observe that the Russian side is counting on exhaustion, while the Ukrainians are counting on the fact that they will succeed in driving the Russian troops out of Ukrainian territory, i.e. perhaps not knocking them down, but throwing them out.

Fatigue strategies can be directed mainly against the military or mainly against the civilian population, and they rely on the combination of physical and psychological exhaustion. This is as true of the artillery duels in the Donbass as it is of Russian missile and drone attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure. In a war of fatigue, the one who has the greater reserves and whose territory is less affected by acts of war than that of his adversary has the advantage.

In the case of the Ukraine war, the advantages clearly lie with the Russians. If the West does not want Ukraine to lose this war, as politicians have repeatedly stated, it must compensate for Russia's superiority with extensive deliveries of weapons and ammunition and a comprehensive willingness to stabilize the Ukrainian state budget. If he does not succeed in this, Russia will achieve its military goals in the long run. Then there will be no more Ukraine.

Many Western governments are overwhelmed with fatigue strategies

Waging a fatigue war is not only a question of will, but also of ability: Will the West's reserves of weapons and ammunition be sufficient to keep the Ukrainian army adequately supplied? In the long run, will the Ukrainian army have enough well-trained soldiers to offer effective resistance? And will the populations of Western countries be willing to shoulder the huge costs of supporting Ukraine for a long time to come?

The answer to these questions remains open, but it must be noted that many Western governments are not prepared for the challenge posed by the fatigue strategy, but have behaved as if they were dealing with a defeat strategy on the part of the Russians: in fact, the production of weapons and ammunition would have had to be ramped up in late spring 2022 to be able to deliver what was promised. And even now, it is apparent that many countries that were at the forefront of loudly declaring their willingness to supply Ukraine with modern battle tanks, but when it came to the immediate provision of these weapons systems, were hardly heard from.

Obviously, they were counting on the fact that the Germans would not deliver Leopard tanks and therefore made big talk behind their broad backs. Just as muzzlers (=Maulhelden) are not real heroes, muzzle suppliers are not real supporters.

A fast and comprehensive supply of the Ukrainian army is the solution

So now it is up to the German government to organize the tank coalition of the Europeans and thus do what it wanted to avoid at all costs - probably also anticipating how things would develop. The formula of "no German unilateral action" must now be refocused. It can no longer consist of observing in Berlin what others are doing in order to then join those who are in the majority, but must itself organize majorities and ensure that these majorities are also capable of action.

This is a challenge to which German politicians are not necessarily accustomed, for which they are not "trained." It remains to be seen whether they will be up to this challenge. This also applies to the way in which these arms deliveries are communicated to their own population: If Ukraine loses the war of fatigue, this will result in a flight of several million people to Germany. One must be clear about this. The formula familiar from the migration debate, namely that problems must be tackled where they arise, also applies here, and it means a rapid and comprehensive strengthening of the Ukrainian army.

Possible window of opportunity for negotiations?

But isn't there a negotiating window that can be used to end the war? Fatigue warfare always implies that at least one of the two sides will rely on a combination of warfare and negotiation. For them, in a reversal of Clausewitz's formula, diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means.

This does not argue against negotiations; one only has to know that here diplomacy also follows the principles of fatigue and that what happens on the front always plays a role. In other words, one can be defeated in negotiations because one suffers defeats in theaters of war and one's own negotiating position becomes weaker and weaker as a result - or collapses, which immediately turns compromise negotiations into surrender negotiations.

For German policy, this means that it must contribute to strengthening the Ukrainian military in such a way that the Russian side sees no chance of achieving its military goals even in a war of fatigue, or must suffer unbearable losses and accept disadvantages in the attempt to achieve them after all. The more insistent this prospect is for the Russian side, the sooner the fatigue war will end.
--------------

About the author

Herfried Münkler, born in 1951, is professor emeritus of political science at Berlin's Humboldt University. Many of his books are considered standard works, such as "The Great War" (2013), "The New Germans" (2016), and "The Thirty Years' War" (2017). Herfried Münkler has received many awards, including the Aby Warburg Foundation Science Prize and the Carl Friedrich von Siemens Fellowship
------------------------------------


Its like I said since weeks: Russia must not necessarily "win" tactical engagements and battles on the ground, just must keep the pressure on and keep the Ukrainians bleeding. Therefore, as some German commentator wrote some time ago, Russia will try to create "many little Verduns": and even if Russia suffers big losses and makes no tactical gains, the losses caused to the ukrianains, even if relatively smaller than the Russian, nevertheless damage the Ukrainians more severely. Russia can afford high losses easier than the Ukraine. This might chnage in a year or so, but for the time being this is the simple grim truth: Russia can afford high losses, Ukraine much less so.

Time is working for Russia, not for Ukraine.

Weapon deliveries must be unleashed, all inhibitions and limitations and concerns must be put down. A decisive military decision must be enforced - the ukraine cannot win by playing the long game. Even if in one or two years the Russians were completely kicked out (and thats a big "if"): what use is in that if then the Ukraine and all its industry, critical infrastructure and agriculture would be in complete ruins? Playing the long game only works for Ukraine if it were fighting the war on the soil of the enemy - not on its own. Over 70% of the critical infrastructure in Ukraine is destroyed already, and that is the assessment of Colonel Reisner from already several weeks ago. The fairy queen will hardly have come over night and improved things since then. China seems to mull delivery or artillery and ammunition, it cannot allow Russia getting too weak if it should be of use as an ally in China's confrontation of the USD. .

Jimbuna 02-27-23 08:31 AM

Putin unleashes direct nuclear warning to NATO saying Russians will 'suffer'

Putin warned that he was considering the United Kingdom's nuclear capabilities as part of his response to the West's alleged aggression. In his interview, Putin condemned the West's actions towards Russia, stating that the country had been subjected to a series of hostile actions, including sanctions and military buildups, that were intended to weaken and undermine it. Putin's remarks have sparked concern among Western leaders, who have warned against any aggressive actions by Russia towards the UK or other countries. The UK's Defense Secretary Ben Wallace has stated that the country is fully prepared to defend itself against any potential threat.

Putin told TV channel Rossiya 1: "In today's conditions, when all the leading NATO countries have declared their main goal to inflict a strategic defeat on us, to make our people suffer... how can we not take into account their nuclear capabilities?

"Moreover, they supply weapons to Ukraine worth tens of billions of dollars."
https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world...35ff291576a297

Jimbuna 02-27-23 08:43 AM

US is amazed at how quickly Ukrainians are restoring power grids after attacks of Russian Federation, - Minister of Energy, Granholm


Washington is amazed at how quickly Ukrainian specialists manage to restore damaged power grids after Russian attacks.

As reported by Censor.NET with reference to Ukrinform, US Energy Minister Jennifer Granholm stated this.

"I know that President Zelensky has really expressed a desire to have a different power grid. A distributed grid that runs on clean energy, but is also not so centralized as to be a target. And this is very inspiring... We are now in the process of sending the third tranche of equipment to Ukraine so that they can replace what was damaged. But at the end of the day, in the long term, we have to fulfill the president's goals of creating a distributed electric grid so that if one area goes down, it doesn't bring down an entire region," Granholm said.

The U.S. is expected to send a third tranche of aid to restore power grids that continue to be targeted by Russian attacks in early March.

"There will be a third tranche, which we will send at the beginning of March. And these funds, of course, help. But what impressed us is how quickly Ukrainians use what we send to resume work as soon as possible. It is truly breathtaking: such resilience and quick execution of tasks by those working on the network. And we will continue to help in whatever way we can," the minister said.

She emphasized that she is personally in contact with the Minister of Energy of Ukraine Herman Halushchenko and feels the desire of the Ukrainian side for constant cooperation and implementation of relevant plans.

"The National Renewable Energy Laboratory is creating roadmaps for countries that have expressed interest in transitioning to 100 percent renewable, 100 percent clean, carbon-free energy. And we want to work with Ukraine, which has expressed a desire to do this, to provide technical roadmaps on how to achieve this," said Granholm. Source: https://censor.net/en/n3402474

Russian invasion of Ukraine caused most massive violations of human rights, - UN Secretary General, Guterres

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine caused the most massive violations of human rights. This is an "alarm bell".

This was stated by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, Censor.NET informs with reference to The Guardian.

Speaking at the annual session of the UN Human Rights Council, Guterres called for the renewal of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 75 years after it was signed.

The UN Secretary-General noted that the declaration is under attack from all sides," pointing to Russia's war against Ukraine and threats to human rights through poverty, hunger, and climate disasters.

"Some governments are abandoning the declaration," Guterres said, calling the disregard for and disregard for human rights around the world "a wake-up call."

He said that "the Russian invasion of Ukraine provoked the most massive violations of human rights" observed in the world today.

"It has caused massive deaths, destruction, and displacement," Guterres said. Source: https://censor.net/en/n3402485

There are currently no prerequisites for negotiations regarding Ukraine, - Peskov

The spokesman of the Russian dictator Dmytro Peskov stated that there are currently no prerequisites for negotiations regarding Ukraine.

This is reported by Censor.NET with reference to the propaganda publication RIA Novosti.

Commenting on China's "peace plan", he noted that its details are "the subject of careful analysis, it is a long and tense process."

At the same time, Peskov noted, there are currently no prerequisites for negotiations regarding Ukraine, and "the special operation is moving towards the set goal." Source: https://censor.net/en/n3402466

Rockstar 02-27-23 09:15 AM

https://t.me/strelkovii/4070

Стрелков Игорь Иванович

Дни, как песчинки в песочных часах, утекают и утекают... Все меньше времени остается на то, чтобы принять необходимые решения до того, как они потеряют свою актуальность...

Танки, орудия, боеприпасы и всё остальное вооружение и снаряжение широким потоком течет на т.н. "украину", а удары по коммуникациям как не наносились, так и не наносятся. Остановлены удары по энергосистеме. "Центры принятия решения" в Киеве принимают решения в максимально комфортном и безопасном режиме - на них даже не пробовали до сих пор покушаться. Между тем, запас ракет и высокоточных боеприпасов всех видов за минувший год в РФ явно не увеличился (не стану утверждать, что его теперь просто нет, иначе обвинят либо в "разглашении военной тайны" (которая мне не известна), либо в "пораженческих настроениях" (которых у меня нет и быть не может тем более)). Проблемы с боеприпасами и просто воспроизводством самого обычного вооружения - в РФ нарастают тоже с каждым днем.

И - на фоне всего этого - несменяемые "маршалы" продолжают "биться лбом" (не своим, к сожалению) о заранее подготовленную оборону врага на Донбассе. С успехами крайне незначительными (а чаще - без всяких успехов), но с большими потерями.
Военного положения - нет и не предвидится (исходя из заявлений лица, внешне напоминающего президента), границы - открыты, нефть и газ - широким потоком идет партнерам (в том числе - киевским). Центробанк РФ наращивает вложения в гособлигации США.

И единственным "развлечением" для ошарашенных действительностью рассерженных патриотов является публичная взаимная травля, проплаченная господами Шойгу и Пригожиным, безобразная сама по себе и свидетельствующая как о том, "насколько всё прогнило" в нашей стране, но также и о том, что в руководстве военными действиями у нас отсутствует главное - единоначалие. (А кто из двух указанных лиц "правее" - определяйтесь сами, если есть желание. Как по мне - так "в сортах говна лучше не разбираться").
t.me/strelkovii
/4070
285.7K views
Feb 27 at 06:38

Quote:

Strelkov Igor Ivanovich a.k.a. Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin

Days, like grains of sand in an hourglass, flow away and flow away ... There is less and less time left to make the necessary decisions before they lose their relevance ...

Tanks, guns, ammunition and all other weapons and equipment flow in a wide stream to the so-called. "Ukraine", and blows to communications have not been delivered, and are not being delivered. Strikes on the power system have been stopped. "Decision-making centers" in Kyiv make decisions in the most comfortable and safe mode - they have not even tried to encroach on them so far. Meanwhile, the supply of missiles and precision-guided munitions of all kinds over the past year in the Russian Federation has clearly not increased (I will not argue that it simply does not exist now, otherwise they will be accused either of "disclosing military secrets" (which I do not know) or of "defeatist moods" "(Which I don't have and can't have all the more)). Problems with ammunition and simply the reproduction of the most conventional weapons - in the Russian Federation are also growing every day.

And - against the backdrop of all this - the irremovable "marshals" continue to "beat their foreheads" (not their own, unfortunately) against the enemy's prepared defenses in the Donbass. With extremely insignificant successes (and more often without any success), but with heavy losses.
There is no martial law and it is not expected (based on the statements of a person who outwardly resembles the president), the borders are open, oil and gas are going to partners (including Kiev ones) in a wide stream. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation is increasing investments in US government bonds.

And the only "entertainment" for the angry patriots dumbfounded by reality is the public mutual persecution paid for by gentleman Shoigu and Prigogine, ugly in itself and testifying both to "how rotten everything is" in our country, but also to the fact that in the leadership of the military actions we lack the main thing - unity of command. (And which of the two indicated persons is “more to the right” - decide for yourself, if you wish. As for me, it’s better not to understand the varieties of crap).
t.me/strelkovii
/4070
285.7K views
Feb 27 at 06:38

Skybird 02-27-23 09:48 AM

Far from over - how Western security circles assess Russia's military options in Ukraine

The war is entering its second year. Weapons supplies from the U.S. and Europe have ensured Ukraine's survival so far. The question is how long the West can and will continue to help. Putin seems to be able to continue the war for a long time.

On the anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we assess Ukraine's and Russia's military capabilities and resources for the future course of the war. In this article, we analyze the situation in Russia and its goals; we will go into those of the Ukrainians on Monday.

https://www.nzz.ch/pro-global/noch-l...&_x_tr_sl=auto

-------------------

The Ukrainian army must first hit the occupiers from a distance - and then can strike out

Time is running against Ukraine, but the key factors on the battlefield allow for an optimistic forecast.

On the anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we assess Ukraine's and Russia's military capabilities and resources for the remainder of the war. In this article, we analyze the situation of Ukraine and its objectives; we dealt with those of Russia last week.

https://www.nzz.ch/pro-global/die-uk...&_x_tr_sl=auto


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