My resources are pretty vague on this issue. Electronic echo-sounding fathometers came into existence as early as 1924, but the indications that I am getting is that the S-boats did not have them until they received wartime modernizations in 1943 and 44. Apparently, they did have a wire-weight sounding line that could be used from inside the boat. This is a long wire with a weight on the end that could be payed out until it struck bottom. The amount of wire payed out indicated depth. This is just a slightly more sophisticated version of the old seaman's lead line, an example of which can be seen in the recent version of King Kong, in the scene where the ship approaches the island.

The problem with this is that it could only be used when the boat is moving fairly slowly, and is only as accurate as the skill level of the man using it.

The Pacific Ocean was actually pretty poorly charted overall in the 1940's. Navigational charts for many areas were based on information gathered by Captain Cook in the 1700's. It was not uncommon to find islands that were several miles from where the chart said it was, and sounding information was scarce and inaccurate. Given this situation, it was a miracle that more boats didn't run aground.

Celestial navigation is a true art form and must be practiced constantly to maintain a safe skill set. When compared to modern GPS based systems, it is actually fairly inaccurate. Under optimum conditions, a highly experienced celestial navigator can develop a fix with an error of about a half mile in any direction. A circular error of one to three miles is normal. In the open ocean this isn't a problem and is good enough. But go into restricted waters with a half mile fix error and use a chart based on 150 year old data and you can go on the rocks pretty quick.

On her third patrol, USS Wahoo (SS-238) penetrated Wewak Harbor on the northern coast of New Guinea, despite the fact that they didn't even have a chart for it! One of the crew members produced a high school atlas and an improvised chart was drawn up. This is extraordinarily ballsy, given the navigational limitations that I outlined above. Then again, this was Mush Morton and his gang and I would not have expected anything less from them! :arrgh!:

Great thread, I've been following it with great interest. :up:

Here's one for you that came up in another thread:

It's been said that some fleet-boats left port with stocks of the older Mark 10 torpedo due to shortages of the Mark 14. Can you confirm this? And if so, how long and to what extend was this a problem?

I'll confirm it for you: ;) yes, many patrol reports document the use of Mark 10s by fleet subs early in the war. This is not even close to being debatable.

As to how much of a problem the torpedo shortage was, boats either were forced to go on patrol with Mark 10s, or they were forced to wait until another boat returned from patrol with unused Mark 14s, which would then be loaded onto the outbound boat. Wartime torpedo production for the Navy simply didn't catch up with demand until 1943.

This is most interesting.

I wonder if it was common for the Mk 14s of one sub to be directly transfered to the other ship without going through depot maintenance?

If this is true, I am sure it added to the problems of the Mk 14 as in effect subs were going out with "old" (not maintained by shore factories) torpedoes. I can imagine with a series of unlucky captains it might be possible they were carrying Mk 14's that have not undergone depot maintenance for 120 days or more?

By the way which is correct?

Mk 14
Mk XIV

Gotta love modern technology!:rotfl:

As far as I can find the US Navy has always used Arabic numerals for designations, as opposed to the British who used Roman numerals until late in the war. Mk 14 should be correct.

Absolutely correct. The USN does not use Roman numerals thank god.

At the start of the war, Naval Torpedo Station Newport, RI was the sole producer of torpedoes for the USN. Despite employing 3,000 workers and working around the clock, they were only producing about three weapons per day. They were barely able to keep up with pre-war demands. Once the war started and rate of expenditures began to skyrocket, Newport fell drastically behind demand. To make matters worse, 233 Mk 14's were lost when Cavite was bombed on the first day of the war. The sub force compensated for this shortfall in several ways:

1. Going out with reduced loadouts.

2. Loading out with a mixed complement of Mk 10's and 14's.

3. Loading out with a mixed complement of Mk 14's and mines.

4. Reducing the number of torpedoes fired per target.

5. Swopping torpedoes between boats between patrols (as Luke noted above).

None of these compensation methods were popular with the crews, as it limitied what they could do. The Mk 10 was a fairly well liked weapon, but the range was short and the warhead relatively small. In mid 1942 when the shortage was at its' height, there was a lot of pressure placed on the skippers to be conservative with the number of torpedoes used. When combined with the gross unreliability of the Mk 14, this policy only served to lessen the number of ships sunk.

By January 1943 the crisis was over, although some shortages were still encountered in the Southwest Pacific command until the summer due to longer transport times. The problem had been solved by expanding Newport, reopening NTS Alexandria, starting up NTS Keyport, and bringing in civilian contractors.

The swopping of fish between boats presented no real problems in maintenance or reliability. The Torpedomen on the boats were superbly trained and capable and could take care of most problems. If anything major was suspected, the fish could be sent to the tender for overhaul. You have to remember that most of the time the fish just sat on its skid in the torpedo room and did nothing, requiring little or no maintenance. If the fish got bounced around in a depth charge attack, or if it sat in a flooded tube for a long period of time, it might require some careful checks. But again the TM's aboard the boat could handle many of these tasks. The boat TM's were somewhat distrustful of the tender pukes anyway and redid most of the maintenance checks themselves just to be sure. After all, your life depended on it.

EDIT EDIT

I forgot one thing. On a few rare occasions, boats went to sea with Mk 15 destroyer torpedoes onboard! The Mk 15 was similar to the 14 in many ways, but it was longer, had a larger warhead, and a longer range. The problem was that it was too long to fit the the standard fleet boat torpedo tube! The solution was to fit the smaller Mk 14 warhead on it and this shortened the fish just enough so that it would fit in the tube. Even with this mod, it was still too long to fit down the loading hatches and on the in room stowage skids. To accomodate them into the boats, the fish would be craned into the water, the outer door of the tube opened, the fish was floated into the tube, and the outer door closed. Once loaded, the weapon could not be completely removed from the tube and taken into the room. They were carried this way into battle and were the first fish fired.

The Mk 15 was more plentiful due to a much lower rate of expenditure by destroyers. Even still, this type of loadout was rare due to the problems outlined above.

Two books I can recommend if you are interested in the history of the torpedos and their problems

“HELLIONS Of The DEEP" The Development of American Torpedoes in World War II. - By Robert Gannon. This book pretty much slams the NTS

Iron Men and Tin Fish: The Race to Build a Better Torpedo during World War II
by Anthony Newpower. This book addresses how different countries addressed (or did not address) their respective torpedo problems.

Here's a question which has come up a few times on the forum and never seems to get answered to anyone's satisfaction.

What keeps the deck gun(s) from rusting into uselessness during a patrol? I've heard that were made from corrosion resistant steel and that the more delicate optical parts were taken below. But some seem to dispute that there is such a thing as corrosion resistant steel.

Excellent thread by the way. Makes for informative reading. :salute:

I can absolutely guarantee that USN submarines use great quantities of Corrosion Resistant Stainless Steel (CRSS). I have polished enough of it to last a lifetime! :DL

Naval guns contain a large percentage of CRSS, copper-nickel alloys, and chromium in their construction for just this purpose. Despite repeated dunkings, the guns held up well. However, the key word here is "resistant". The guns required careful maintenance whenever possible or over a period of time they would cease to function.

The early 3"/50 and 4"/50 had the inner bore sealed by the breech block and a tampion in the muzzle. The tampion was easily removed before action. The later 5"/25 was made entirely of CRSS and other resistant materials and did not require the bore to be sealed.

For more information, surf over to the following links:

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_Main.htm

and

http://www.oldsubsplace.com/Submarine%20Deck%20Guns.htm

These pages contain more info than you will ever want to know about naval guns. Enjoy! :up:

One other interesting method that the USN uses for corrosion control is the placing of zinc anodes in certain areas on the external part of the boat. When pure zinc comes into contact with steel, it greatly slows the process of oxidation and prolongs the life of the surrounding steel or ferrous metal. The zinc anodes will vary greatly in size, running from the size of your thumb to the size of a brick.

But, even so, many captains used Roman numerals in their patrol reports when documenting the use of torpedoes. :doh:

Bravo! Thanks for the deck gun answer and clearing this one up. I've seen the zinc plates on the keels of boats in dry storage at marinas and always wondered what they were about. :salute:

Thanks Luke and Davey for clarifying about the Mark 14 shortage. :yeah:

Small question :D :

I read US periscopes were fitted with colored filters in the rayfilter-assembly (red, green and yellow). How were these used? (red in bright light, yellow at night, etc?)

I'd also be interested to know what, if any, colorfilters were present in U-boats, but I guess I'm asking the wrong people. :hmmm:

Darn! Note to self: don't leave thoughts unfinished and then go on vacation, even if it is to gather photons from remote celestial objects. Where would such a story, written by a crewmember who survived the incident, reside? The story was excellent and well-worth putting a link in here. He was very worried about his sister boats and stated that no investigation into their seaworthiness was conducted.

My information shows that S-10 was SS-115. Confusing at best.

In this boat's case, it was an MBT that sprung a leak (more than sprung a leak, lost a section of beer can there) and they were unable to blow ballast from a full tank that contained the entire ocean! Ballast tanks, being open to the sea don't normally resist much pressure, as pressure inside and outside are the same. As such their resistance to depth charging would be unremarkable until a section of the tank just corroded out, leaving the boat unable to surface. I'm off to ferret out this terrific account, even though I have lost any trace of where it came from. Don't try this at home.

Holy Cow! Looking for the above story, turned up an even more enlightening story about the plight of the poor crews stuck in the sugar boats at http://www.subvetpaul.com/SAGA_8_96.htm . It's the story of THE SAGGING SAGA OF THE SUGAR BOAT. by Dr. Charles W. Gibbs, published in POLARIS August 1996. It's too long for me to cut and paste, it and its owner may not live for long, but here it is, the story of the sugar boat, the hidden enemy and the sagging sugar boat. If you never follow another link, please follow this one.

Holy Something or Other than a Cow! Found it. The Final Cruise of USS S-10 (SS-115), by Dale A. Danielsen, Published in POLARIS April 2000. Check this out and the entire lost until rescued by SubVetPaul, Polaris Sagas, selected articles of interest to submarine veterans published in the Polaris, official bulletin of the US Sub Vets of World War II.

Damn. Losing the boats is tragic, but losing the men and their stories is infinitely more so. I think I'm going to capture all of SubVetPaul's site to my hard drive too. Who knows when it will be gone.

Floating a boat in sea water is equivalent to floating it in battery acid. It eats everything, and what it doesn't eat it cruds up with mineral encrustation. I worked for awhile as a marine mechanic on salt water and you wouldn't believe the number of Mercaturkey Outboard lower units we opened with air chisels because they were eaten up with corrosion and encrusted so that they could not be disassembled normally.

At any rate, just like battery acid, salt water acts as an electrolyte. When two dissimilar metals are bathed in it, one of the metals becomes a cathode and has crap added to it (yum!) and the other acts as an anode and is eaten for lunch by the action of the electrolyte and the cathode. The way to stop this temporarily is to find a metal that acts as the anode for just about all other kinds of metal and attach it electrically to the other metal. It so happens that zinc is an anode for all the different kinds of metals used in boat, ship and submarine construction. So you bolt these zinc anodes to prop shafts, decks, whatever, one per electrically isolated amalgamation of metal parts and only the zinc is eaten for lunch, not your precious prop shafts, ballast tank metal, guns or whatever else you thought would be good to go for a bath in a battery electrolyte.

Periodically, the zinc anodes are inspected and replaced if they are depleted. If you miss one lousy piece of metal that is electrically isolated from the rest of the boat, it STILL gets eaten. Yum! Salt water is fun! Zinc anodes stop electrolytic corrosion, but oxidation is a chemical process not affected by anodes. Paint, muchas chipping and grinding are about the only tools you have there.