I guess you could say that these threats from KJU was also psychological warfare. Well to put it easily these threats backfired and that is very simpel why they did. You don't as a little country threaten a country/Superpower that is way bigger in all areas than yours.

This is what I think.

Markus

Actually, NK has fired missiles that are capable of hitting the US, so they do have them, they just haven't fired them at the US (yet)...






<O>

Some people will only believe it when the first warhead initiates over Denver. :03:

NK doesn't need missiles to destroy South Korea and I suspect they could do serious damage to the USA ...
so don't be surprised that an attack on NK will result in your ATM being closed down: https://www.yahoo.com/gma/north-kore...opstories.html

Indeed, their cyber division is top notch, it's how they get a lot of their money these days. I believe they fleeced Bangladesh for $93m not that long ago. Then it's electronically laundered and goes through shell companies in the PRC to get various things dispatched to the border regions of China where they then 'go missing' across the border into the DPRK. It's a thriving economic industry down there, which is part of the reason the PRC is so reluctant to completely shut down trade with the DPRK because it accounts for most peoples earnings in that region. That being said, they are slowly tightening the noose, so we've got to give them some credit. Of course, backing a nuclear armed state into a corner is sure to work out well.

In regards to missiles that can hit the US, we're still not 100% certain of the Hwasong-14s range, I believe the current estimate is around 10,000km, which gives it access to roughly the western half of the US. Honestly, I think that the Hwasong-14 can go further than that, we just haven't seen its full potential yet.
The 14 though is just the first step, their next goal is to transition from liquid to solid fueled missiles, as it stands they fuel them horizontally and then roll them out to firing position and launch. This gives them the opportunity to fuel them underground in hidden shelters which reduces the warning time that the US would get, but it increases the risk that when they go to erect the thing, it falls over and explodes...and yes, this has happened, but with the Hwasong-12 apparently on the 15th April test this year.
Solid fueled missiles don't have that risk, and they don't need fueling because there's no evaporation risk like the liquid fueled ones. You can keep them on standby for some time before you need to change it over, and if you have it inside a canister then you have greater protection and it's easier to reload the TEL after launching. They have the technology for solid fueled missiles and canister launchers, they just haven't done it to the size of an ICBM yet. The Pukguksong 1 and 2 are solid fueled cold launch missiles, but they are SLBMs and IRBMs respectively.
There's still one TEL that appeared in their parade which hasn't shown up yet, and that's this thing:

http://i2.cdn.cnn.com/cnnnext/dam/as...-super-169.jpg

So they could well have some surprises left for us over the coming year. Things seem fairly quiet at Sinpo at the moment, they're constructing more buildings which is possibly to create more SSBs or a new class of SSB, but actual tests have quietened down at the moment. There was a spate of ejection tests which had people thinking we might be seeing a new solid fueled missile coming into play since the Pukguksong 1 and 2 have already been tested, or it could be that they're working on a new ejection system for the submarine, since one of their test launches broke the conning tower. :oops:

I believe the continental U.S. has fielded 4 x squadrons already. I read in the spring that Japan had received the first few of their order.

As to policies and plans, I'm sure their are very senior governmental/military officials that provide experienced analytical recommendations based upon sets of conditions/events; someone has them in a book. Whether they are followed really depends on the person/small group making the decisions.

It would be foolish not to contemplate a set of variables to go along with potential events. Otherwise, it would take the decision-maker to long to get input based on valued thoughts.

Someone has a big fat binder. The decision-maker just has to find the opinions that match the events that are happening.

Getting those opinions to the decision-maker would be to hard if someone knocked out all of our communications with an EMP burst.

The picture below could very well be a fake. It happens with many countries that are just trying to puff out their shirt.

Squadrons of what? GBIs?

If we use the following assumptions:
- conservative view of US BMD (vs say Russian alarmist one)
- estimate of DPRK ICBM based on the known R36 series performance but adjusted for number of engines.

We would see that H-14 could carry 2-3 RVs, if developed to the Soviet 80s technology, which they may have acquired from disgrunted Ukrainian enginiers (https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/14/w...ype=collection). Then we would notice that in order to defeat 40-48 GBIs and deliver the minimal deterence criteria they would need only 20-16 ICBMs, which I would guess is within their capacity to produce.

MIRVs are definitely on their to-do list, but I don't think they're there just yet, the Hwasong-14 is supposedly designed for a 'heavy payload', so MIRVing it is not out of the question, but I think by the time they've gone into MIRV technology they will probably have moved beyond the Hwasong-14 and gone into a cold launch solid fueled ICBM of some description.

What concerns me about Russia and missile interception is that Russia has so far misidentified most of the DPRKs launches, insisting that they haven't launched an ICBM yet. Now either they're doing this for political reasons, or their radar coverage of the DPRK isn't that good. Which makes one worry that if they miss any launch from the DPRK that the Alaskan GMD intercepts then all Russia is going to see is a load of ICBM like launches from Alaska that are going to land on Russia. :oops:

4 Squadrons of F-35 aircraft.

Sorry, I do not follow how JSFs are related to the problem.

Oberon, the heaviest MIRVed ICBMs were always liquid fuelled ones.

All things considered they may be interested in ICBMs with storable liquid fuels due to how those are most efficient in terms of throw weight. For example Russia, despite mastering solid fuel MIRVed ICBMs (such as Yars) is still desighning a new generation liqiud fuel ICBM - Sarmat.

BMD stuff is not a significant issue in my opinion, as the BMD sites are well known and are covered by two EW systems, the EW radars and the new EW sats. While the sat force did suffer attrition, with the gap in capability occuring (2014?) it is now back to minimal capability (with more launches to go) and coverage of two nodes - Pacific and Atlantic from HEOs.
Specifically we have deployed new radar stations on Eastern direction, to improve EW in that direction:

You can read more here: http://www.russianspaceweb.com/eks-network.html
http://russianforces.org/sprn/

Someone mentioned about the JSF being operationally deployed. I am not as sure how many have moved from the assembly line to European buyers, but Japan is hot for them. Japan is quickly wearing out their F15/F16s just reacting to Chinese patrols.

I am not sure where S. Korea stands in the acquisition flow, but for my thinking, they may not see as much of a need at this point in having to deal with N. Korean air threats.

The Chinese are pushing for a blue water capability and the Japanese Archipelago really blocks them from getting into the Pacific. I did hear that China has "made" itself a corridor over/between small Japanese islands and Japan is pissed about it. But, what can they do?

Getting back to the JSF, at this point there may be 5 or 6 squadrons in the U.S. Most likely assigned around the U.S. perimeter. I do think Alaska, Virgina, and Tucson have squadrons, but not sure of the rest.

We've got one squadron coming (slowly) online I believe, should be up by next year.

Really though the main thing the ROK will be after are CAS, since the KPAF will be pretty much dead within the first couple of days, if they even bother to show up.

I think survivability is the problem, for Russia it would not be easy for enemy aircraft to penetrate Russian airspace and hunt for TELs, but the DPRK is going to lose aerial superiority very quickly so it's either got to launch everything it has early before it gets blown up, or hide it very well. The advantages of Cold launch solid fuels mean that the preparation time is extremely small so they can just roll out and fire.

So what's with the data discrepancy over the missile launches?

https://www.rt.com/news/395213-north...ssian-defense/

https://www.rt.com/news/397886-north-korean-irbm-range/

The figures released by the Russian MOD on the 4th July launch are out by 2,000km altitude and 400km horizontal range.

We know plenty of cases where liquid fuel missiles were and still are used on mobile platforms - from SCUDs to R29 series SLBMs on Deltas. So I dont think that launcher survivability is a core concern here.

Any number of reasons, from obvious political ones to military ones (disinformation regarding capabilities). The trajectory parameters are not the sole point of contention - the sources also show different launch sites.

Presumably though these liquid fueled missiles are not using cryogenic fuels? Otherwise that would severely limit the operational time of the missile.
There's two theories on how the DPRK got a tech jump on the 14, and that's that they got some RD-250 engines or a whole R-36 from sources. So that means the Hwasong-14 probably uses N2O4 and UDMH (or heptyl) propellant, so the main problem there would be corrosion from the N2O4, but if you mix that to MON then it's a bit easier.
Makes one wonder the pros and cons of modern liquid fueled vs solid fueled designs. Russia seems to be the only nation still using liquid fueled SLBMs so they must find some use in them, every other nation (including the DPRK) are using solid fueled. :hmmm:


In regards to the reasoning, it is rather confusing since it doesn't really serve Russian interests much. Russia is the only nation to under-state the DPRKs missile capabilities, even the DPRK gives differing figures, so it's not to protect the DPRK from something because they're already boasting about the Hwasong-14s range. If it's to under-state the capabilities of Russias early warning defence then who does that benefit? Surely that makes Russia look weaker rather than stronger and encourages her enemies to regard her as such? It's a position that I can't really figure out I must admit. If they were over-stating the figures then I could understand that they were trying to increase the DPRKs deterrent power, but if anything they're reducing it.
Very strange.