| Skybird |
09-20-05 11:32 AM |
"A majority of Iranians hate their oppressive theocratic government" is a little bit far-fetched, to say the least, and reminds me of the overly enthusiastic expectations of americans that Iraqis would be eternally thankful for beeing freed of Saddam. This oppressive theocratic government has more support than you think. Even more improtant: it's support amongst young men is growing again, after a decline of several years in which they hoped reforms would be possible and would be supported by the West. When the West and America not only let them down on that hope, but Washington even started to angrily wordshelling them, that wishful thinking found a stop, and the reformers lost attractivness. Now the young are sticking closer again to their leadership (that is especially popular and supported by military and even more important: revolutionary guards, but, as I said, a constantly growing number of young men as well.
Concerning the "imminent danger" of "imminent Iranian nuclear weapons", there is no such thing as an "imminent nuclear Iran". Get over it, and don't fall for the same attempts of verbal betrayel that we have seen before the Iraq war. Such babbling illustrates certain interests of those in the West who speak them out on every opportunity. And this is what you should be concerned about much more.
http://www.iiss.org/showdocument.php?docID=661
Quote:
Iran’s strategIc WeaPons Programmes
a net assessment
remarks by Dr John Chipman, Director, IISS (London Institute for Strategic Studies)
IntroductIon
Welcome to the press launch of the latest IISS ‘Strategic Dossier’
– Iran’s Strategic Weapons Programmes – A Net Assessment. This
dossier is the third in our series, which has included similar
publications on Iraq (published in September 2002) and
North Korea (published in January 2004).
Each of our dossiers has presented a particular set of
assessment challenges. Unlike North Korea under Kim
Jong Il and Iraq under Saddam Hussein – police states at
home and pariah states abroad – Iran has a more open
society, with a more complex and diverse internal political
system, a broader range of public opinion, and more
interest in preserving its international respectability and
avoiding world condemnation and isolation. This relative
openness has meant that there is more in the public domain
about Iran’s capacities and there are greater opportunities
to discuss information that has become public with relevant
officials in Iran. Nevertheless, as in all areas of great military
sensitivity, there remains a good deal that cannot be known
for certain from the outside. Where information is too scarce
to make a firm judgement, we make this clear.
SourcES And ASSESSMEnt cHALLEnGES
In the nuclear area, to avoid referral to the UN Security
Council, Iran has submitted to extensive investigations by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 2003
to verify Iran’s acknowledgement of undeclared nuclear
activities extending back over nearly 20 years. The results
of these IAEA investigations form the basis for our nuclear
assessment. We also benefited from discussions with
knowledgeable experts, as well as technical briefings and
visits to nuclear facilities organised by the Iranian Atomic
Energy Organization. Although a number of uncertainties
remain about past and current activities, including the
history of Iran’s enrichment and reprocessing efforts, we
judge it is unlikely that Iran is hiding significant stocks of
fissile material or production facilities for such material.
Much less reliable technical information is available on
Iran’s suspected chemical and biological weapons (CBW)
programmes, which have not been exposed to the same
degree of international inspections. Given this limited
information base, we evaluate a range of public sources,
including official US government estimates, other reports
of Iranian procurement efforts, and claims by opposition
groups. In most cases, the accuracy and reliability of this
information cannot be confirmed and so our judgements
are more circumspect. In contrast, the existence of Iran’s
ballistic missile programme is not in question, but details
of missile production facilities and capabilities and operational
military details, such as inventories, deployment and
doctrine are less clear from available public sources.
With all these pitfalls in mind, we have tried to present
a balanced and cautious set of assessments in individual
chapters on Iran’s nuclear, chemical and biological capabilities
and its ballistic missile programme. To help establish the
remarks by political context, we have also included an opening chapter
that recounts a political history of Iran’s nuclear programme,
analysing how domestic and international political factors
have shaped the course of Iran’s nuclear development for
nearly 40 years, including a detailed account of the more
recent EU-3 negotiations with Iran. Finally, the conclusion
seeks to summarise our judgements about technical capabilities
and the political motivations that form the basis for
our overall assessment of the risks posed by Iran’s strategic
weapons programmes.
nucLEAr WEAponS cApAbILItIES
Public estimates for how long it would take Iran to acquire
nuclear weapons range from only a few years to at least a
decade. In our dossier, we analyse several different possible
scenarios, based on both technical and political factors.
From a technical standpoint, the most critical factor is Iran’s
ability to produce sufficient quantities of nuclear weapons
usable fissile material, requiring approximately 20–25kg
of weapons-grade uranium or 6–8kg of separated plutonium
for a simple implosion device. For over two decades,
Iran has sought to develop fuel cycle capabilities in both
areas. In the uranium area, Iran is constructing pilot- and
industrial-scale gas centrifuge uranium enrichment facilities
at Natanz. These facilities are designed to produce low
enriched uranium (LEU) to provide fuel for the Bushehr
nuclear power plant, but they could be converted to produce
enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a dozen or so
nuclear weapons annually. In the plutonium area, Iran is
commissioning a heavy-water production plant and is
constructing a 40 megawatt (MW) heavy-water research
reactor that could produce enough weapons-grade plutonium
for one or two nuclear weapons a year, assuming that
Iran builds a reprocessing facility to separate this plutonium
from spent fuel.
Of the two approaches, the centrifuge enrichment
programme is closest to fruition. Nonetheless, we estimate
that it will likely take Iran at least a few years to complete
and operate the pilot scale enrichment plant at Natanz,
currently planned to contain 1,000 centrifuge machines.
Firstly, Iran will need to resolve technical problems at
the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) in order
to produce sufficient quantities of high quality uranium
hexafluoride (UF6) feed material for enrichment. The particular
chemical process and the equipment used by Iran in
the initial yellowcake purification step in the conversion
process are inferior for producing clean UF6. As a result,
the UF6 produced at the UCF thus far is too contaminated
with traces of molybdenum and other elements to be used
as feed material. With practice, Iran should be able to overcome
this problem, although it may mean running the UCF
at very low capacities.
Secondly, Iran will need to complete and operate the
pilot-scale centrifuge facility at Natanz before it can produce
weapons-grade uranium in sufficient quantities to support a
nuclear weapons programme. Currently, a single cascade of
164 machines is installed at the pilot plant. The cascade only
operated briefly with UF6 gas before the October 2003 suspension
agreement with the EU-3 took effect, and its ability to
sustain prolonged operations is unknown. In any event, it
would take more than a decade for a 164-machine cascade
to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single
nuclear weapon, assuming ideal conditions . Despite the
suspension, Iran has already manufactured and assembled
enough centrifuge machines (more than 1,200) to complete
the additional five 164-machine cascades originally planned
for the pilot centrifuge plant. But, based on Iran’s demonstrated
rate of installing and testing centrifuges at the pilot
plant before the October 2003 suspension, and the likelihood
that some of these machines will fail, we estimate it will probably
take at least a year or two to install and test the remaining
cascades and work out the usual start-up problems that typically
plague first-time centrifuge operators before the facility
could operate on a reliable sustained basis.
Once it is operational, the pilot-scale centrifuge facility
will have a limited capability to produce the highly enriched
uranium (HEU), of about 90% U-235, required for nuclear
weapons use. Under ideal conditions, a pilot plant of 1,000
P-1 centrifuges can theoretically produce about 10kg of HEU
a year starting from natural uranium feed, thus requiring
about 2–3 years of operation to produce enough weapons
grade uranium for a single weapon. However, the pilot plant
(as currently planned) is configured to produce low enriched
uranium (LEU) of about 5% U-235 for nuclear power reactor
fuel rather than HEU, and continuous operation is unrealistic.
As a result, actual production of HEU is likely to be considerably
less than the theoretical maximum, perhaps as much as
50%. Iran could scrap its current plans and build the pilot
plant in a configuration to maximise HEU production, but
this would take at least a year or two. If the pilot plant is built
and completed as currently planned, it would take a further
six months to reconfigure it for improved HEU production.
As an alternative to producing HEU directly from natural
uranium feed, Iran could produce a stockpile of LEU, ostensibly
for nuclear power reactor fuel, and then break out by
using this material as feed to produce HEU in a short period
of time. In theory, with LEU feed, the 1,000-machine pilot
plant could produce enough HEU for a single weapon within
several months of operation, even taking into consideration
likely inefficiencies and some requirements for re-configuration.
However, unless Iran acquired an alternative source of
LEU feed, the plant would need to operate for at least a few
years to produce enough LEU for a running start to produce
enough HEU for a single weapon.Thus, in any break out scenario involving the 1,000- machine pilot centrifuge plant, at least a few years of high
operation would be needed to produce enough HEU for
a single nuclear weapon, whether this involves direct
production of HEU from natural uranium or production of
a stockpile of LEU that is then used to produce HEU. Iran
could reduce this time by installing additional enrichment
capacity, depending on the rate at which Iran can manufacture,
assemble, install and test additional centrifuge
machines and cascades. Based on partial data from IAEA
reports, Iran has been able to manufacture and assemble
additional centrifuge machines at a rate of between 50
and 100 new machines a month. Assuming Iran cannot
easily increase this rate of production, it could double its
enrichment capacity within a year or two of resuming the
manufacture of centrifuge machines, with additional time
required to install and test the machines in cascades.
In conclusion, if Iran threw caution to the wind, and
sought a nuclear weapon capability as quickly as possible
without regard for international reaction, it might be able
to produce enough HEU for a single nuclear weapon by the
end of this decade, assuming it can
1) produce sufficient quantities of clean UF6;
2) complete the pilot centrifuge plant; and
3) operate the plant on a high capacity basis over
a period of a couple years.
Unanticipated technical problems in any of these areas
would lengthen the time frame.
As an alternative, if Tehran does not feel compelled to
acquire nuclear weapons urgently or judges that the risk of
breaking out with a marginal capacity is too great, it could
wait until it completes the industrial-scale centrifuge plant at
Natanz, planned to contain 50,000 machines. Although the
industrial-scale plant is likely to take more than a decade to
complete , such a facility could produce enough HEU for a
nuclear weapon within a few weeks (with natural feed) or
even a few days (with LEU feed) without reconfiguration,
thus denying other countries adequate time to act before break
out was achieved. In addition, this approach would enhance
Iran’s options to pursue covert enrichment options because
the completion and operation of industrial-scale conversion
and enrichment facilities would substantially facilitate efforts
to conceal and construct smaller secret facilities.
In contrast to the production of weapons-grade uranium,
Iran’s ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium seems
more distant. Iran’s 40-megawatt heavy-water research
reactor at Arak is in the early stages of construction, scheduled
for completion in 2014. However, the project is likely to
run over time. Moreover, although Iran has conducted laboratory-
scale reprocessing experiments, it has very limited
technical expertise to build an industrial-scale reprocessing
facility. In theory, if Russia delivers fresh fuel, the Bushehr
nuclear power reactor could accumulate substantial quantities
of weapons-grade plutonium within only a few months
of operating. In order to acquire that plutonium, however,
Iran would need to build a reprocessing facility suited to
Bushehr fuel. This poses some additional technical challenges
beyond those that exist for building a reprocessing
facility for fuel obtainable from the Arak reactor.
Assuming Iran produces sufficient quantities of fissile
material, Iran’s ability to design and fabricate nuclear
weapons from this material is unknown. The IAEA has
conducted some limited investigations of possible weaponisation
research and development, but has found nothing
conclusive. Some analysts speculate that Iran might have
acquired a nuclear design from the A.Q. Khan network (as
Libya did), but this has not been confirmed. According to
press accounts, Western intelligence agencies have acquired
a large set of computer files from an Iranian source, showing
studies to develop a nuclear warhead for the Shahab-3 missile,
but the details of this reported research are not public, and
it is not clear whether this research has gone beyond theoretical
studies. Thus, on the basis of public information, it is
not possible to assess the status of Iran’s suspected nuclear
weaponisation efforts.
cHEMIcAL And bIoLoGIcAL WEAponS cApAbILItIES
Compared to its nuclear programme, it is much more difficult
to assess Iran’s suspected chemical and biological weapons
capabilities. For many years, public US government estimates
have accused Iran of stockpiling chemical and biological
agent and weapons, but there is no conclusive evidence in the
public domain to support this accusation. The most recent
US government estimates have become more cautious about
asserting that Iran actually possesses a CBW stockpile, while
still claiming that Iran continues a CBW research and development
programme and seeks dual-use materials, equipment
and expertise to further its chemical weapons capabilities.
From public information, we cannot determine whether
Iran is conducting offensive CBW research. Nonetheless, it is
certainly true that the development of Iran’s civilian, chemical
and biotechnical infrastructure has enhanced Iran’s inherent
ability to produce chemical and biological weapons agents
if it decided to do so. Rather than risk exposure – especially
in the area of maintaining stocks of agent or actual weapons
– Iran may be content to conduct CBW research and development
within its civilian activities (which would be very
difficult to detect) and maintain a break out capability, in the
event that the production and weaponisation of chemical and
biological agents was deemed necessary.
bALLIStIc MISSILES
Iran’s ballistic missile programme is based primarily on
liquid fuel technology acquired from North Korea – the short
range Shahab-1 (Scud-B) and Shahab -2 (Scud-C) missiles,
with effective ranges of 300–500km, and the intermediate
range Shahad-3 (No dong) missiles, with an effective range of
1,300–1,500km. We estimate that Iran has deployed a single
Shahab-1/2 missile brigade, comprising three or four missile
battalions for a total of 12–18 mobile missile launchers and
48–72 missiles in the field, and at least one Shahab-3 missile
battery, which would normally consist of 3 launchers and
12 missiles in the field. Additional missiles are stored in
reserve. As far as is known, Iran’s missile forces are armed
with conventional high explosive warheads, although Iran
could probably build primitive CBW warheads if it chose
to do so. Based on the most recent flight tests in 2004, Iran
is seeking to develop a smaller warhead for the Shahab-3,
which appears consistent with reports of research into the
development of a nuclear warhead for the Shahab-3, but the
details of this reported research are not available.
concLuSIonS
Unlike countries driven by a sense of national survival,
Iran has not launched a dedicated effort to acquire nuclear
weapons as quickly as possible at all costs. While most
Iranians support the nuclear programme as a matter of
national pride and accomplishment, and deeply resent
efforts by outside powers to deny Iran the benefits of modern
technology, few Iranians openly profess a desire for nuclear
weapons. Officially, Iran claims that its nuclear programme
is entirely peaceful and that the enrichment programme is
only intended for fuel production. Privately, most Iranians
make more sophisticated arguments, knowing that the
‘purely peaceful’ justification is not entirely plausible. Iran,
they say, needs a latent nuclear weapons capability to stay
afloat in a sea of nuclear states and to strengthen Iran’s
bargaining position against more powerful countries, such
as the United States, but they assure that Iran would never
actually build nuclear weapons. Except for some hardliners,
they say, Iranians are sophisticated enough to recognise
that nuclear weapons would make Iran a target of international
hostility, spur further proliferation in the region, and
help America enhance its security presence in the region.
Finally, they say, Supreme Leader Khamene’i (like Ayatollah
Khomeini before him) has ruled that nuclear weapons are
contrary to Islam. Even if these arguments are genuine,
however, the temptation for Iran’s leaders eventually to
translate nuclear potential into reality could be difficult to
resist once the option is available.
Iran’s nuclear option is not imminent. On purely technical
grounds, Iran appears to be at least several years
away from producing enough fissile material for a nuclear
weapon, and whether Iran has the expertise to fabricate a
nuclear weapon from this material is unknown. This ‘worst
case’ scenario assumes that Tehran blatantly reaches for
nuclear weapons without regard for international reaction.
Up to now, however, Tehran has been more cautious. It has
been prepared to accept delays and limits on its nuclear
activities in the interests of dividing international opposition
and avoiding confrontation. Rather than dash for a
bomb, Iran may seek gradually to acquire a much more
substantial nuclear production capability over a decade
or more – for example by completing a large-scale centrifuge
plant for producing nuclear fuel – before it decides
whether to exercise a weapons option. The challenge for
international diplomacy in these circumstances is a delicate
one. It will be important on the one hand to apply pressure
and create inducements to persuade Iran not to develop a
fuel cycle capability that it could later turn into a weapons
programme. On the other hand, it will be important to apply
international diplomacy in a way that does not inspire Iran
to abandon all restraint and seek a nuclear weapons capability
without regard to the international repercussions. For
its part, Iran must decide if mastery of the fuel cycle is worth
the international isolation that in the current climate would
no doubt result from its refusal to compromise on this point.
It will also have to judge whether its power and status is
reinforced or weakened if it defies the wishes of an international
community aroused to the dangers of allowing a
country to sneak towards a nuclear weapons capability.
The IISS has provided with this dossier a technical analysis
of present, putative and potential capabilities. The greater
difficulty is conjuring a satisfactory diplomatic outcome to
the present impasse.
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A study beeing done by an UN gremium and given to the UN around end august or early september made coclusions of the same kind, expecting Iran to be 12-15 years away from a nuclear weapon. AT LEAST 12-15 years. |
