So was the US military. I don't see the point you're making here.

Of course, if you delete the context, you won't see the point.

The Red Army in 1941 and 1942 had suffered millions of casualties, therefore it was necessary for them to redeploy experienced troops from the east. All I was trying to say is that by 1945 the Red Army had grown enough that it could fight without the need to strip one side or the other of defences.

Not really, the Allies would have been fighting with the Nationalist Chinese (Then again, as I said, assuming they continued to be part of the Allies), which were severely weakened by the war. Support for the Communists grew significantly after the war and would have grown even more if the Nationalist government got itself into yet another war, and the Allies would have to contend with them too.

The only thing you could trust the Nationalist Chinese to do in 1945-1949 was lose. They were a miserably corrupt and horribly incompetent regime.

In the 1930s Chiang refused to fight against the Japanese because it would distract him from his fight against his internal opponents, even though the Japanese were invading his freaking country. I highly doubt that he would have been willing to send his army to invade Russia in 1945 when the Mao's Communists were still fighting back home.

We could have made the Russians fight a multi-front war in 1945, but we would have been fighting a multi-front war too. If you're fighting the same enemy on multiple fronts, the defender actually has the advantage because of internal lines. Multiple fronts is only a problem for the defender if they're being attacked by two different countries.

Related reading for this thread:
http://www.amazon.com/When-Titans-Cl...8198885&sr=8-1

Read it about six months ago IIRC. The Red Army was a REALLY mean and big machine immediately Post WWII.

PD

You make it sound like Japans invasion was the Chinese governments fault.

I said "launch an offensive from China (and Mongolia)" not "have the Chinese launch an offensive".

You mean "interior lines"? I'd say that Russias very size and lack of transportation infrastructure would mitigate that advantage until long after enough of the country had been overrun that the wouldn't be able to produce their own fuel and food to supply their armies.

Yes, I think you have a point in general. Allied supply lines would indeed be very lengthy, but its not like they would have had to be created from scratch either. By 1945 our military transportation system was already in place. A well oiled and practiced operation that spanned the entire globe, all leading back to that huge, never before seen "Arsenal of Democracy" which was itself running at it's peak of wartime production capability.

Well in part it was.:DL The perceived weakness of the Chinese Government gave Japan the will to invade a numerically superior country. Had China had a cohesive and well ordered regime in the early to mid 30's Japan would have had a much harder time reaching the decision to invade.

However IMHO their main driver was desparation to obtain raw materials due to the economic strictures placed on Japan by Western governments, so if you want to point fingers then the lack of resources and these embargoes were one of the root causes of Japan's expansionist ambitions.

That's not the point. It all goes back to the supply problem, if you have a mass of ever-growing communist partisans and army behind your lines, you are going to have problems supplying and reinforcing your lines. Trains will blown up, convoys ambushed, and it will all be a huge mess.

Well, the Soviets managed to launch the Manchurian offensive in slightly less than 3 months following the end of the fighting in Europe. In that time, the Soviets moved 49 divisions and numerous independent formations, over a million men and thousands of tanks, guns and vehicles, from Eastern Europe to Mongolia and Siberia using 126,000 rail cars and prepared everything for the attack (A not inconsiderable task, considering the scale). So, if there was an infrastructure problem, it certainly did not stop the Soviets from being able to redeploy masses of men and equipment from one side to another in a reasonable amount of time, certainly not in any more time than the Allies would need to move their forces across the ocean.

That's still ignoring the problems inherent with invading Siberia, such as the terrain and weather, that would have made any successful invasion impossible to achieve until mid-1946 and probably made it impossible in any case.

I'd say the numbers of partisans would be directly related to the way the civilian population was treated just like what the Germans experienced in the Ukraine.



Impressive, but that was an unopposed movement all tied to one rail line conducted after the cessation of hostilities. We'd have the ability to bomb that line along great stretches of it. Indeed we'd have the ability to severely hamper their movement out of Europe as well.

The climate is, imo, your most valid point. Still, if one had to invade Russia, and this discussion assumes there was that need, the way to overcome "General Winter" or at least lessen it's impact would be a three pronged offensive from the east, west and up from the south. Deny the enemy the ability to keep withdrawing into the hinterland. That was napoleon and hitlers mistake.

That directly relates to how the population is treated by the Nationalist government, and that wouldn't be under the control of the Allies.

Good point, but railways could be repaired and expanded, especially with the massive forced labor manpower the Soviets had from gulag-dwellers. Also, this would use to hamper troops from getting there, but there was already a considerable Soviet military presence in the area.

Likewise, Allied convoys could be bombed by the VVS, of course this wouldn't be very effective until a reliable 1-engined long-range escort fighter was introduced (The La-11, historically, but in wartime the Soviets could probably work up something faster). And their supply lines in the east would quite undoubtedly harassed by partisans in China. Also, had the war lasted long enough, the Soviets could bomb Allied railways with the Tu-4, a copy of the B-29 (Though I doubt it would have lasted as long).

The withdrawl strategy is only nessecary if the Russians cannot fight the enemy head on, which is not the case. I doubt the Allies had the manpower to gain the numerical advantage needed to attack from all 3 directions, or even 2.

American troops have very little experience in winter warfare. They were struggling with the German attacks in the Ardennes and in Alsace, which aren't nearly as nasty as in Russia and Siberia. The Russians were much more experienced in the winter, so any Allied attack up to Siberia would be useless unless attempted in the summer, and that would only allow the offensive to begin in either May or June, 1946, leaving plenty of time for the Soviets to bring up reinforcements and/or win on other fronts.

Well I realize it wouldn't have been easy Raptor but I still think it could have been done. After all it wouldn't have been a single country taking on the bear while at the same time fighting other enemies. It would be two entire continents, both with huge, well trained, equipped and experienced armies, already on a war footing and already deployed darn near in a circle. You couldn't ask for a better situation imo.

Ultimately - there are 3 reasons the russians would have lost.

The Bomb - more would have been made - and used - to force unacceptable infrastructure losses upon the russians.

Production Capability - the russians ultimately would have found their ability to wage war whittled away. The Allies - with its largest contributor the US - would have had no such problem. No russian attack could have been mounted against the production capability of the US - and the supply lines over the oceans were secure.

Civilian concerns - a wartime people - stretched thin via war - and suffering at home with the loss of industrial ability represent a HUGE threat to power in a communist system. It is said that the Czars never really understood the danger the people presented - and that is how communism and the bolsheviks truly found fertile soil. Those same people that lifted the bolsheviks to power had to be dealt with - and ultimately you can't send everyone to the gulag - because after a while - there is no one left. The same applies to any government of people - but in a system that purportes total equality among its governed - the danger is far greater when the disparity becomes too great, and the burden too great for the people.

Interesting thread.

I was always taught that the defeat of russia in the cold war was the fact that the free world had far more spending power than the warsaw pact.
that, and if it wasn't for the walker spy ring, they wouldn't have tried so hard to catch up to our technology, and they went bankrupt (hows that for karma huh?) Anyways, I am more based on tactics than logistics, and I am not all too knowledgeable on such things.

how about the flipside, a russian invasion of NATO? :hmmm:

This is almost certainly true.

Frankly, I don't really buy the whole Walker thing, and consider it part of a dumb Western thinking (racism is a nice term for all this) that the Russians can't think of not only new ideas, but the obvious on their own.

Sure, no doubt it had its place as one piece of information, but the idea that the Soviets took Walker just to tell them they had to quiet their subs as proposed by certain Western pundits as a certain Stuart Slade is utterly laughable. (Stuart Slade actually proposed, among other things, that the Soviets couldn't even conceive of passive track extraction existed without Walker telling them, in defiance of several page in the 1967 Soviet Watch Officer's Guide teaching the four bearings method.)

It is not like the basics of hydroacoustic propagation is a secret art, or the Soviets can't evaluate, at close range, how much noise their subs made and that it was more than American subs...