The S boats had shorter torpedo tubes (same diameter 21''), as the Mk10 torpedo was quite a bit shorter than the Mk14. So no, historicaly the S boats couldn't fire the Mk14 torpedo. :salute:

The Mk 10 measured 15' 3" long or 4.95 meters long
The Mk 14 measured 20' 6" long or 6.25 meters long

My question is that if a Fleet Boat loaded Mk 10's did some sort of spacer have to be used to make sure all the spindles lined up? Or were the spindles on the Mk 10 and the Mk 14 in the same position as measured from the rear of the torpedo?

Thanks for the quick response! I really appreciate you clearing this up for me,it was just one of those things you wonder about but don't know where to look to find the answer.:salute:

Well, we made it back from Orlando after saying hello to the Mouse. We had a lot of fun but the place was packed. Big advice: go to Disney on an off season!

Anyway, if there was a pantheon of gods in the U.S. Submarine Service, then Richard Hetherington O'Kane would be right there on Mt. Olympus. His skills as a submariner are beyond question, he was a tremendous leader and motivator of men, he was supremely intelligent, and his moral character and personal courage are an inspiration to all.

One of the truly remarkable things about O'Kane is that in the early days he was brash, impulsive, almost reckless, and tended to speak his mind openly, sometimes when inappropriate. These types of traits were not good ones for a naval officer, and when leading a submarine into battle they can get you killed.

Under normal circumstances, if he had survived the war O'Kane may have been destined to be a footnote in history. Fortunately for him and the submarine force, he came under the tutelage of the Zeus of submarine gods, Dudley Walker Morton.

Here is a man whose contributions to the Submarine Service are incalculable. Not only was he possessed of an indomitable fighting spirit and the skills of a true natural born leader, he was a submariner to the core and was determined to carry the hurt to the enemy. "Mush" Morton took command of the USS Wahoo (SS-238) at perhaps one of the lowest points in the war for the sub force and provided a much needed shot in the arm and the perfect example of what a fighting submarine was capable of.

As his Executive Officer (XO) O'Kane came under Morton's wing. Mush guided and taught him and O'Kane sucked it up like a sponge. Morton took a talented but not yet fully formed officer and in a few short months transformed him into one of the greatest submarine sailors of all time. O'Kane went on to achieve great things and never forgot what ol' Mush had taught him.

What is even more remarkable is that Morton spawned another great officer, George William Grider. After serving as Morton's Engineering Officer on the Wahoo, Grider went on to command the USS Flasher (SS-249) and earned a reputation as an ace ship killer.

Morton, O'Kane, and Grider were just a few of the many men who made such a difference. There is a natural tendency to give the credit to the skippers, but none of those men would have achieved what they did without superb enlisted sailors. The Torpedomen, Gunner's Mates, Motor Macs and others are what made the sub run. They fixed the gear when it broke, plugged the holes made by depth charges, and carefully maintained the torpedoes. Without them the war could not have been won. O'Kane accepted his Medal of Honor on behalf of those men whom he had unwavering respect and admiration for.

I've read both Wahoo and Clear the Bridge. One thing that is evident in reading it was that O'Kane (and Morton) weren't "glory hounds". O'Kane goes so far as to say he believed the loss of a large number of skilled and experienced crew might have contributed to Wahoo's loss, and other subs besides. He makes it clear how much a submarine was reliant on good teamwork with all the key positions knowing what to do and when to do it. He frequently pays tribute to all members of his crew (obviously more often the officers with whom he had the most contact).

At any rate, I found both books real eye-openers. If there's a single episode in either book that had me going "holy ****!!" it was when Tang was going full astern to back off from grounding while firing torps at a target!!!

"One of the truly remarkable things about O'Kane is that in the early days, he was brash, impulsive, almost reckless, and tended to speak his mind openly, sometimes when inappropriate. These types of traits were not good ones for a naval officer, and when leading a submarine into battle they can get you killed."

I remember a passage in Wahoo where O'Kane was reading the regulations regarding the potential need for him to relieve the skipper (not Morton, obviously!!) due to the skipper making a hash of an attack and/or failing to do all that was reasonable to sink a target. The skipper saw the book open in the conning tower and thought it was instructions for servicing some piece of equipment - I think it was packing the scope, but I'm going from memory - and read it, only to find it open at the relevant section of Rocks and Shoals.....talk about an "Ooops!!" moment.....and rather ballsy from O'Kane (still prone to speaking his mind I guess!).

I've heard it suggested quite a few people thought people like O'Kane were nuts, but I got the impression he was supremely aware of what could be done and what couldn't, and was prepared to tiptoe right along the divide between the two. His confidence and apparently brazen performance seemed, at least to me, to stem from that awareness.

Again, thanks for your reply - I've found this is to be one of the most interesting threads in all the years I've been at SubSim.

p.s. did you ever meet any of the surviving 'gods' during your service?
p.p.s. I don't know if it's an age thing, or a reflection of what you've done in your life, but you write very well, with a sophistication of language not seen very often these days (I'm a self-confessed language nut....). It's a bit like finding Tolkien in the middle of Tom Clancy!!

Steeltrap,

Thank you for the kind words. I truly appreciate it.

Unfortunately, I never had the honor of meeting any of the WWII skippers. I did have the opportunity to talk to a bunch of enlisted vets during a one day cruise that we did on the Darter in 1985. We were in Pearl Harbor for a Tactical Readiness Evaluation and hosted some WWII vets that were in town for a reunion. The opportunity to go to sea with these men was priceless. I talked to one man who served on the Nautilus (SS-168) when she participated in the destruction of the original Darter (SS-227) after she ran aground on Bombay Shoal. These heroes were thrilled to be able to go to sea again on a diesel boat after 40 years and we were happy to oblige them. It was a great day.

I would have given my eye teeth to have had a few hours with Dick O'Kane, Gene Fluckey, Lawson Ramage, or one of the other skippers. It would have been humbling to converse with what I consider to be truly great men.

Guys asking questions about the Mark 10s and the S-Boats, remember that our S-Boats and Mark 10s are brand spanking new, with not even a scrape on the paint topsides. The REAL Mark 10s had been fired so many times their bearings were all sloppy, the motors worn out and they weren't nearly as much fun as our Mark 10s.

Same for the sugar boats. They were all corroded, to the point that at any time, even at periscope depth, the outer hull could bust wide open, making it impossible to blow a ballast tank at best, or killing all on board at worst. I just read the account of an S-Boat that had a ballast tank blow out because the corrosion was so bad the sub was like a beer can. They, after 15 hours of struggle, got the boat up to surface, started the engines, refused a tow and drove her up the east coast to scrap her. Her squadron mates were all in the same shape but there was no investigation to see if those boats were seaworthy. They continued to serve all the way up to and through World War II.

I'll have to look for the account. It'll grow hair on your chest for sure. Those S-Boats were pretty near suicide.

What exacerbated the problem with the S boats was that the build quality was very poor. With the end of WWI the United States went into an isolationist stance, and with it went funding for the Navy. The end result was problems like the rampant fires from excessive condensation in the boats.

Dave,

In the Fleet Submarine Manual, it mentions that the helmsman was stationed in the conning tower on the surface, yet it doesn't mention anything about where he was stationed when the boat was submerged. Given that the OOD was stationed in the conning tower when submerged, I gather this is where the helmsman was as well. Do you know anything more about this?

The actual quality of workmanship in the construction of the S-boats was no better or worse than any other submarine. The issue was the immaturity of the submarine design process. You have to remember that when the S-boats were designed, the USN, and indeed the entire world, had been operating "modern" submarines for less than 20 years. There was an extraordinarily steep learning curve for the designers at this point; they were literally making it up as they went along. There was little precedent, and no vast body of experience or data to draw upon. The requirements for the S-boat design was quite ambitious for the day and the technology to implement the requirements barely existed, or in some cases didn't exist at all.

It is true to say that the S-boats did not live up to their designer's, and the Navy's, expectations. But this is hardly surprising given what I have stated above. They did, however, provide valuable experience in design and construction. We learned what worked and what didn't and that experience served to lessen the steep curve the designers faced.

The corrosion issue was a well known problem on the S-boats, but it is more of a function of the "primitive" materials being used, as opposed to a quality of workmanship issue. Corrosion resistant materials were virtually nonexistant at this time. I had a science teacher in high school that called water the Ultimate Solvent. There has never been a more accurate statement. Sea water is insidious. It will destroy anything it touches if given enough time. Even modern nuclear submarines have to be very carefully monitored for corrosion and proper preservation techniques have to be stringently applied. It is a tremendous overstatement to say that all the S-boats were as badly corroded as Rockin Robbins states. Some were and they were decommissioned in the 30's. The rest that served during the war were obviously not in that bad shape as they survived numerous war patrols, depth chargings, and storms. The incident that RR refers to was I believe the S-10 (SS-115) and she was decommissioned for this very reason in 1936. This was an isolated incident as the rest of her near sisters, S-11, 12, and 13 all served to the end of WWII.

Electrical fires from short circuits caused by condensate dripping into electrical equipment was a recurring headache for ALL submarines of ALL navies prior to the introduction of air conditioning. I addressed this issue in a previous post. The problem was mitigated to a certain extent by careful engineering practices and thorough cleaning. I would not classify the issue as rampant, and it had little or no relation to quality of workmanship or design.

The S-boats, and the men who sailed them, have earned a lot of respect. Some of the boats served the USN quite well, despite a less than optimum design, until 1946! This is an unheard of longevity for the time and is very remarkable. :yeah:

Luke, I don't know if this will help or not but in CTB O'Kane mentions that the control room helm was the Auxiliary Steering Station. That is also supported by this description from the USS Pampanito site:

Auxiliary Steering Station: The steering station is located amidships against the forward bulkhead. Under normal conditions, the steering wheel in the conning tower was used to control the rudder. This wheel was used in emergencies. In this area are:

• Steering wheel or helm
• Auxiliary gyrocompass
• Underwater log indicator
• Gyrocompass repeater
• Rudder angle indicator
• Dead reckoning analyzer indicator (lower forward)
• Motor order telegraph which transmitted speed orders to the Maneuvering Room where the motors were controlled

It looks like you are correct and that the helmsman would normally be in the CT, whether submerged or surfaced.

Dave - please correct me if needed.

Dave,

Thanks for the reply re: S boat construction. You are indeed right about the time and circumstances surrounding the development of the S class. When I made my remark about the poor workmanship, I had this quote in mind from Norman Friedman:

(Page 133, U.S. Submarines Through 1945)

No correction is necessary. You hit the nail on the head.

Luke,

I too rely on Friedman quite a bit, but I have learned to read between the lines in his stuff. His writing style is very choppy and sometimes hard to interpret. It is true that the S-boats had some construction problems, but so did all yards that built subs from one time or another. Cramp Shipbuilding in Philadelphia built some fleet boats during WWII and ran into some serious quality control issues for a variety of reasons. Several of their boats had to be towed away and finished at Navy shipyards. Even the mighty Electric Boat Co. has taken criticism at times. The construction problems with the S-boats were not pandemic and I will stick to my assertion that most of the issues with these boats were design related. Friedman is completely correct, however in stating that the boat's basic deficiencies were not corrected due to the gutting of the fleet following the Washington Naval Treaty.

The S boats were the largest submarine class in the fleet at the start of the war and comprised 1/3 of the total submarine fleet. The S class seemed to suffer from running into things. Of the 6 S boats lost in WW II, only one was due to enemy action the S-44. Three ran aground, one collided with a USN ship, and the last by accident during a training exercise off the coast of Hawaii. Despite the S boats age, they still managed to do over 240 war patrols.

Since three of these S boats ran aground my question is:

Were the S boats equiped with depth finding equipment at the time they were lost?