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I should add the the Japanese themselves didn't think they were going to win. The IGHQ literally classed their chances in the upcoming war as a "90% chance of 'national death'." (quote from an IGHQ officer in a 1961 interview was in Combined Fleet Decoded, also an excellent book) tater |
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The best would have been if there had been no WWI in the first place, if the Kaiser could have struck a deal with his cousin, and continued german prosperity in the middle east and the second rate colonies. However what does it matter what he did? The wars in the last 100 years were part of a continuous process, requiring constant elimination of superpowers. That process was over in 1990, when there was just one left, and now we're already in a completely new age. |
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Still it would have been interesting to hear him defend his case, and outline what led him to his strategic decisions, which imo were sound, though later on more and more uncorrelated with reality. Has anyone ever considered that maybe later on information was handed him only through a pink filter? P.S. Please let me stress that I am trying to reduce the discussion to Hitler the strategist and politician, his acts against humanity are on a completely different level. |
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Anyway I don't consider him a "hero", but just a very experienced combat aviator that went through the whole war and had much experiences to tell. Quote:
I was just trying to illustrate the point that even if being so pro-german as I am, I celebrate the fact that Germany lost WW2. Winning WW1 could have turned like you suggest, but that would have been just a change in situations for the countries that fought. Nothing compared to what would have happened if Hitler had won :o Quote:
His political side was a completely different matter, however, that's something one must concede. Quote:
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Ordinary guy? How unfortunate that his paintings didn't sell well, I have seen some of them and they weren't that bad! |
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Yes I had readed about that in J.A. Vallejo Nágera (A very famous spanish psychiatrist who directed a hospital in New York) in his book: "Locos egregios" (Famous mads), an essay to make a psychiatric diagnosis about the personality of a series of famous personalities in history: http://www.fisterra.com/human/1libro...s_egregios.asp
BTW I can only recommend that book to anyone, it's a very interesting and enjoyable read.:up: |
Yes I have read that book with great interest, I studied the leaders of WWII and thru history in research and decision making in large complex socities is not easy, but Hitler was clearly mad and deranged and his military decisions ruined any hopes of rational planning and indeed humane conduct of the war, WWII. WWI was a international suicide pact that was carried out by all the major powers, and sadly destoryed much that was good. We have recovered a lot but the world might have been quite different. This is an excellent discussion and I read it with much appreciation and interest. War is in the end only an extension of policy that has failed to understand how to negoitate and act in a realistic and compassionate way....ie a failure of compromise and understanding of other ppls and countries needs and challenges. There are no victors in War and there is no glory..but there are many brave and dedicated people and much sacrifice.
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Great thread, lots of good discussion. On the original subject of US vs German submarines, here's my thoughts...
I agree with most of the comments about depth vs firepower (torpedo tubes), range, etc...but I don't think that these were defining factors in the success/failure of the respective US/German submarine campaigns. Regarding the spot-on observations about comms discipline - fully concur that this had a significant impact, but even this, I think, didn't have a decisive effect on ultimate outcomes. Bottom line, from my perspective, is that at the tactical level, both USN & KM had effective boats manned by tough & proficient skippers and crews. Relative strengths/weaknesses notwithstanding, their differences are far outweighed by the similarities: diesel-electric boats, with basically same speed/range/depth characteristics, armed with comparable torpedoes. Sure there were differences, but they were differences of degree rather than kind. In the big picture, one campaign was successful and one failed because they fought very different wars. Two big reasons: 1) At the strategic level, the Allies' industrial/economic advantage was just too insurmountable. This factor, of course, came into play in all theaters, for all services. As one poster mentioned, Allies reached a point where they were building ships much faster than Germany could sink them. The US submarine force didn't face this problem in the Pacific. 2) Allies put high priority and achieved success in rapidly improving ASW doctrine, technology, and force structure. Japan did not - not even an effective convoy organization, let alone production of improved, dedicated ASW surface and air capability. Assuming even a semblance of historical accuracy, we see this ourselves in SH3 & SH4. Not far into an SH3 career, you reach a point where lone slow ships are extremely rare, while aircraft & escorts increase in number and effectiveness. The SH4 skipper, doesn't experience that; the tactical challenge in late '44 isn't much different from early '42; aircraft aren't any scarier, escorts aren't much more effective, and there's still plenty of lone slow merchies plowing around almost 3 years into the war who apparently haven't yet deduced that there's a submarine threat out there - Straight non zig-zag courses, non-convoyed. I'm not trying to say "that's the way it was because Ubisoft says so"...just trying to point out that the game does a decent job of reflecting historical fact: US/UK effectively responded to the submarine threat, while Japan didn't. Another way to look at it is role-reversal; if US skippers/crews in US fleet boats had tried to fight the Germans' North Atlantic campaign...they probably wouldn't have done much better. And vice versa for German U-boats waging the US Pacific war...they probably would have achieved similar results against the Japanese ASW defense. Ok...standing by for counterfire. Batteries released! :) |
Yes, load up the HE..... Fire when ready!
The US would not have used submarines in the Atlantic for offensive purposes if the roles were reversed. Submarines were not appropriate to the task at hand and could only lead to defeat. The Germans used submarines because they were the only tool in the toolbox and they didn't know what to do. If Raeder were to exert any cajones in the war, it would have to be with submarines. An admiral without a viable navy is just a front-line private on the Russian front. Why were submarines inappropriate weapons for the Germans? Let's look at the Pacific war and why subs WERE appropriate there. Japan, working alone, used its merchant fleet to go out, fill up with supplies from captured oil fields mostly, and return those supplies to the island of Japan. We were able to isolate the island, knock down Japanese supplies in Japanese bottoms and choke off any replacements of war matériel for the future. The key is Japanese cargo, Japanese bottoms, no foreign entanglements. Against Britain, Germany was sinking ships of a number of nations, bringing in supplies from multiple sources, not just of food and raw materials, but finished products. The only way to choke off Britain was to bring those supplier nations into the war. The United States is not an island, was self sufficient and not subject to strangulation by submarine encirclement. The war was lost as soon as the decision was made to use a weapon that was inappropriate to the job at hand. Using U-Boats was one of the the worst decisions of the war. |
@Rockin Robbins: Look that just makes very little sense. Britain was extremely dependent on her atlantic imports, and a relatively small number of U-boats were an excellent way to hurt her war machinery. Look at the resources the allies had to muster in order to eventually counter them. Even if the boats didn't sink any ships at all, the convoy system alone meant a drastic reduction in transport capacity, because ships had to wait in port before all were ready and then wait again for unloading. The reason no more was achieved was rather in Germany diluting her was efforts on all fronts, when Dönitz said he wanted at least 300 boats he got only 100, during Paukenschlag there was a genuine chance to disrupt US shipping for several months, had it not been conducted by just a dozen boats. Even Churchill, who was certainly no coward, said the u-boats scared him more than anything else.
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I thought I was clear. Britain could not be starved because her stuff (technical term) was shipped on foreign bottoms from nations not subject to U-Boat strangulation. Sinking those boats from nations, especially the United States, resulted in a war they could not possibly win. 300 U-Boats would only have been 300 more coffins on the bottom of the Atlantic.
A submarine is a proper weapon if: 1. You are fighting an island nation without raw materials of its own which is importing raw materials on its own bottoms so that you draw no nation into the war who you cannot beat. 2. You control the sea and air at least enough to give your subs relatively safe passage into and out of the enemy shipping lanes. 3. If there are any choke points between where you are and where you need to be, you need to control them. 4. The presence of the submarines needs to be unknown enough that convoys cannot easily bypass them because the subs are slow. Chatting promiscuously on the radio is suicide. Germany had three strikes there. None of these conditions were met. Therefore, they were blasted out of the water in the Bay of Biscay on the way out and blasted there again on the way in by unhindered air and sea forces of the enemy. They had no control of the sea or air so hunter-killer groups could swarm and kill at will. They broadcast their whereabouts like a couple of schoolgirls on cell phones. And in order to do as well as they did, they drew the United States, an unbeatable foe, into the war when there was no reason to do so. All this makes "very little sense?" The submarine was an inappropriate tool for Germany to use in WWII. There was no reason for the Germans to fight the United States, or Britain, for that matter, except that the inappropriate use of the subs made it impossible to avoid. Doenitz had plenty of subs for operations that made sense. He did not have enough to attempt the foolishness that he engaged in. He would have lost even with his 300 subs. |
I think RR is right on regarding the larger strategic & political impacts. In my post, I was simpy comparing the submarines & crews themselves...saying that there was no hugely decisive advantage/disadvantage at the tactical unit level. If US subs/crews had tried to fight the German campaign, they too would have met failure, and vice versa.
I do agree that comms discipline was huge factor. Where I *do* differ from RR a little and lean toward Global's viewpoint...I *do* think that with sufficient U-boats, the KM might have been able to force UK out of the war; perhaps not outright surrender, but at least an offer of armistice - which I think Germany may very well have accepted, even with crazy Adolf at the helm. BUT; after Dec 1941, this wasn't possible, because US entered the war. At that point, yes, I agree with RR; quickly became futile for the U-boat effort. Fully concur that number of boats involved in Drumbeat was irrelevant in the long term. Ironic that Germany's "ally" actually forced the event that sealed the Reich's doom. And still incomprehensible to me that Germany declared war on the US...it's not entirely clear to me that, Pearl Harbor notwithstanding, Roosevelt and Congress would have immediately jumped into the war with Germany without that. Sure, Roosevelt *wanted* to....but domestic politics were what they were. Germany's declaration freed him politically. Even today, I've met quite a few folks from that time period who've told me that they fully supported war vs Japan because of the Pearl Harbor attack, but didn't think that Europe was our fight, and would have been quite content not to enter that conflict. I think that's somethiing that isn't much discussed today. Another interesting "what if" variable: Today the idea of a separate peace between Germany & USSR seems kinda weird - of all the various combatants, these two in particular seemed more than anyone else to be implacable foes locked in a death struggle. The truth may have been more complex than that. In 1943, Germany was clearly in trouble, but USSR wasn't in much better shape. Sure both countries were able to continue the war, but I think at that point the attractiveness and possibility of a peace agreement (or at least a "non-war" agreement, kinda like Korea today) was much more real than is commonly perceived today. Diplomats of both countries were in contact with each other in neutral countries (most notably in Stockholm), and there was a lot of discussion about such an arrangement. Indeed, that was probably Roosevelt/Churchill's biggest worry throughout 1943 - that Russia would stop fighting. The entire Africa/Mediterranean campaign from Casablanca to Anzio was fought just for that reason....to convince Stalin to stay in the Alliance. So..."what if", even after US entered the war, the U-boats (again, in sufficient numbers), had been able to harass/interdict Atlantic shipping to the point of *delaying* the North Africa/Sicily/Italy/even Normandy operations because of restricted flow of war material? Maybe delay them enough that USSR just said "enough is enough" and bowed out. Doesn't mean US/UK would have quit also. And doesn't mean Germany would have "won" either. But would have led to a longer war and possibly an outcome for Germany not quite as stark as Unconditional Surrender. |
Wow, all that is really hard to say because Hitler was crazy. Irrationality will always be confusing. And Hitler was irrational all the way from the most simple basic decisions to global strategy decisions. Irrational and very dangerous to his own people. This cut off his ties to reality altogether as terrified underlings sought to feed him what he wanted to hear right then and then get out of sight. All the "might haves" that make sense to us would have made no sense to him at all.
My speculation also is baseless, because I don't believe Hitler was capable of pulling it off. It's just fun to speculate. Someone else would have had to have been in charge to make anything different happen than what did. |
If I may chime in here.........
A submarine force is useless without a surface Navy. The most you can achieve is some interdiction. The reason the USN subs were so successful is because the IJN was actively engaged by US surface forces. Surface (and Air) forces in the Atlantic had nothing else to do other than solve the ASW problem. Germany could not effectively counter the allied surface fleets. They had none of their own. Pretty ridiculous to start a war where Naval Supremacy will most likely be a factor without a Navy. Remember as well that the "strangling" of the UK was supposed to culminate with a Nazi amphimbious invasion. "Overlord" was a stillborn. Their moment of opportunity waxed and waned with the turning of the Air Battle Of Britain. It's impossible to take the submarine platfrom and analyze their strategic implications in a vacuum. Submarines are properly employed as part of a fleet. |
You guys are forgetting that the U-boats war was fought against Great Britain and not the USA, and that the whole strategy was based on the realities of 1939 - 1941, when Germany still had a chance to defeat Britain with swift action as it had with France. From 1942 onwards, I agree, Germany had missed her small chance and it was a lost cause once Britain and the USA were geared up for war, and with Russias neverending supply of cannonfodder.
Had Germany build and concentrated a maximum number of boats as well as her whole airforce to the siege of Britain, while she was struggling with the most basic ASW measures, and the USA was a teethless giant, this had a realistic chance of completely disrupting Britains imports, forcing Churchill out of power and getting an armistice in 12 months. That was the plan, and it was not impossible in '40 and '41, but it was never carried out. Instead Hitler conducted the Atlantic campaign more like a propaganda war that would give him of a big number of war heros and propaganda material for very little investment. Quote:
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