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Considering how good the SJ and SD radars the Gatos used was,plus the 10 torp tubes I think the Gato/Balaos would have given the British fits. Plus the fact that the US sub service was excellant at developing sub tactics on the fly. They may have suffered serious losses early on...but they would have found a way to neutralize any advantage the Brits might have had.
The crews on US boats were generally better trained than their German counterparts. And I believe they also underwent mental tests to make sure they were suited to sub duty. Not sure if the Germans did that. As for saying that the US navy started the war with more subs than Germany had in 1939...that is a moot point. They may have had more subs,but many of them were stationed in the Atlantic when the war began and others were undergoing maintanance. And as for the constant denigration of Japanese ASW efforts,tell it to the boys who didn't make it home. You make it sound like only incompetent crews could have possibly been sunk by the Japanese. In a way,I find that to be rather insulting. |
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Silent Hunter I got that down pretty accurate (I think iRL they used to enter AOB though while SHI used target course, but target course is just derived from own course and AOB - so IRL it might have even eased that calculation off you). Now, iRL both Navies used to fire from very short ranges (until guided / pattern running torps etc showed up I guess) where there would be higher error tolerance, and of course there is no doubt the Kriegsmarine hit a lot of ships, however it's nice to be able to check your fire solution BEFORE shooting your fish, as well as being able to run circles around your target, go submerged etc and know constantly where the target is by simply looking at your TDC bearing and range readouts. Quote:
I believe cracking the German Naval Code was one of THE horsemen of the apocalypse for the U-Boats. In the end it was ignorance and stubborness which spelled doom for the U-Boats. As in the other military branches and operations, Hitler and part of the Command grossly underestimated the enemy's ability and will to fight, probably because of huge initial successes. We did not want to believe the level of sophistication on the Brit radar systems, nor that they cracked the naval code. And instead of using our technology in a concerted effort to counter effectively, we developed some fancy high tech **** here and there, which had little practical use in the great sheme of things. Which was a good thing for the world. |
Gato vs. VIIC
Funny how this discussion pops up again now SHIV is about to be launched. Two years ago we had almost exactly the same thread when SHIII was introduced.
When comparing the Gato's/Balao's/Tench with the German boats we should remember that they were designed with completely different goals in mind. We should also realise that the origin of the US fleet boats was a German design. The Germans, based on their experiences in WW I, went for an agile, simple sub to cut Britains commercial life lines in a battle that was to be fought on the Western Approaches and the North Atlantic. The VII was ideal for such a campaign. The US saw Japan as a potential threat to it's supremacy in the Pacific. In case of a future war the Navy rightly predicted a Japanese expansion in a South Eastern direction to secure raw materials, especially the oil fields of Sumatra (Duch Indies). In order to realise that goal the Philippines had to be conquered by Japan. The US Navy Plan Orange foresaw an excursion of the main US battle fleet towards the Philippines Sea to intervene with Japanese landings. The idea was that both battlefleets would clash and fight it out. Fleet submarines were intended as - next to - invisable scouts to lead the battle fleet towards the enemy. Furthermore they would try to intercept Japanese capital ships during their approach to the US fleet. Finally they would attack retreating Japanese units or reinforcements. Thus the US needed a very long range boat with a speed comparable to contemporary battleships. In 1919 the US had acquired the U 140U-Kreuzer (sub-cruiser) as reparation payments from Germany. Thhe specifications are: draught 1930 tons; armarement: 6 torpedo tubes and 2 x 6" deck gun; range: 13.000 miles. This served as a prototype for the US Fleet boats. Because the US battlefleet was put out of action by the attack on Pearl Harbour, the Navy had to fight a different battle than anticipated. US carrier groups fought defensive battles at the outskirts of the expanded Japanese Empire - with some offensive raids to test the Japanese reaction - and only submarines could wage an agressive war. It took the US about 9 - 12 monthes to get its act together, but as from ultimo 1943 the US sub fleet was engaged in a total war against Japanes merchant shipping, a role the fleet boats were never designed for. They were extremely effective in this role, accounting for more than 50% of the Japanese merchant losses... |
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Our boats would not have done very well in the "confind" spaces of the areas VIII boats were mainly deployed. German boats were built to the needs they had and ours to what we anticipated were to be. Having said that I am sure a U-Boat Kapitain would not have minded at all to have a Gato/Balao class under his feet in the mid Atlantic or during their ventures to the US east coast or off the coast of Cuba. With the length of patrols of the US boats the size and accommodations on the US boats certainly outclassed their German counter parts. I guess if one compared boat to boat - plus and minus - the US Boats would come out on top, but I am sure many a German sailor thought he lived because of the boat he was in. Happy Hunting :ping: |
It seems to me the Gato's biggest advantage is its radar. German U-boats would have benefitted greatly from this.
Didn't mean to put down Japanese ASW as much as comment on excellance of Uk-US ASW. Tha bit about the U-1400 is really interesting! Had no idea, so it seems they were both German designs.;) |
I guess I don't get this whole weapon-theater-swapping arguement. For example, it's a given that the German Tiger and Panther tanks were far superior to the US M4 Sherman. I'm sure Tigers and Panthers would have rolled over the laughable Japanese tanks and flimsy anti-tank weapons. They also would have been a pain to ship and get across a beachead given their larger size. Shermans and Stuarts were easier to cram into a ship's hold and were more than enough tank for the confined atolls and jungles of the Pacific. Shermans in Europe? Well...you got us Americans there. Quantity had to make up for quality.They probably should have hurried the development of the M26 Pershing along. ;)
I guess in the end it's all a moot point. Both sides developed material to fit the requirements they needed at the time and the rest was history. |
Gato vs. VIIC
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For instance, in January '44 the US general for tank procurement, a certain George Patton, vetoed the mass production of the superior M26 Pershing tank on grounds that changing the production process would interrupt the delivery of the M4 Sherman, a tank with which the war could be won. As a consequence US tank crews in the European Theater of Operations suffered apalling losses against Panthers, Tigers and German AT guns ... |
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There eventually was the M48 Patton...but long after. |
Gato vs. VIIC
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But I'm pretty much off topic by now. :-? |
It's to tough to call, I'd lean towards the German boats, However the Japanese never put the resources into their anti submarine warfare capabilities that the Allies did.
Their merchant fleet was almost non existant by 1945 mostly due to the success of american submarine forces. But then again without the allies staggering investment in aircraft and new technoligies the U-Boats would almost have certainly closed the atlantic. The US subs seemed to be more a bane to Japanese fleet as well. They sunk the Shokaku and Taiho at the battle of the Phillipine sea Archer Fish Sunk the largest aircraft carrier of WW2 the Shinano it's first day out of port. |
How to necro a thread!
Having visited the U-505 IX at Chicago and the USS Pampanito at Fishermans Wharf: the main difference is the VII was a submerged campground vs an actual submerged dwelling of the superior Gato or Baleo vessel. One overlooked aspect of the capture of the U-505 was the huge bucket in the engine room that everyone defecated in as the 2nd toilet opposite the cooks galley was used for food storage. I've seen the picture of a US sailor who bravely removed the bucket:Kaleun_Sick: at the capture even as the scuttle charges were being neutralized, but cannot locate it. The engine room must have reeked!
Moreover, bathing aboard a U-boat was nil for a crew of 45+ due to poor desalinization equipment. The repair backlogs at German bases was miserable as opposed to US facilities at Peal, Midway, Australia thus negating the Nazi strategy of strangling Britain into submission while the Allied effort in the Pacific was what Doenitz could only dream of. The advent of Liberty and Victory cargo rapid production vessels further stymied the Kriegsmarine effort to a total of only 3-5% of Allied cargo vessels sunk overall; ie: a failure of the overall strategy concept largely borrowed from WWI's failure when Britain's Grand fleet did most of the starving of Germany into submission. Doenitz must have seen the light; he pulled all his subs from the Atlantic in 1943??!! |
[QUOTE=Aktungbby;2938782][COLOR="ruby"]Having visited the U-505 IX at Chicago and the USS Pampanito at Fishermans Wharf: the main difference is the VII was a submerged campground vs an actual submerged dwelling of the superior Gato or Baleo vessel. One overlooked aspect of the capture of the U-505 was the huge bucket in the engine room that everyone defecated in as the 2nd toilet opposite the cooks galley was used for food storage. I've seen the picture of a US sailor who bravely removed the bucket:Kaleun_Sick: at the capture even as the scuttle charges were being neutralized, but cannot locate it. The engine room must have reeked!
Moreover, bathing aboard a U-boat was nil for a crew of 45+ due to poor desalinization equipment. The repair backlogs at German bases was miserable as opposed to US facilities at Peal, Midway, Australia thus negating the Nazi strategy of strangling Britain into submission while the Allied effort in the Pacific was what Doenitz could only dream of. The advent of Liberty and Victory cargo rapid production vessels further stymied the Kriegsmarine effort to a total of only 3-5% of Allied cargo vessels sunk overall; ie: a failure of the overall strategy concept largely borrowed from WWI's failure when Britain's Grand fleet did most of the starving of Germany into submission. Doenitz must have seen the light; he pulled all his subs from the Atlantic in 1943??!! "Having visited the U-505 IX at Chicago and the USS Pampanito at Fishermans Wharf: the main difference is the VII was a submerged campground vs an actual submerged dwelling of the superior Gato or Baleo vessel." Well said. Interesting, older thread I do not recall ever reading. Thanks for reviving. I have visited both boats as well and agree. However, Pampanito is a Balao Class of course and 505 is a Type IX. Type IX as are aware is more comparable to the Gato or Baloa than a Type VII. I believe we're perilously close to false comparison when comparing the Gato to the Type VII as were built for different theaters, different missions originally. Gato's were "fleet type submarines" designed to run with and scout for the US fleet when battleships were still the mainstay, before carrier airpower truly supplanted that role by the time the US was in the war. To my knowledge Us submarine doctrine was not faced on sinking enemy merchant vessels until after Pearl Harbor when the unrestricted warfare order was given, where as Germany had conducted such warfare in WW I and believe that was the plan all along for the next war, to blockade the enemy with warfare against commerce. Not sure if anyone brought this up but one thing US submarines had going is they did not face the same type of mass effective, ASW effort from the Japanese that the Germans faced from the Allies. IJN was late to the game in ASW doctrine and while it was no cakewalk for the US submarine force, it was not what the UBoats faced. US submarines did not really hit their stride until 1944 (torpedo issues finally resolved in late 1943) and US doctrine evolved with night surface attacks being preferred method, "wolfpacks" becoming common against lage (by japanese standards) convoys of 12-15 ships. The IJN never really had surface and air based radar that was effective against submarines that was widely deployed and it made AW less effective overall, unlike the Allies. I think about Tang in June 1944 off Nagasaki, attacking a convoy with 12 escorts, some with surface search radar, on the surface at night, from inside the convoy, in shallow waters. They slipped inside the screen and pretended to be part of it. Japanese apparently did not have PPI scopes, just "A Scope" type displays, so even if they detected the sub, it blended in well. They attacked successfully and escaped. This was not an abnormal feat against convoys in 1944 and 1945, even when they had plenty of escorts and radar. "Ramage's Rampage" of 31 July 1944 in Parche, of Jack's attack on the Take Ichi Convoy in April 1944, which had a direct strategic impact on the New Guinea campaign. |
The Gato and VIIC types can be considered as mobilization type boats, for mass construction in war conditions. Preparation and commissioning with a new crew. In this regard, the Germans are ahead of the Americans, in terms of the training and preparatory base for commissioning these boats significantly. It is stupid and inappropriate to compare these boats in any other way. The conditions of use, tactical and technical characteristics, and the evolution of the development of submarine warfare are completely different for US and German submarines.
---------------------------------------------------- Тип Гато и VIIC можно рассматривать как лодки мобилизационного типа, для массовой постройки в условиях войны. Подготовке и вводе в строй с новым экипажем. В этом плане немцы опережают американцев, по учебной подготовительной базе ввода этих лодок в строй значительно. По другому сравнивать эти лодки глупо и не уместно. Условия применения, тактико-технические характеристики, эволюция развития средств ведения подводной войны абсолютно разная у подлодок США и Германии. |
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