US pilots had the luxury to learn from mistakes. As a result, US pilots could improve over time. Japanese pilots didn't have a lot of wiggle room for mistakes as their planes sacrificed all pilot protection for "offensive" capability. Also, the huge range of IJN planes—a big "plus" for their design, did have a bad side. It meant they operated FAR from any sort of help if they did go down.

Note that at Midway US CV operations doctrine was still very much a work in progress, informed by their one real combat experience, the Coral Sea. They had very little time to integrate their new information, but they did so, and damn fast.

If you have any interest in early USN vs IJN air combat, Lundstrom's two "First Team" books are obligatory reading.

Japanese pilot training brings us back on topic. They were in a mode in the Pacific War that required a SHORT conflict. Their pilot training could not rplace losses, they didn't have the resources to fight a long war, or replace losses. As such, an alternate strategic plan that could have used what they had better, without putting them in a war of attrition that they could not possibly win is interesting.

Thanks for that, I'm always on the lookout for good books.

And yep, that's what I've read. The Japanese gambled everything on a short war, with the US rolling over and suing for peace shortly after the Pearl attack. Oh boy, did they ever misread that.

I guess it comes back to the point made earlier, they seemed to view the 'decadent Americans' of being incapable and unwilling to fight them.

As soon as it became apparent that the US completely stymied their plans by not just rolling over and giving up they were screwed.

EDIT: Another very good point I hadn't considered.
But I do remember reading that the US went to great lengths to rescue downed pilots.
On the Japanese side the attitude seemed to be - if you go down, too bad. It's in the hands of the gods.
Another reason for the quick decimation of their top line aircrew.

Really, the choice of planes in many ways was bizarre. They went to great lengths to try and create incredibly good pilots. The USN pilots also had excellent training, but they culled fewer, so call it many "very good to great" pilots vs a handful of "only the great" for the IJNAF.

The IJN had such an investment in aircrews, they really should have done whatever possible to keep them alive. Planes can be replaced... for Japan, pilots were virtually irreplaceable.

As the war progressed, Allied pilots got better over time, and Japanese pilots got worse. Add in better Allied aircraft, and the slaughter becomes inevitable.

:haha:I was afraid someone might ask me that so, I was reluctant to even bring it up.:D Ugh, I hate looking things up in the books. OK, I think it was touched upon in my book, "Japanese Destroyer Captain", written by an IJN Naval officer who was present during every major surface engagement with the USPF. I'm trying to remember, off the cuff, so that I don't have to go foraging through the pages.
Ahh, I found it! Not exactly as I described (though I could've seen it in another book) so I'll post it verbatim, right from the book: "The problems of aviator training and radar developement were also neglected too long. By late 1943, when most of it's crack pilots, who should've been teaching, had already been killed in action. When the Navy belatedly started to train aviators on a mass-production basis, it discovered that the aircraft factories were unable to keep pace with the demand for planes.
All 100 of my students at the Torpedo School were college and university graduates who had originally volunteered for flight training and duty. After three months of preliminary air training, these men were all switched to surface assignments, and thus to my torpedo-boat class, simply because of lagging airplane production."
That's all I could find thus far so, I stand corrected until then.;)

@tater: "Note that at Midway US CV operations doctrine was still very much a work in progress, informed by their one real combat experience, the Coral Sea. They had very little time to integrate their new information, but they did so, and damn fast."

Absolutely. The USN, during the early years, had not yet learned how to use their carriers in battle. They hadn't learned how to coordinate their carrier air groups and use them in tandem with one another (i.e., torpedo bombers, dive bombers and fighters) which, ironically, and some would argue, was one of the reasons for our decisive victory at Midway.

I agree with the overall advantage that American pilots had.I am a but surprised that none has yet mentioned another obvious advantage that US pilots had rotation,they only had to fly x amount of missions before they rotated away from the combat zone(unless they willingly wished to stay) and either received additional training and often trained newer pilots them selves.This simple fact gave American airman a huge advantage because they learned from combat pilots and also this boosted morale as well.

Japanese and German pilots had no such luxury the ones that survived fought the entire war in some cases.

Some have argued that the best fighter of the war for the Japanese was the N1K2-J Shiden Kai not many where made but it was well armed and did have some actual protection for the pilot as did the Ki-84 of course they stared making planes with some actual protection too late to matter.

I am not sure I fully agree with some of what had been said.I have read in many places that the Zero was still a very serious threat to most any plane if you attempted to get into a maneuver dogfight with one.The US Navy never made a plane that was more maneuverable than the Zero they made planes that where faster,stronger,more well armed,and safer for their pilots.They simply did not play to the Zeros strengths they made their own.

The Thatch Weave is a fine of example of what I mean this tactic was used to force a Zero not fight at its strengths.Of course even the highest scoring ace in history Eric Hartman loathed Zero style maneuver dog fighting he called it a useless ballet.Better to zoom in kill him and zoom out.

@WernherVonTrapp That is true we where mostly still flying the Devastator at Midway I think the only thing that plane ever devastated was itself:haha:.
Though the very brave runs that they did make on the Japanese carriers did keep their Zeros at low altitude which allowed our SBDs to do what they did that day.Sometimes the only thing that you can give is your best you have to respect the Devastator pilots for what they did that day weaker men might turned tail and run without even trying.

The Zero was certainly deadly if a pilot fought on the Zero's terms. The thing is that they did not do this for the most part. Being good on paper, or for a type of fight that doesn't happen is meaningless. The rest of the world was already moving to higher wing-loading planes designed for "energy fighting" (to use a modern term).

The Mitsubishi factory was absurd... it was in a port area, and the streets were too narrow for trucks. It had no airfield. So every single plane they built was shipped in PARTS (after being assembled, then disassembled) with ox carts to a nearby airfield. Nearby as the crow flies, but several hours by ox cart. Then they had to be assembled (again)

WTF. Seriously, WTF?

Why didn't they just bulldoze a road through some houses?

Why is that absurd? Because the plane was not transported by truck or train it was bad?:hmmm:

The Germans where doing the same thing because of all the bombing.They pretty much turned their aircraft into a cottage industry and spread production everywhere.That is actually very clever it makes bombing you enemies production facilities impossible.My grand father saw many of these German underground and forest factories they where just as good as an American factory only smaller and spread out.

The Japanese began doing the same thing towards the end of the war.

I am not saying that the Zero was the best plane of the war but you are underrating it somewhat.If a plane inspires another nation to make a plane(or planes) that is better that is the sign of a good plane.Not sure why pilots where so happy to get either F6Fs or F4Us if the F4F was a better plane than the Zero overall but they where pilots maybe they did not know what they wanted.

And by your statement that makes the F4U a bad plane as well because it was not the most agile aircraft.Every plane is a design compromise in some way.You cant that one is bad for this reason but not another.

The Zero was a design compromise that they failed to improve in a timely manner when it was clear that opposing aircraft where getting better than it was as the war progressed.

No, the Mitsubishi factory ALWAYS had to assemble, disassemble, cart with pack animal, then reassemble every single Zero they built from the very first one. This was not a response to US bombing, it was gross inefficiency.

In fact, they recognized it, then Nakajima ended up building most of the Zeros. They could have increased production just by knocking down some buildings, but they didn't want to harm some old, historic neighborhood apparently...

The USAAF had no problem knocking down the historic neighborhood, so they should have builldized it before the war started anyway ;)

I'm sure I said something like that ;)

Sorry Sergei did not read every single post.

@tater
You seem to be picking and choosing statements.I did not say that they did this because of US bombing I sadi that the Germans did and the Japanese did as well later in the war.I meant that how a plane gets where it going to fight is not a factor on how good or bad the plane is in combat.

Nakajima made the engines for the Zero and where also a secondary factory.I'd honestly like to know your source on this whole Mitsubishi factory us of oxen Ive never heard this before.Could you do that instead of TYPING IN CAPS? Try italics or bold they are much more gentlemanly.

Even if what you say is true according to "Japanese Aircraft of the Pacific War" US Naval Institute Press, in a chart from US research post war the Japanese industry still increased aircraft production during the war peaking in late 1944 so it would seem that the pack animals did not have much effect.

P.S. Whatever did happen to the guy who started this thread in the first place.:hmmm:

Yeah I was wondering that.
He hasn't been back since it started.
Pity, this has been an interesting thread and I've learnt some new things, always a good thing.

Zero Fighter by Akira Yoshimura

The factory in question was the Nogoya Aircraft Works. They built not just Zeros, either.

The oxcart trip from the Aircraft works to the airfield took 24 hours.

Every single plane built there made this trip by oxcart.

They increased production because they built more and more at other factories. Japan didn't have the resources to waste a valuable factory that was constrained by the speed of oxcarts.

The road was never improved, and the more planes they moved, the worse the road got. Part of the reason for the oxcarts was the size of the streets, part was that they vibrated the airframes less, apparently. The oxen were by mid 1942 trucked back closer to the factory to let them rest (the trip was 48 km to the airfield). They started with 50 oxen, by 1944, they were dying of exhaustion and they had only 30.

LOL. Oxen.

BTW, I'd use more complex formatting (don't EVEN get me started on that ;) ), but bold on this forum doesn't look good to my eye in most cases, and I think it is less legible. I liberally use italics as it is.

I think the Japanese may also have been hampered by an inability to adapt their tactics. Just as in the Banzai charges that lead countless scores of soldiers to an early grave, the Japanese failed to adapt their dogfighting tactics to meet the threat. Then again, maybe too few of them made it back alive to tell anyone.:D

Well we certainly seem to do fine even in his absence...:D

If the production capacity of Nogoya Aircraft Works was 1 plane/day and the oxen delivered 1 plane/day then no problem at all. If the production capacity was 3 planes/day then you'd have a problem. So if Nogoya Aircraft Works was a "small shop" they accomplished this:
1. They saved transport fuel,
2. They preserved a historical neighbourhood
3. They "meshed" their installation in a urban/port environment
4. The location was near a port (great when you import raw material).
5. If their "botlleneck" was slow oxen they could always change to fast oxen.
6. If you were an american pilot that had just flown XXX miles through YYY enemy air defenses and ZZZ enemy fighters would you bomb an oxen convoy?

Some of the above for your amusement, some for consideration, choose your pick! :D

.

The Nogoya Aircraft works was 495,000 square meters and employed 30,000 workers.

Well in that case I'm guessing that the ox cart section of the line was 'not necessarily to Japan's advantage'.

Man, that's the most delicate and roundabout way of saying 'we lost' I ever did hear.

I take that as a reasonable source on the oxen.

And it certainly true that Japan was never able to produce enough aircraft to meet demand.

Even tough a lot of Japanese pilots did die there where several very skilled ones that lived through the entire war like Saburo Saki he actually was not a bad guy really either he actually once observed a cargo plane that appeared to have a women abroad it so he flew in to look and there was so he deiced not to allow his flight to attack the plane. Another time post war i guess in the 80's or 90's he sent a letter to the Australian government explaining the actions of a RAAF Hudson and the pilot of this plane Warren F. Cowan turned and faced Saki and seven other Zeros head on and actually caused confusion amongst the Japanese until Saki shot him down Saki felt that Cowan was worthy of being rewarded for his actions but wrote the letter when he found the man had not and they never did award any metals despite Sakis letter.Saki was also an NCO not an officer and spent as much time fighting the poor treatment of enlisted men as he did the Allies which was another underlying problem in the Japanese military.

Maybe the OP is sitting there in shock thinking "What have I created?":haha:

Production capacity?
Other "products" and services?
Alternative roots? Shipping out he disassembled planes via train or ship?
And above all what's the payload of a japanese ox cart?
Having worked in factories I will not believe that they would tolerate a permanent "lag" between production capacity and delivery rates via those god damn cows! :D

Not wanting to dispute you in any way tater... just ... something doesn't click ... :hmmm:


.

All of this is Very true. While thw wildcat didnt have better capabilities, it made up for it with being heavily armored and using tactics. without self sealing fuel tanks and NO armor the zero might as well been a flying match. one quick strafe and it burst into flames and killed the skilled pilots.

Don't forget as well that Japan could not produce 115/145LL AVGAS and only very limited quantities of military grade 91/96LL AVGAS (early in the war) and so was unable to match the west in aircraft engine power. This is why they could never reliably intercept the B-29's when they operated at high altitudes and one of the factors that allowed the USAAF to strip the turrets and associated defensive gear off the Silverplate Superfortresses used to drop the Bomb.

In 1941 Japan's GDP was less than 18% of the United States and the US economy was still operating at less than 80% capacity when Pearl Harbor was bombed. They realistcally never had a chance and chose war as their foreign policy choice since their warrior code would not allow for compromise.

There is a solid trend which echos throughout history that when warriors meet soldiers, warriors lose. For sure they'll score a few wins and maybe even provoke a disaster or two, but the overwhelming results of warrior societies fighting professional military's has ultimately been defeat and destruction of the warrior cult. Warrior cultures are inherently vulnerable because they place the highest premium on individual excellence rather than teamwork and mundane aspects of warfare like mass-production economies, logistics and technical innovation. The culture of Bushido doomed Japan.