| seanobrgp |
11-23-10 08:21 PM |
Not to divert the discussion away from military deployments and armaments, but I had some thoughts on the context of the situation that might be relevant. Of course, I'm only a college student and hardly an expert, so take my reading for what it's worth.
North Korea isn't as inscrutable as their reputation might suggest, but I feel the most important question arising out of the attack on Yeonpyeong is one we'll never have an answer to. Was the military acting of its own volition or were they given the consent of the Kim family? If the latter, then North Korea is continuing its practice of using external actions to further its internal narrative. The destruction of the Cheonan, for example, solidified the regime in the wake of its disastrous currency revaluation, and given their increasingly dire economic situation, they probably expected us to start a dialogue without requiring them to undertake verifiable nuclear disarmament. However, I think it's also plausible that the military is flaunting its independence as we close in on Kim Jong-un's ascent to power, and such a prospect would have serious ramifications for the entire region and the future of North Korea.
In the aftermath of the Cheonan incident, but before the evidence of his culpability was made public, Kim Jong-il made a visit to China, where everyone thought that he was requesting additional military and humanitarian assistance. If he or a high profile delegation are seen in China in the next month, I'd interpret that as a state endorsement of what occured. If no such visit is forthcoming, it could indicate fragmentation amongst the establishment -- or nothing at all. Such is the nature of North Korea.
Officially, the North Korean government is an institutional triumvirate: Choe Yong-rim is the country's premier and head of a Cabinet comprised of officials chosen by the elected Supreme People's Assembly. The Presidium Standing Committee of that Assembly has the authority to legislate when the body is not in session (it almost never is), and there is a judiciary of some form, though I don't believe it's ever been relevant. In actual practice, all of the power in the country is concentrated in the military establishment and Kim Jong-il's National Defense Commission, but I think it's important to remember that this is a rather new development in North Korean internal affairs. It wasn't until 1992 that the Commission was separated from the President's direct control, principally to allow Kim Jong-il, then serving as head of the Army, to oversee the entire military, and only the 1998 constitution made it an independent extension of the state endowed with executive authority accountable to no one. Though it may have been essential to maintaining the Eternal Leader's legacy, Kim Jong-il has only been a titular head of the Korean Worker's Party since 1997, never sought to proclaim himself President or establish any substantial political office, and his most intimate advisor -- the only man with his ear -- is O Kuk-Ryol, the military's most prominent figure. While everyone in the country is implicitly subordinate to him, Jong-il never made any effort to expand beyond the sphere of influence he was accorded while preparing to succeed his father; he simply re-defined the government to facilitate the military's preeminence, and I think that has made rule by anyone outside of it nearly impossible.
The tacit significance of the 3rd Party Congress and Jong-un's unveiling in September, then, may have been that Kim Jong-il intended to revive North Korea's much neglected political apparatus and shift the balance back to them. Kim Jong-un can lead North Korea as an ideologue on name alone, and by crediting him with pioneering CNC industrial efforts, declaring his birthday a national holiday, and portraying him publicly as the enigmatic heir to the family's legacy, they are already well on their way to accomplishing that. But Kim Jong-il must also be aware that the military won't accept Jong-un as a suitable replacement, so he has appointed Jang Song-thaek, his brother-in-law and a consummate party insider who endured a purge earlier this decade, as Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission. The intent is probably for Jang to serve as Jong-un's prince regent, bridging the gap between the country's political and military institutions until Jong-un can assert his independence and define his own style of leadership.
If Kim Jong-il has been unable to coalesce these interests, compensating for Jong-un's numerous inadequacies and transitioning the country away from strident military rule, then succession is imperiled and some form of insurrection is probably inevitable. But this is all conjecture: we only hear what North Korea wants us to hear, and if there are elements bristling at the prospect of another Kim, we won't know until they take distinguishable action. The Yeonpyeong incident could have been the first external sign of a fracture within the regime, an attempt to resuscitate diplomatic negotiations, or both. If Jong-il was attempting to stabilize the internal dynamic to allow for Jong-un's rise, it not only suggests that Jong-il isn't politically adept, but has to cast doubt on whether Jong-un will be allowed to come to power at all.
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