Actually you were just a little condescending here:
Attempting to show a point by lecturing and talking down to people never goes over very well.

Maybe you don't know this CaptainMattJ, but out of the 4.5 million German military casualties during the war, about 3.5 million of those were on the Eastern front.

So, given that about 75% of Germanys losses were in the East, how many should the USSR have lost?

You bring up some good points. Points that I felt would inevitably become apparent. Has anyone ever watched old Popeye or Looney Tunes cartoons, just to name a few. Or has anyone ever visited YouTube to explore the "Banned Cartoons" category. Deprecation is a very effective tool of war and, one not lost on the American populous during WWII. Don't forget that Japan blamed the U.S. for many of it's problems and this dates back to WWI, if not further. Children see, hear, and eventually inherit the predjudices of their parents. Probably, at first, their deep resentment toward the U.S. crept up slowly as it does with all forms of predjudice, before it culminated into precisely directed propaganda toward a nation that they knew could not be defeated. Even Yamamoto knew that. It was he who informed the Emporer and his war staff that, after Pearl Harbor, he could not foresee military victories against the U.S. beyond a 6 month (approximated) time frame. Guadalcanal was proof evident of that prediction. Japan's alliance and assistance to the allied nations of WWI was viewed as a way to extend their position in the Pacific (the payback for services rendered effect) without the necessity for war. When their position did not materialize as expected, then the resentment began to set in. You have to realize just how close to poverty the Japanese people were after WWI and with each successive setback (e.g., the Washington Conference, Oil/Scrap Metal embargo, etc.) their prejudice toward this nation grew with a passion. After Yamamoto's prediction began to materialize (proof evident), their overall strategy became fixed on creating defenses that the United States would throw itself up against, and eventually tire of the high losses. But, when this too failed to stop US, true to their Bushido code of die rather than surrender, their passion, contempt and disdain for the US Military became fanatical, obviously under false hopes again.
Will the troops stand fast and fight more against an enemy they know will obliterate them, or, will they stand fast against an enemy that is possible to defeat? It's one of the basic rules of war.

I submit it is fair to say that the Japanese never really learned anything once the war broke out. The Way of the Warrior ensured that those who might have been able to pass on new knowledge died gloriously while wireless communications from the isolated island garrisons carried far more homages to the Emperor than any real combat lessons learned.

Despite possessing radar they never developed the concept of controlled fighter direction or an operations centre were information could be analysed and acted on and the Army's sole effective reaction to American combat firepower was to dig deeper, a purely passive response that could never bring victory. Their operational command and control doctrine would not have been out of place on the Western Front in 1917 while as noted, their logistical arrangements were sloppy and inefficient.

Pushing beans, bullets and gas down to the troops was a duty unworthy of Samurai even when they actually had stocks of those commodities.

Once the orgy of quick successes passed, the Japanese armed forces failed to adapt and learn and soon all they knew was how to die. With no real institutional memory and doctrines based upon wishful thinking, mythology and percieved racial superiority the doomed any chances of adapting the the American way of war.

I think you will find that the quote "Quantity has a quality all its own" is generally attributed to Stalin, but perhaps that is apocryphal. I understand that Fleet Commander Sergei Gorshkov also used it to silence his critics when questioned about the many diesel boats in the Red Banner Fleet built after the USN submarine force went nuclear.

I agree about the quantity statement. I think that the US is often (in the ETO) accused of having loads of inferior stuff, and winning by "mass." I think this is a disservice. Military technology doesn't exist in a vacuum. It exists in the context of doctrine. US technology during the war fit very well with US doctrine. Yeah, we had a lot of "stuff" at the sharp end, but that was a product of the "culture" of our military which put a premium on logistics, and where possible, expending "stuff" in place of men. The latter being a doctrine that any democracy should support, and which most autocracies could not care less about.

As an aside, the IJNAF is usually given false credit for having a technological lead in aircraft at the start of the war. The prowess of the Zero is grossly exaggerated, IMO. Read Lundsrom, and it's clear that the USN never suffered a negative kill ratio during any statistically meaningful stretch of combats. They were even, or even better from the very first engagement—flying the F4F. Jap air forces did very well at the start primarily due to mass. 50 Zeros meet a handful of operational planes over Malaya, and the outcome is a foregone conclusion, regardless of aircraft quality.

The fact that stalin and his officers didnt have enough respect for their soldiers lives has no relevance? They sent them on mass suicidal charges, without enough support. the Soviets couldve easily shaved a couple million. The germans may have been better trained, but they still suffered flaws. like under eqquiped for winter fighting. and their tanks often needed repairs and the panzers were no match for the T252. The Soviets couldve saved lives, but did they? not really. They had Quantity and for the most part quality. They just didnt value their troops enough. as for what they SHOULDVE lost, i dont know. Maybe 5-7 million. It depends on certain thing that couldve been done differently and mistakes avoided. what i WAS trying to say is that that number of casualties was unnessecary and not ALL those Soldiers had to die. still the soviets wouldve lost a considerable amount even if the right measures were taken.

very true that the corsair was in ways better then the zero. however the corsair wasnt always available, especially at places like wake. they had wildcats go up against zeros and they were totally outgunned. The reason the zero was so ferocius was its maneuverability. when a plane can outmaneuver a zero, it was over. the zero had no armor. the hellcats and corsairs and my personal favorites the P51 Mustangs were quite capable of downing a zero easily. especially as the quality of pilots reduced as more of them were getting killed. but the japs developed much MUCH better planes, like the Ki-84 Frank and the J7W Shinden. both these fighters were WONDERFUL! Awesome fighters. the shinden didnt get to see action though. they also developed pretty good bombers too.

I have it on good authority that they should have lost 7,999,999. :D Unfortunately, I was unable to avoid being squashed alive by a Panzer because I slipped on a banana peel in Berlin, and that pushed the number to an unacceptable level.

The F4F is not the corsair, that is the F4U.

BuAer named planes by type, number (serially) of said type from manufacturer name code.

F = fighter

4F = 4th procured from supplier code letter F (Grumman) = "Wildcat"

F-4th from supplier U (Vought) = "corsair"

F-6F (6th from Grumman = "Hellcat"

(there were F5F prototypes built for the USN, but they were not built in production---procured even included prototypes).

Anywa, the lowly F4F never had a negative K/D vs the zero.

against seat belts
 

tater wants the seat belt laws repealed....:D

oh well then. Wildcats didnt fare well enough against zeros. sorry about the mix up. the wildcat just didnt have the speed, maneuverability, range, or climbing a zero could get. however these problems were quite easily overcome in the F6F Hellcat. and it still had great armor.

Well, you're right about that.
But as soon as US fighter pilots stopped trying to 'dogfight' the Zeroes, they started to enjoy considerable success, despite their 'inferior' aircraft.
Heard of the Thatch Weave?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thatch_weave
It's interesting stuff.
Don't fight the enemy on his terms. If he has an aircraft that's more manoeuvrable than you, for the love of God don't try to out-turn him. You'll lose.

And there's the very important point that Japan did not have a proper system in place for replacing their combat losses.
The US would rotate some of their veteran flyers to other air groups, or back to the States, to train the new guys.
Japan never had any system like that, and would keep their combat vets flying until they got shot down. With each successive defeat they had less pilots with combat experience, and no-one to train the new guys.

Having superior equipment (be it planes, tanks, ships, whatever) is only one part of the equation.

Actually, the F4F was a very close match to the Zero. The -3 was faster at sea level (just barely), and both the -3 and -4 were better armed and armored.

Regardless, the F4F fared very well vs the Zero in RL. As I said, Lundstrom's two "First Team" books go over every single air engagement during the first year of the war that the USN was involved in. His books are meticulous, and he usually manages to ID the specific japanese aircraft, pilots, even crew, and which attack was vs which aircraft. he compares US and Japanese records, and sorts out the overclaims from the actual kills.

The F4F was NEVER in the hole vs the Zero. never. From day one the USN pilots in the F4F held their own vs the Zero. So yes, on paper the Zero had several advantages as you mention, but in RL combat, it faired dead even to WORSE than the F4F.

Regarding Thatch, you need to remember that the first time USN pilots saw a Zero was the Coral Sea. The next time was Midway. The "learning curve" to figure out what NOT to do vs the zero was basically ONE combat (and they didn't do terribly at the Coral Sea).

Add up all the time involved, and it took the USN pilots what, 30 minutes to figure out how to counter the Zero?

The amazing thing is also that the F4U, and f6F—the two planes that WTF pwned the Zero—were both designed before the war started.

Ah, I was about to mention that sergei, but you beat me to it. Indeed, the Thatch Weave was a very successful defensive, (perhaps even offensive), tactic that proved more than a match for the Zero. It allowed the F4F pilots to keep their guns sighted in almost any direction. Developed (I think) during the Battle for Midway, it was destined to work against a Bushido mindset where the (one on one, mano y mano) tactic was just too ingrained into their everyday lives, let alone their battle tactics. In this respect, it was a foregone conclusion. Add to that, the fact that a completely intact Zero was found somewhere in the vicinity of Attu or Kiska. It was repaired and made flightworthy, and then, tested to the very limits of it's capabilities. It was through this testing that the pilots learned of a weakness in the Zero, (I think it was) turning to the right while in a dive, or maybe vice-versa. The F4F did more than just hold it's own against the Zeros and Oscars.:up:
I remember reading something in one of my books that touched upon the reasons for Japan's inability to replace their seasoned pilots. It actually had more to do with their selection process than anything else. A lot of candidates, who probably would've made excellent pilots, were overlooked due to a, well, "technicality" best describes it in my mind.
On a side note, and with reference to the "quality vs. quantity" question, don't forget that by the beginning of 1944, the United States' Pacific Fleet was larger than the navies of all the warring nations, combined!

I hadn't heard of that.
You've intrigued me Wernher.
Don't leave me dangling like that :DL
What was the 'technicality'?

EDIT:
That's a very interesting point, I hadn't even considered that.