Also Germans had better torpedoes than Americans due to their technological advantage. Look at German T-5 passive sonar fish and her US poor caricature called "Cutie"... :rotfl:

A blank post! What a curiosity! Sure would like to know what the poster intended before prematurely hitting the post button.:rotfl:

I don't completely agree with you here, RR.

The fact that U-Boats could dive deeper doesn't mean that they were planned with that in mind as primary objective and other attributes were sacrified.

The thing is, Type VIIs were designed exactly for what they were used for: Furious Wolfpack battles in medium range battlefield (The North Atlantic, blocking the UK), where shorter endurance and less weaponry was not that relevant since firepower of several U-Boats was to be concentrated and the bases were at reach (Take a look at Kretschmer's patrols in 1940, he went out, exhausted his torpedoes and went back to reload and go out again in 15 days). Instead, agility, quick diving times and deeper diving meant better chances of escaping from enemy pursuit according to the state of technics at the outbreak of the war. And I suppose the german Navy preferred a smaller U-Boat that could survive, rather than a larger one that couldn't. :hmm: You can't blame them for overestimating the potential of the Royal Navy escorts, can't you?

Also, your arguments fail to recognize that american subs were designed as fleet boats, and the outbreak of the war already deprived them from that function as the better part of the US Pacific fleet was crippled in Pearl Harbor. It was just pure luck for the americans that their submarines were able to fullfill a role (commerce raider) they were not designed for, and not intelligent decisions. ;)

The main problem for Germany in both Wars, (But extremely accentuated in WW2) was that civil leaders (Wilhelm I and Hitler) still had too much power to decide about pure military matters. It is well proven that Churchill worked much better when he acted as politician than when he tried to play the role of strategist in military matters, but Churchill was carefully prevented from continuing to do damage, and forced to let his generals work as such, while Hitler and Wilhelm I were never stopped.

Roosevelt never ever had nor the interest or the chance to intervene in military matters. He trusted in his Generals, and that paid off also a lot after some initial mistakes. In that, the americans were million years ahead from germans and even from the britians. The only thing that still worked wrong was a too big bureacracy in some military areas (I'm thinking mainly about the bureau of ordnance regarding the Navy) that with its stupid inertias from peace time made the Navy lose too much time at the start of the war, and some too cautious Submarine force admirals.

I think it is easy to forget that it was these outdated, outgunned german submarines that were close to bringing an empire to it's knees (Buchheim).

This is wrong. It took the British years to figure out how deep the U-boats went. When captured crews reported 200+m they considered it bragging or right out misinformation, because no other nations subs went that deep. Consequence: they set their charges much too shallow, and generally those depths make the blast much less effective. Why would the the germans haved dived deeper and deeper, exceeding their "safe" depths by 150%, if it was not making them safer?

Hedgehogs were deadly, that's undisputed, but they were developed .. because depth charging proved too ineffective. Add to that many dcs had much too little explosives, see Hirschfeldt: the germans were laughing about the US ones at the beginning of the war.

I rather think it was criminal how they ignored the fact that their underwater speed was insufficient, and radar of course.

Well we always tend to overengineer things, and that is because our mentality is to prepare for anything that could go wrong. Did you notice that when faced with new ideas germans always start to consider the risks? It is a flaw, but it also makes german technology much safer and durable, I think that's pretty accepted world wide.

I think there was nothing wrong with the submarines. They were simple, robust and effective offensive weapons, especially the Type VII. I agree though that it was a fatal mistake to stick with the designs much too long, instead of working harder to get new technology out.

I think the key to the (quick) defeat was rather that Germany were resting on their laurels too long, not training enough new pilots before or after the Battle of Britain, not rationing food, not building better submarines and jet planes, sticking with antique shoes and carbines, no winter clothing, etc.

Look, that the same ignorance prevailed with their enemies. Why is it always forgotten that the germans broke into the Allied codes as well? It just turned out to be fatal for the U-Boats because they were already outnumbered, their survival too much dependent on stealth. But I think both sides made the mistake of being much too conservative in analyzing the options of the opposing side, an important lesson learned from WWII.

Do I have to say "unconditional surrender"? I think you are right here though, it was desperation, especially towards the end.

We were utterly defeated, found guilty of unprecedented crimes, and could count ourselves very lucky that the new situation after the war changed everything. So finally could get rid of the stupid militarism, become one of the most tame and also, americanized societies in Europe. But we paid a high price in being reduced to a second rate nation. But thanks a lot, it's always nice to be acquitted of the Nazi stereotype (I was born decades after the war, and I am tired of it).

These are excellent and very cogent posts, bringing the differneces and the similarieis into sharper and sharper focus.

The U Boat and the US Fleet Boat were highly developed weapons that had both their technology and their range of missions AND their tactics and strategic use evolving rapidly as the two sides of both Ocean Areas battled with each other.

As both fleets found plans pre war were changed radically by actual war and the reality of how it changed from projections. Both the USN and the IJN boats were freed from their fleet role but the IJN did not figure that out fast enough....

IN the atlantic, the U boat role as Sea Lane breaker worked but they could not change the physcial characteristics of the boats already in serivce to make them more effective in the face of fast improvment of Allied ASW and ASW Air. My grandfather used to say you plan for the battle you must fight in 5-8 years but you fight on ships built for the battle of 5 years ago.

re the Supreme leaders of WWII, they all had their fingers in the pie from what I hear, but ys, the USN was of the four major powers the most independent much because of the vastness of their efforts, the fleet grew to gigantic proportions and the actions had to be decided by the Admirals on the spot, something their equal numbers in the IJN, the KM and even the RN would have much desired, for Churchill did sadlly mess around quite often with strategy and tactics, but after a while they were able to keep him away.....he was a fool in such matters and directly caused the terrible debale of the idiotic invasion at Gallipoli, but that is another war and another story. FDR meddled a lot before the start of the US part of the war, he actually sent several semi secret missions to try to trigger a Japanese response, including a poorly armed schooner carrying a US Flag that was later portrayed in a movie....but Pearl Harbor did his desired result for him. He always fancied himself qualified to approve military matters and was fortunately unable to do more in the Pacific than he did in the Atlantic Theatre....for the outcome was able to be directed by the new lessons that the USN was learning fast.

Great comments from all hands here, remarkble and I think very good observations.

And I agree with GlobalExplorer's observations about the actual effectiveness of the U boat in combat and the robust nature of German design and planning, ..... and it was indeed widespread on all side to under estimate the enemy, in many ways, including codes.

There were many brave men in service in Germany as well who did not follow the Nazi line, yet who did their duty as best they could, modern societies are vulnerable to demagogs, US as much as anyone if one looks at modern american society which is rife with such adulation and poor judgment. From back then, to now, much we can see and learn.

Actually, the failure of the u-boats was not the hardware (on either side), it was the squishy bits inside, and the squishies back at HQ.

In short, the failure was one of doctrine.

Unrestricted warfare was a good doctrine.

Concentration of firepower (wolfpacks) was good doctrine.

A certain amount of centralized control is even OK, but the data used needs to come from something other than your submarines.

Having your boats (that rely on stealth) routinely use long range radios is terrible, awful doctrine.

Had the germans put the pack commander in localized control, with only very short range radios, things might have gone better for them.



On the other side, US doctrine started out terribly wrong. Deep submerged attacks on sound alone for fear of air attack was bad. The whole "fleet boat" concept was obsolete---not because of Pearl Harbor, it was simply wrong, period. The whole notion of the "silent service," OTOH, was great submarine doctrine, and served them well throughout the war. They also quickly changed when they observed reality.

The fact is that overall, u-boats were incredibly ineffective vs convoyed ships. They should have realized this, and changed their thinking.

There's where we differ. Unrestricted warfare was good doctrine in the Pacific. It was suicidal doctrine in the Atlantic. Without attempting to strangle Britain, in the process having no choice but to attack American ships, Hitler could have intimidated his way to peace after graciously allowing the British army to escape at Dunkirk.

With America full of German expatriates and sympathizers, Britain contemplating her naval (hehe) and wondering whether to sacrifice millions of lives to a cause of dubious nature and with small chance of success, the Nazis had an excellent chance of ending the war, at least long enough to be ready for the real war, right there.

What's the plea of the U-Boat fanboys? If only they had had that extra four or five years to build that they were promised? The time was available right after Dunkirk. But Hitler was a blood-crazed pitbull, no longer thinking of anything but killing whatever blundered in front of him. He refused to act or even consider whether he was acting in his own best interest. It makes you wonder whether the entire war was nothing but a suicidal impulse.

Unrestricted warfare unrestricted the options of Britain and the United States and restricted the options of Germany. The only option it left her was to die. It was a terrible decision for the fans of Germany, removing all hopes of any semblance of a victory or even a draw. The moment unrestricted submarine warfare was declared Germany was doomed.

I think warfare reality and developed strategy of German and US submarine forces was so different that any comparisons here are very questionable...that is why Rockin's laughing on "too deep" U-boats max. depth is so laughable... :rotfl:

We would have gotten into the war in Dec. 1941 regardless, with "Germany First" as our plan. Nothing would have stopped that.

Remember, also, that Germany declared war on the US first. I don't think the probability of any negotiated peace between Britain and Germany was any higher than all the air in the room I'm in moving to the upper left corner, frankly. Possible, I suppose, but amazingly improbable.

'The only thing that really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril'. Winston Churchill

A major fault lied with the Germans themselves never exploiting the U-boat strategy. Doenitz always said he wanted at least 300 boats, which he barely got when the Battle of the Atlantic was lost (in the beginning he had less than 50), and the boats were already reduced to cannon fodder.

The biggest reason for the german mistakes was the already mentioned boot licking attitude in Nazi germany, the instinctive packing around an alpha male: Hitler, Goering, Doenitz on the administrative level, the glorification of war heroes: Galland, Prien, Rommel. That killed self reflection, personal responsibility, and timely recognition of flaws. From 42 onwards german leaders were only covering up mistake after mistake. Truely a failure of an opressive vs. a liberal society.

But if we talk about U-Boat efficiency it makes a big difference if we talk about the first two years, when the Germans were clearly in the advantage, and Britain a bit slow in coming up to terms. Or after 42/43 when the battle in the Air and Sea was lost, and the entrance of the USA meant that the war as a whole was a lost cause.

Concerning Radar on the american boats, I agree that is overrated, though it gave them an almost unfair advantage. It was much more important that the Japanese had no radar of their own. In general subs can do very well without Radar, and were most effective before it was invented. Once it was there, all subs were on the defense, especially in the case of the U-Boats, which had to operate under total enemy air supremacy.

Possibly, possibly the advantages would have been reversed because the germany were unable to realize the capabilities of huff duff.

One gets the impression they did it only because they could sink more tonnage, at a moment when the numbers had become dissappointing due to more effective british asw. If that is really the case, doesn't it underline that there was really something wrong with their sense of realism?

That is an interesting question, but one that will never be answered. With Churchill in power, no way, but with another leader? Even he himself was fully aware that his pursuit of the war meant the ultimate sacrifice: the economic ruin of the British Empire, in order to save the free world. Britain lost the war to the two new superpowers in that respect.

The fact that Germany declared war on the US is interesting in the fact that the intent was that Japan should return the favor and declare war on Russia. Hitler in having a two front war had simply bit off more than he could chew. Should Japan had engaged Russia at that time it would have been a big help to Germany. Japan however in fighting China already to her west did not have any interest in adding Russia to her list of foes.

So like some soap opera you have the US pledging to defeat Germany first when they were attacked by the Japan--not Germany--at Pearl, Hitler declaring war on a nation, America, one he went to great lenghts to avoid doing so, and the don't ask don't tell policy between Russia and Japan--who by treaty should be at war--not only not fighting each other but behaving almost like friends!

Radar is a double edged sword (as it certainly is now). At the time, US boats had radar, but if you read about specific boats, the skippers were very aware that their radar might be detected, and they in fact detected enemy radars sometimes themselves.

Unlike normal RDF gear, they knew that the enemy was not as capable in terms of detection and so were a little more loose with it.

the IJN had radar towards the end but not that good and not that widely deployed.

Again very interesting comments here :up:

Here's an interesting fact that not everybody knows: The original purpose of the Type IX U-Boats was to serve as control station for the Flotilla Chief in the Front :) i.e. the flotilla chief would embark in a Type IX and lead a wolfpack of Type VIIs from his unit to engage the convoy in the North Atlantic. Hence the longer range and endurance of the Type IX, as it was prepared as sort of battlefield high command post.

The idea got buried due to the lack of enough units and the development of long range communications; Dönitz and his HQ made here one of the biggest mistakes by later not realizing their codes had been compromised despite all evidences.

:yep: After all, Hitler was just a private from WW1, his real knowledge of military tactis at high level was equal to zero, and despite having proven very intuitive in certain matters, and with a sharp eye in politics, he failed to accept his own errors in military command. Also, the german forces were completely caught by surprise with a war in 1939; Hitler had assured his high staff that there would be no war before 1945 (Navy's Plan Z had 1946 has main objective for full completion).

BTW Global, I'm currently reading Adolf Galland's memories and what a lesson he teaches of how ridiculously bad was conducted the war by Hitler and his friends. Even if they had not commited crimes against humanity or started an aggression war, they should have been hanged for their negligence in decissions-making.

In all, I must say that I'm sorry that germans lost WW1 (Somehow I think that if they had won it there would have been no WW2, as they probably would not have done a Versailles Treaty and an explotation of the defated nations like UK and France did), but I really, really thank God for them having lost WW2. It sends shivers down my spine to think about a nazi germany victorius and with nuclear weapons in his arsenal :o