If only Kurita had stayed and attack the landing for a few hours. I bet if he tried to leave after that he would have found Oldendorf blocking his way with the Pearl Harbor force.

There will certainly be more American deaths and injuries than there were historically. His forces will be shooting down American planes that historically survived and damaging American ships that historically were not scratched at Leyte Gulf. If his forces survive long enough to tangle with Oldendorf’s task force, (and that is a big if), then he is likely to inflict some damage before his forces are ultimately destroyed. Think of the causalities that would result if Yamato manages to put one shell into Pennsylvania's magazines before Yamato and Kurita is overwhelmed.

And overwhelmed Kurita must be. The forces he is rushing into are just too vast and no matter how many he manages to destroy, there are always more over just over the horizon. Kurita’'s forces began being suffering attrition a couple of days earlier when Dace and Darter attacked in Palawan Passage. He got hammered more as he crossed the Sibuyan Sea and suffered more damage in his encounter with Taffy 3. By the time he turned around he had few undamaged assets. And things are not going to get any better. If Taffy 2 and Taffy 1 get between him and the gulf, then he has to go through them. If they stand off, then they can conduct unencumbered air operations. Either way, he continues to have ships sunk or left behind and every time he loses a ship, the opposition gets to focus its attention on the ones that are left. Then, he has to fight his way through Oldendorf and the escort vessels in the gulf itself. Anything that survives long enough to shoot at the transports or forces ashore is not going to be very combat effective and will quickly succumb to Third Fleet units.

In short, Kurita might make it into Leyte Gulf, but he is not going to make it out. He will certainly take a lot of Americans with him, but the destruction of his force will not have any significant impact on the invasion, much less the war. Kurita is up against what Lincoln called the "“terrible arithmetic"” and nothing he does can alter that basic equation.

There was nothing in Taffy 2 or Taffy 1 that needed to slow Kurita's force at all. They didn't have to be allowed to get close enough to put a single shell on any of Kurita's ships, while Kurita's cruisers and battleships only needed a half dozen shells to sink any of the DDs and DEs Taffy 1 and 2 could offer.

What rattled Kurita was the headlong attack by DE's that couldn't hurt him. Kurita over-thought the process and then reasoned "if they are attacking like that they are stalling for the backup that is going to kill me." After all, DEs don't have any business attacking capital ships and wouldn't do so without a good strategic reason, would they?

Well, the answer was yes, they would. Which drove Kurita to the wrong conclusion and he called it quits for the day. After the war he regretted backing out. For good reason. There was no saving Japanese lives by living to fight another day. Their only goal was to trade for as many American lives as possible. By backing out Kurita lost the best deal he could have made.

But he lived to see the end of the war, which he probably wouldn't have.

Have you asked Uncle Albert? :O:

That's Great uncle. Hurry with Albatross paint so I can write installment two of Udo von D, Jasta 666. Fortuately I've borrowed Udet's new parachute! You literally inspire me!:arrgh!:

Been a while since I posted in this one. I've got a new question for you all. What if Yamamoto decided to invade Hawaii once he saw how badly Pearl was hit once the attack was over?

Just to add a few things to TorpX's excellent points.

The Japanese, even at the height of their success, never had anywhere near the logistical capability or the amphibious doctrine to transport 60,000 troops to a remote landing site, land them under enemy fire, provide them with sustained gunfire and air support, and keep them supported throughout what could easily be a month-long campaign.

The invasion of Malaya, which was the single largest Japanese amphibious operation of the war, had involved a mere three divisions, and they hadn't all been landed all at once, nor had they been landed into the teeth of concerted enemy fire. Furthermore, the Japanese invasion convoys in that campaign had been operating from bases in French Indochina, which were only a few hundred miles from the Malayan beaches. British airpower was dispersed, and unable to concentrate against the Japanese landings. By contrast, Hawaii is some 3,900 miles from Japan, and almost 2,300 miles from Truk, which were the only staging areas developed enough for such an undertaking.

The Japanese succeeded in only ONE opposed beach landing in the entire war - at Wake. Everywhere else they landed on a nominally hostile but tactically undefended shore and then moved overland on their objective. And the first assault on Wake was thrown back. The second Wake assault only barely succeeded.

The communication and supply failings that led to the US surrender at Wake won't be present at Oahu (Wake was an outpost short on everything - Pearl was a major base and well provisioned on rations and water along with things like small arms ammo). The US had four infantry regiments in fighting shape on Oahu, plus most of the combat support for two triangular divisions and a vast array of coastal defense artillery. Oahu is going to be Wake x10.

Plus, all this ignores how the Japanese hide three divisions moving across the Pacific at transport ship speed, or find the ships to move them in, or the escorts for them, or the oilers to top off the escorts, or keep up air support.

The hysteria at the time surrounding a Japanese landing on Oahu was largely that: hysteria, grounded in the fears of a shaken public who were unfamiliar with the logistical realities of the Pacific War. Even in the darkest days of the war, with the Allies suffering defeat after shattering defeat, and the myth of Japanese invincibility at its height, the actual odds of the Japanese Fleet being able to assault Oahu and then go on to prowl the west coast of the United States were practically nil.