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The actual number of u-boats built by year:
1935 (14) 1936 (21) 1937 (1) 1938 (9) 1939 (18) 1940 (50) 1941 (199) 1942 (237) 1943 (284) 1944 (229) 1945 (91) http://uboat.net/technical/shipyards/ If the Germans had only had the Type XXI/Me262 in 1939, things would have been different! Possibly, but nothing happens in a vacuum. It has been pointed out that if the Germans this, then the Allies that, so there's no need to go over it again. It has also been argued that the Germans could not possibly have produced more u-boats, and that if they could and had it would have taken from other parts of the war effort, since resources are finite. I agree with all of those, so I'm not adding anything new, just summing up. [edit] As for "never had more than 30 boats at sea", in 1943 the average was indeed right around 100 boats at sea for some months. Here is a listing of number of boats at sea and number of merchants sunk. http://www.mistari.com.au/u-boats/sh..._per_month.htm Note that even with that many boats at sea, the number of merchants sunk per boat never exceeded 6, and during the time when the most boats were available the average only once reached one merchant per boat. |
1942 (taken out of context):
"During the first four months of the new German offensive, there was a daily average of 111 U-boats at sea in the Atlantic. Although their campaign was losing the savage force of the March slaughter, they were still doing reasonably well. By sinking forty-four Allied ships in April, they brought the year's score up to 218 ships of better than 1.3 million gross tons. According to the Admiralty's conservative assessment, the Germans lost only fourty-four boats U-boats in those same four months. In actual fact, their losses totalled fifty-five boats--but even that higher number seemed to be bearable in the face of the results achieved and eighty-three new constructions." -The Tenth Fleet pg.182 "Fateful Misconceptions": "Doenitz's most serious trouble at this stage accrued from major deficiencies in his own basic planning and his management of the U-boat war. If he had a grand strategic concept at all, to match tangibly his ideas about the presumably decisive role of the U-boat in World War II, it revolved around his "integral tonnage theory". Firmly believing that ultimate victory depended on his ability to sink more ships per se than the Allies could build, he went for tonnage in sheer quantity, disregarding the crucial factor of quality in the effort. According to his theory, a westbound freighter in ballast was as valuable a target for his U-boats as an eastbound troopship, for example, chock full of soldiers, or a Liberty ship heavily laden with war material consigned to Britain or to North Africa. Moreover, he had no acute appreciation of the relative importance of the various operational areas. Instead of emplying his U-boats when and where they could have inflicted the greatest damage, he assigned them to areas where he expected the best results in numbers at the lowest cost to himself. He thus built up his score without regard to the value of the sinkings to the overall German war effort." -The Tenth Fleet pg.251 |
Info may vary, but my statement was during the beginning or "Happy Times" Germany never averaged more than 30 Uboats at sea and did mass damage.
At any one time during the so-called 'Happy Times' for U-boats, there were only ever a maximum of 30 at sea. For an area the size of the northern Atlantic, this was not many. Despite this, they managed to wreak havoc. Individual U-boat captains like Kretschmer were responsible for the sinking of 200,000 {above doesn't include uboats in the med, indian, etc..} Complete link http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/u-boats.htm The debate as I see it is a comparison to how resources could be best used. Most know high command still preferred the big guns on BB's over Uboats and mass resources were used and we all know the failure of the few BB's compared to Uboats. Imagine early if they would have allocated all those resources to U-boats. If more Uboats would'vbe been built early on, britian may have been brought to her knees. Churchill also said it was only Uboat damage Britain would have to contemplate surrendering. To those that argue resources could have been better used, then where would you have used those resources and got comaparable damage? In fact Uboats got lil resources overall and almost brought Britian to her knees.. |
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Looking at the numbers involved, i.e. merchants sunk per u-boat at sea, merchants sunk vs merchants at sea etc., I don't think Britain was exactly "brought to her knees". Wartime propaganda is a wonderful tool. Positive propaganda can inspire people, and negative propaganda can drive them to strive harder. I've read several books on the Battle Of Britain from during and immediately following the war, and they insist that on one hand Britain was "on her knees" and on the other the Germans never had a chance, often in the same book and sometimes in the same chapter. |
U-boats may not have won the war for Germany, but it is hard to see how they would have been better off without them. (Unless, you avoid war with UK entirely.) The problem for Germany, as I see it, is that their ambitions simply exceeded the resources they had available. But, if their objectives had been scaled back, different strategies would have been possible. Quote:
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The question still remains, what resources would you trade uboats for that would've had the same effect....., another BB? We know early German command still thought the big ships were more important than Uboats, what a mistake. Think if Germany would've put those resources into uboats, not declared on America and continued it's campaign against Britian, instead of turning against Russia, the Uboats would've brought Britian to her knees. Who knows, but I see no other resource for the buck that did as much damage as Uboats did |
What would I trade U boats for? Me.262's
Two or three hundred U Boats may or may not have brought Britain to her knees but three or four hundred Me. 262's put into service before the Battle of Britain just might have. Had they pushed it's development this could have been done. At 652 miles range that is more than a 109 with drop tanks. (621) Operation Sea Lion just might have succeeded if Germany had air superiority and all those merchant ships would have had nooo place to go. Britain wasn't in all that good a position to fight a big invasion and the US, no doubt would have declared war but we weren't in a very good position to be much help right away. The British would have had to hold out for quite some time before we could do much. Magic |
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Of course you'll say that they could have poured more time, money and effort into engine development, but they made them as fast as they could, and nothing was going to change that. Useless speculation is useless. |
I'll land in Dread Knot's corner. Just as Germany had nothing to gain with a war against the US, it also shared much and had much to lose by going to war with Britain. So long as they kept the British and Americans out of the war, owning the entire continent and Russia too was well within their capabilities.
I believe that even as late as Dunkirk, a rational Germany could have played nicey-nice, saying that they allowed the British to escape for humanitarian reasons and that they had no quarrel with the British people. They could have offered and held to a non-aggression treaty with Britain, granting them most valued trade status. I don't believe Britain's obligation to Poland would have justified hundreds of thousands of casualties if they continued at war. This would have left Germany with a secure continent, actually protected and secured by the British, leaving them full access to all of their military means to attack Russia. They wouldn't have needed their subs any longer. A 100% effort would be focused eastward. That would have left Russia, a communist country with no real friends, to be roasted like a Thanksgiving turkey. After the war, we would have learned that there were much worse things to deal with than Soviet Russia... |
I believe, from all I have read, that Hitler made it well known that he did not want "this" war with the UK, even considering the Brits as Nordic cousins, and through diplomatic chains had sent many peace feelers to the UK after the fall of France.....Britain adamantly would have nothing to do with that. After all, Germany didn't declare war on Britain or France, they declared war on Germany.
Churchill knew FDR would eventually enter the war on the UK's side. After all the US aide was very open and had most in the world wonder just how neutral America actually was. The U-Boat crews seen for themselves the US escorts providing screen for the British convoys. As for Hitler declaring war on the United States, I've read he had done it for two reasons, one was the knowledge of all the US aide crossing the Atlantic to the UK. The second is that he was hoping Japan would return the favor by surging it's huge Manchurian army forward into eastern Russia.... We now know that Stalin's spies in Tokyo informed him that Japans ambitions were elsewhere and that allowed Stalin, even before Pearl Harbor, to move about 40 highly trained and winter equipped divisions westwards to save Moscow in the winter of 41/42. In the book 'Barbarossa, The Russian-German Conflict 1941-45' by Alan Clark, the author repeatedly states that Hitlers personal strategies were sound, but his Field Marshalls (all of whom were primadonnas) constantly sent him false information about their own armies abilities in order to do only what they pleased. After the war they all blamed Hitler for his meddling, because of course, dead men can't defend themselves. |
After Pearl Harbor, Hitler should have sent the USA condolences and sent the Japanese ambassador packing, in disappointment for not having joined the Russian campaign earlier. The Tripartite Pact is dissolved! This would have put Roosevelt over a barrel as he would have to then struggle to get Congress to declare war on a neutral Germany after being attacked by a hostile Japan. It also would have shown Hitler's confidence in eventual German victory after the winter setback, and possibly underscored any peace overtures to Great Britain if Hitler announced that he would not adopt unrestricted submarine warfare and further provoke the Americans who had tried to help their cousins. Rumors about making a separate-peace with Russia might have been unsettling for the British too, as Stalin had no guarantees that the German offensives in 1942 would fail. You want your enemies to scramble with each other to be the first one seated at the peace table.
In seeking to cement his entangling-alliances, Hitler unified his enemies instead. |
But the central fact is that Hitler was not rational. His plans were NOT sound. He did not act in his own best interest at all, especially in his persecution of the Jews. The entire thing was a maniacal tirade, illogical, irrational, insane and without sense.
Hitler was operating solely as an emotional bomb, exploding continuously from 1939 through his death in 1945. There is not sense to be found anywhere in his actions. Therefore, analyzing them is just an exercise in frustration. |
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