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Originally Posted by micky1up
STeed old friend you dont seem to get the point your too ridged
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micky1up the fact is Germany could never win the war in Russia have a read of this and your see why -
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Failure Of Logistics In "Operation Barbarossa" And Its Relevance Today
by MAJ Loganathan
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Why this topic?
One might wonder why 'Operation Barbarossa" was chosen when there is a more recent example of a successful campaign carried out by the Americans in the Gulf War. The reason is very simple - Gulf War logistics is a success story whereas logistics during the German invasion of Russia in 1941 code-named "Operation Barbarossa" is a prime example (although some 50 years ago) of how logistics played a major role in the failure of the German invasion. While it is good to learn how actions done correctly can lead to success, it is equally worthwhile to learn how actions carried out without good planning and considerations can lead to utter failure. Moreover, the Gulf War is only a good example for nations with interests spanning vast areas of the globe. For most, the threat is in close proximity.
Introduction
The art of logistics during combat is a highly complex, often misunderstood, operation. It can mean the difference between success or failure on the battlefield. Campaigns at the operational level have repeatedly demonstrated that commanders often fail to allocate sufficient resources to logistics. Along the same lines, there is often a lack of appreciation for the tremendous demand borne of combat operations carried out over significant distances. Leaders have over-extended their lines of communication and moved beyond sustainment to the detriment of combat effectiveness. The result: defeat. The German invasion of Russia in 1941, known as "Operation Barbarossa", serves as a prime example.
Scope
While there are many reasons for the failure of the German invasion in 1941, my intent is to show how logistics contributed to that failure. Some of the main logistical problems faced during the operation and the reasons for such problems will be highlighted. This essay will only focus on "Operation Barbarossa" from the time of invasion in Jun 1941 to the point of the first German defeat in Dec 1941. This paper will then examine some of the crucial lessons learnt from that operation. But first, a brief mention would be made on the operational plan as envisaged by Hitler and his generals.
"Operation Barbarossa" - The Operational Plan
The German invasion of Russia on 22 June 1941 code-named "Operation Barbarossa" was by far the greatest in scale not least for the sheer size of the battlefield, but also because of the numbers who fought there. The frontier at the opening of hostilities was nearly 1600 km long with a depth fighting area of almost 1000 km. In all, 162 divisions of ground troops - approximately 3 million men - were involved.1 Hitler conceived the invasion of the Soviet Union as a gigantic pincer movement which was as follows: Army Group South commanded by Rundstedt comprising 4 armies and First Panzer group was to drive on to Kiev and the Driper Valley, and to envelop and destroy all Russian forces between the Pripet Marshes and the Black Sea. Bock's Army Group Centre - 2 armies and 2 Panzer groups - would advance from Poland to force a break - through towards Smolensk, and then capture Moscow. Leeb's Army Group North - 2 armies and 4th Panzer group - was to swing Northeast towards Leningrad.
The attack succeeded initially beyond the Germans' greatest hopes. Within two weeks, Soviet frontier defences were crushed and the German tank forces penetrated deep into Russian territory. Stalin, the paramount leader of Soviet Union, had gone into a profound psychological depression. Despite numerous losses, by Oct 1941, the Red Army regained its composure and fought back such that by Dec 1941, the Soviet troops launched a successful counter offensive to defeat the Germans before they could reach Moscow. Hitler envisioned a typical blitzkrieg campaign of not more than four months' duration, but this was not to be the case. What, then, went wrong?2
Logistics Problems and Failures in the Campaign
In Strategy For Defeat, William Murray states that the superficial attention that the OKH (German Army General Staff) and OKW (Armed Forces High Command) paid to the logistics of sustaining the Wehrmacht inside Russia was one of the most glaring defects of the pre-invasion strategy.3 The German Army entered into the campaign with full confidence of total victory within months. Because of this falsely engendered belief, there had been no forethought, no proper planning to equip the armed forces with modern strategic weapons, winter clothing, ammunition and therefore they faced a whole host of logistical problems.4
Logistics planning was overly optimistic and totally unrealistic and planning factors were often determined by capability rather than actual requirements. For example, although the number of armoured divisions available for "Operation Barbarossa" had more than doubled from 15 in May 1940 to 32 in June 1941, the number of vehicles had only increased by a third from 2574 to 3332.5
Similarly, full wartime production was not in effect before the invasion. For a campaign of such magnitude, German factories were operating on a single shift basis and the under-utilisation of German industrial capacity resulted in shortfalls in essential combat materials. Production consistently lagged behind consumption. The Germans had been involved militarily in Norway, Belgium, France and the Balkans prior to the invasion of Soviet Union, resulting in major equipment shortfalls and damages. For a force which depended on machines for its offensive capability and its survival as none had depended to the same extent before, these were crippling defects. Many of the deficiencies had been foreseen and, as often as not, side-stepped or ignored on grounds of economy or because Hitler and many of his commanders had deluded themselves into believing the war would be won long before winter took its toll.
Transport assets within a theatre are major factors in campaign planning, both tactical and logistical. Being a key element in logistics, it can severely restrict operations. In Sinews of War, James Huston has highlighted that in a theatre of operation, a single authority, identical with the command authority should be responsible for logistics.6 This is again precisely what the German logistics system lacked - unity of command. The transportation responsibilities were split between the Chief of Transport (rail and inland waterways) and the Quartermaster-General (motor transport). This made an already bad situation worse. The German motor vehicle production could replace neither normal wear and tear nor keep up with combat losses.7
As a result, the Wehrmacht conducted a major demotorization programme, procuring horses and wagons to offset the critical truck shortage. The transport of supplies became more dependent on horse, than motorised power. During 'Operation Barbarossa", the Wehrmacht relied on more than 625 000 horses.
Although the Germans committed themselves to a strategy that favoured rapid movement over long distances, heavy reliance was made on horses, which were used to pull everything from field kitchens to artillery pieces.8
Logistics assets must be manoeuvrable. Support units must be sufficiently agile and mobile. But when a German division entered the fighting, it did so with 162 different types of soft skin vehicles, among the 21 major groupings of which it was composed. Most of these groupings had 17 different types of lorries within a unit establishment of 33 vehicles. The artillery regiment had 445 vehicles on establishment and there were 69 different types of lorries.9
The problem of spares for these many and often unusually different types of machines can best be imagined. The lack of standardisation and the limited supply of spare parts was exacerbated by the lack of maintenance units within the invasion force. Heavy maintenance units remained in Germany or Poland based on the incorrect assumption of no requirement due to the short duration of the campaign.
By August 1941, the motorised supply system was exhausted. Ammunition and fuel, both of which were previously under-estimated were in limited supply. The reason was because the planning requirements were inaccurately based on the transportation capability rather operational consumption. Commanders were unable to exploit tactical advantage because of severe shortages of fuel and ammunition and as such resupply could not keep pace with advances. Tactical operations were curtailed for weeks waiting for resupply from the rear.
Food was another essential commodity that was in critical short supply. It was never an important priority to Hitler. When in late 1941, Hitler was told of the shortage in transport and that the system was only able to supply the armies in the field with one of the most urgent priorities and to choose between warm clothing, food and ammunition, Hitler chose ammunition. Shortfalls in the ration resupply system resulted in 'slaughter' platoons being formed within divisions as an expedient measure. Commanders in the field relied on foraging local livestock to feed the soldiers and this continued until such time when shortages resulted in troops eating their units' horses.
The Germans discovered that most roads in Russia, except only a few main highways, were turned into impassable mud tracks following even moderate rainfall. Therefore, railway, the only other main source of communication was heavily depended upon. This too was grossly inadequate. Not only were the main lines few in number and the branch line system poor, but the whole railway network used a broader gauge than that of Western European. This incompatibility between German and Russia rail systems brought about a tremendous strain upon the small amount of rolling stock which the German Army was neither able to seize nor to adapt. In winter, the railway life-line often failed and in the sector of the Army Group Centre, to quote just one example, only 9 out of 27 trains which were required daily to sustain the Front completed the journey.10
The Russian winter is one main reason often cited by historians for the failure of the German offensive. No provision was made for extremely cold temperature in Russia which at times was as low as -40o F. Vehicle engines froze, artillery and rifles were rendered useless by frozen lubricants. Grease, oil and other lubricants with cold resistant properties were needed to keep vehicles and guns in action as the normal issues were found ineffective. While the Germans did not have these, the Russians in contrast had developed them years before.
One critical failure was that no provision was made for cold weather clothing, as it was assumed that the campaign would be over before the onset of winter. Troops resorted to stuffing newspaper into summer uniform to keep warm. It was estimated that 14,000 amputations resulted from frostbite during the winter and the impact on the morale of the soldiers can be imagined.
By October 1941, Hitler's lines of communication stretched from 800 km initially to about 1600 km eventually. As the invasion advanced, the lines of communication became unmanageable and unable to satisfy continuing logistics demands. Front line units were soon operating on a hand-to-mouth existence. Stretched to its limit, the state of the German supply lines created a logistical nightmare. Conditions rapidly became sub-human, supply systems failed and it was more a question of surviving than of fighting.
On 6 Dec 1941, after 168 days of continuous combat and within 30km of Moscow, the most modern and powerful armed force in the world was nearly exhausted. They were half-starved and half-frozen; out of fuel and ammunition. The overstretched 1,600km supply lines, exacerbated by severe transportation and weather problems, had proven to be grossly ineffective. The result was the Wehrmacht's inability to sustain the battle. Despite their precarious condition, the disciplined Wehrmacht tried desperately to reach Moscow. During the final stage, Stalin's Red Army counter-attacked, forcing a hasty retreat of Hitler's forces. Although the war was to continue a few more years, this failure, as the first German defeat in the Russian war, had a devastating impact on the Germans.
The Wehrmacht's greatest resupply failures can be summarised as follows: a) its inability to sustain the force; b) excessive long lines of communications, c) over dependence on rail roads, d) severe shortfall in motor transport capability, and e) untrafficable roads causing a total collapse of the supply system resulting in diversions of supplies, hoarding and total lack of confidence in the supply system as resupply could not sustain the battle.
Lessons Learnt
The account given above has examined logistics support in 'Operation Barbarossa" and found that logistics constrained the war effort and contributed significantly to German failure. The Wehrmacht was not prepared logistically to project combat power deep into Russia and as seen above, had much difficulty deploying to the theatre. These problems clearly constrained early combat operations and resulted in long term waste and inefficiency that limited a larger or more successful effort.
What then are the lessons that can be learnt?
Though the nature of conflict has changed drastically since World War Two, some of the lessons will still be relevant if examined in light with more recent battles in mind. Some of the more significant lessons include:
a. Adequate planning and preparations under the tranquillity of peace is the key towards sustainability. The lesson learnt is the need for proper planning and adequate stockpiling of reserves and resources during peacetime, to prevent a shortage or cut-off of supplies during wartime.
b. Logistics considerations belong not only in the highest echelons of military planning during the process of preparation for war and for specific wartime operations, but may well become the controlling element with relation to timing a successful operation. Conflicts will not succeed without the pragmatic considerations of subsistence, ammunition, repair parts, fuel and transport.
What appears to be an apparent capability on a Commander's map board is brought face to face with an often harsh reality when logistical considerations are factored in.
c. The campaign will keep us mindful of the importance of logistics in military history and of the necessity to use a balanced and mature judgement when moving with the offensive posture on the battlefield. A fine line must be discerned and then drawn between reckless proposals and boldness - that line is established by logistical acumen.
d. There is a need for a single command to oversee the allocation of scarce logistics resources especially transport and ammunition. The failure to do so will have drastic consequences. In comparison, one of the main reasons for the success of logistics in the Gulf War was the effective centralised planning and allocation of resources by the central command.
e. Logistics support must be tailored according to the operating principles of the Army. If the emphasis is on fast moving battles fought by the armour, then the logistics support must be realistic and bold enough to support the needs.
f. Logistics can be a force multiplier; however, if not controlled, it can be the Achilles' heel of an operation. Combat forces deployed to a theatre without the required logistics structure to support will experience reduced combat effectiveness and low troop morale.
Conclusion
"Operation Barbarossa' provides graphic evidence that today's operational commander must thoroughly forecast, plan and allocate resources for adequate logistics support. Analysing the operation in retrospect, it can be concluded that German invasion was doomed to failure from the beginning. The failure to integrate logistics planning with strategic and tactical planning resulted in the invasion force reaching its culmination point short of the campaign's objective. As Hitler pushed his Army further to Moscow, the Army became over extended, and the campaign was lost.
ENDNOTES
1. Lucas, James. War on the Eastern Front, 1941 - 1945, P.V11
2. Fugate, Bryan. Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 P.85
3. Murray, Williamson. Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaftte, 1933 - 1945, P.107
4. Lucas, James. Op.Cit, P.11
5. 1bid. P.8
6. Huston.A. James. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775 - 1953, P.665
7. Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallestein to Patton, P.145
8. Fugate, Bryan. Op.Cit, P.101
9. Lucas, James. Op.Cit, P.8
10. 1bid. P.87
Bibliography
1. Taylor, AJP. The Second World War - An Illustrated History. Hamish Hamilton Publishers, 1975.
2. Fugate, Bryan. Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front. 1941, Presidio Press, 1984.
3. Lucas, James. War on the Eastern Front, 1941 - 1945, Jane's Publishing Company, 1979.
4. Murray, Williamson. Strategy For Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933 - 1945, Air University Press, 1983.
5. Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallestein to Patton, Cambridge University Press, 1977
6. Huston.A.James. The Sinews of War: Army Logistics, 1775 - 1953, 1966.
MAJ LOGANATHAN is currently S4, 3SIB. He completed the Singapore Command and Staff Course in 1996. He obtained a BA (Hons) degree in History from the NUS in 1988.
Last updated: 18-Jul-2005
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